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PREFACE 
During the I960's among large firms with a high degree 
of monopoly power, those which were controlled by their stock­
holders reported average profit rates of about 14.5'^» while 
those which were controlled by their managers reported only 
about 11,5'^» The separation of ownership from control within 
these management controlled firms accounted for more than a 
twenty percent average reduction in reported profit rates. 
What is more, the managers of these management controlled firms 
appear to be so Immune from adverse stockholder reactions that 
they have by far surpassed the point at which such reductions 
in reported profits are of even minimal consequence. In 
general they have received such large benefits from their past 
profit-reducing activities that they are willing to give the 
stockholders most of the small changes in their firms' poten­
tial profits. Furthermore, regardless of firms' degrees of 
monopoly power, those which were management controlled reported 
much more variable profit rates over time than did those in 
which the separation of ownership from control was less signif­
icant, 
I was surprised by these results, I had anticipated that 
the separation of ownership from control would have no statis­
tically significant effects on firms' profit performances, My 
initial belief was that to single out just one link in an entire 
organizational structure was too narrow-minded, I felt that 
petty thievery and non-profit-oriented activity by all other 
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employees in lar^e corporations would surely swamp whatever 
effect might exist because of a separation of ownershiD from 
control. 
My a priori hunch was wron# because of two important ef­
fects, First, top-level managers, because of their positions, 
have great opportunities for using a firm's profits to provide 
themselves with tax-free, utility enhancing surrounds. Sec­
ond, managers are in powerful positions, and can, if they are 
forced to do so by the stockholders, reduce much of the slack 
throughout the infrastructure of their organizations. If the 
managers are relatively free from stockholder demands, though, 
they just don't run as tight a ship as they could, 
I feel fairly certain that top management officials will 
take issue with these conclusions. They will pro to great 
lengths to point out how competitive the market is for top man­
agers in this dog-eat-dog world of business, They will show 
how all department and division managers are striving to take 
over their jobs and how they can get fired for inefficiency 
just as easily as the next guy. These arguments must fall on 
deaf ears, though, for the evidence of this study contradicts 
them. 
I'm not saying that these managers receive higher salaries 
which account for all of the differential in reported profits. 
Nor do they even receive such niceties as chauffeured cars, big 
expense accounts, etc., which would add up to such a laree dif­
ferential, That would be too obvious. Certainly a part of 
this differential goes for these things, but another part of it 
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shows up In less obvious forms, such as sllRhtly thicker car­
pets, sllRhtly blKRer desks, prettier secretaries, etc. These 
Items provide the managers with increased utility in forms 
that are less apparent to the casual eye of an uninformed 
stockholder who never visits the corporation's main office. 
Still another portion of this differential takes on an 
even less obvious form; the managers of management controlled 
firms permit their own behavior to be copied throughout the 
organization. Junior executives find themselves with more 
secretaries than they really need for secretarial work, division 
managers use computers because computers are fashionable, not 
because they always are efficient, etc. The work I've done so 
far doesn't provide me with any sound figures on what portion 
of the differential is attributable to each form, but I would 
guess that the lion's share shows up in this last form, and 
the smallest shows up as salaries and immediately obvious per­
quisites for chief officers. 
Before I performed any of the tests in this study, I de­
cided to classify firms into three different categories of the 
amount of separation of ownership from control: management 
control, weak owner control, and strong owner control, with 
the three categories representing ascenting amounts of stock 
held by an effective coalition of stockholders. I did this be­
cause while I thought that there probably was a big difference 
in performance between management and strong owner controlled 
firms, I suspected that weak owner controlled firms might in 
reality have succumbed to the control of their managers. 
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Again the results surprised me. When all firms were con­
sidered, regardless of their monopoly power, the weak owner 
controlled firms reported the highest average profit rates I 
And among just those firms with a high degree of monopoly power, 
there was little difference between the profit rates of the 
firms in the two classes of owner control. This discovery, 
along with others in Chapter VI, led me to the conclusion that 
weak owner controlled firms were the most profit-oriented of 
the lot, a conclusion I would have scoffed at earlier. It must 
be that these controlling groups of stockholders either are 
extremely shrewd operators, able to determine precisely the 
minimum amount of investment necessary to control a firm, or 
are extremely unsure of themselves in their weak minority posi­
tions of control, I finally decided on the latter alternative 
because if the former were true, these firms would have in 
fact behaved more like management controlled firms. 
This study was performed In what might be termed a se­
quential fashion. The first five chapters were written before 
the basic results described above became available. Conse­
quently my treatment of the various Issues in those chapters 
was not biased by my conclusions, and as a result some of my 
predictions were not verified, leading to a reformulation of 
some of the theoretical results. 
Chapter I discusses the extent of the separation of 
ownership from control. Managers are shown to be acquiring 
control of more firms over time, a trend which has been appar­
ent from the early 1930's. 
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Chapter II begins with the development of a model ex­
plaining why management controlled firms should be expected to 
tolerate (or to seek) more profit-reducing activities than 
owner controlled firms. This model provides a key to the 
entire study, for it underlies everything which follows it. 
The remainder of Chapter II describes other authors* 
theories about the possible effects of the separation of owner­
ship from control. Chapter III treats earlier empirical studies 
of these effects. In general, studies in this area until now, 
whether empirical or theoretical, have suffered from misspeci-
fication and statistical errors which have invalidated their 
results. 
Chapter IV sets out a model for corporation behavior, 
based on the general characteristics of the theories discussed 
in Chapter II, This model was constructed in such a fashion 
that numerous, empirically-testable hypotheses could be and 
were derived from it. 
Chapter V explains the data used to test the predictions 
of Chapter IV, and Chapter VI presents the results of these 
tests. Chapter VII relates these results to the models of 
Chapters II and IV and makes the adjustments in these models 
which seemed mandatory in the light of the statistical results. 
One of the important findings of this study was that the 
profit performance of a corporation entails more than just the 
reported profit rate. The response of profit rates to tax rate 
changes and the variation of each firm's profit rate over time 
were also significantly affected by the separation of ownership 
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from control. The results of tests involving all three of these 
facets of profit performance were necessary to give a more com­
plete idea of how type of control influenced a firm's behavior. 
Tc measure a firm's degree of monopoly power, I decided 
to study the barriers to entry into the industries in which it 
operated, I am firmly convinced that if a single measure of 
monopoly power is sought, barriers to entry should be used, be­
cause they represent the constraining impact of both actual and 
potential competitors. I departed from most of the major studies 
in this area, though, by trying to allow for diversification. 
It no longer seems reasonable to assign a large corporation to 
just one industry since an increasing number of these large 
firms are developing a broadly diversified base. I took this 
situation into account by weighting each firm's sales in each 
industry by that industry's barriers to entry. Then I could 
obtain a composite measure of monopoly power for firms, allowing 
for varying sales in industries with different heights of 
barriers to entry. 
Because of the results of some earlier studies, I had a 
strong suspicion that heteroscedasticity might bias my statisti­
cal tests. I was encouraged by Professors Fletcher and Mensing 
to pursue this suspicion and found it to be well-founded: 
heteroscedasticity was present, particularly with respect to a 
firm's type of control, for all three facets of profit perfor­
mance. This problem had me stymied for a while when I dis­
covered that its usual solutions of weighted regression or data 
transformation were unsatisfactory for the statistical techniques 
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and the data I was using. Finally I decided to use just sim­
ple statistical comparisons for my tests, incorporating the 
different variances into the calculations of the test statis­
tics. 
The general results of this study have convinced me of 
the relevance of satisficing theories of the firm. These 
theories claim that profit maximization is an inappropriate 
objective function to use in studying firm behavior because 
firms are composed of many different people, all of whom have 
different utility functions, of which profits are only one 
argument# It appears that profits are a fairly important force 
affecting decision-making in a firm up to a point, but beyond 
that point the interest in profits is subordinated to other 
goals such as the status, power, or prestige of the more power­
ful decision makers. 
The various members of my graduate committee deserve a 
great deal of credit for this work. Lehman Fletcher, my major 
professor, counseled me and suggested revisions throughout the 
past two years. I particularly appreciated his providing me 
with a great deal of independence, raising questions mainly 
when I gave him earlier drafts to read, Richard Mensing pro­
vided numerous suggestions and many hours of work to help me 
with the statistical analysis in Chapter VI. James Stephenson 
and Charles Meyer, through their courses and by reading first 
drafts of some of the early chapters also provided valuable 
help. 
Others also contributed significantly to the development 
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of this study. Joseph Puckett, William Merrill, John .ordin, 
the members of the Iowa State industrial organization s-.minar, 
and the participants in the economics seminar at Miami Univer­
sity all gave me useful suggestions in the development of the 
model in Chapter IV, William Kennedy supervised the computer 
work for some of the statistical tests of Chapter VI. Theodore 
Thornton, Charlotte Latta, and Shu Huang lent research and 
computational assistance in the early stages. Professors R. 
Monsen, Do Kamerschen, K. Boudreaux, R. Earner, L. Weiss, H. 
Mann, and W. Shepherd all made unpublished work available to me, 
Carol Hanrahan did the typing. 
Most of all I should like to thank and apologize to my 
wife, Karen, and son, Matthew, for their toleration of my 
absence from home during the past six.months. Nothing will ever 
keep us apart so much again, I promise. 
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CHAPTER I. THE EXTENT OF THE 
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM CONTROL 
A corporation Is a legal entity that Is owned by Its 
stockholders. One potentially Important determinant of a cor­
poration's profit performance Is the degree of control over 
the management of the corporation exercised by Its stock­
holders as distinct from its managers. 
This chapter, by way of introduction, discusses the ex­
tent to which corporate control is in the hands of persons who 
do not own a substantial amount of the firm's stock. The re­
mainder of the study is concerned with some of the economic 
effects of this separation of ownership from control in large 
U.S. industrial corporations. 
Control of the corporation is not usually a matter of own­
ership of a majority of the stock by one person or a small 
group. Where stockholders are numerous and widespread, with 
no single stockholder owning very much of the stock, their con­
trol of the corporation is likely to be very weak and its 
managers will have ^  facto control of the corporation. The 
likelihood of this situation arises from the difficulty the 
multifarious stockholders have in meeting and agreeing on some 
course of action alternative to one proposed by the corpora­
tion's managers. Furthermore, because the incumbent manage­
ment controls the dissemination of information about the cor­
poration and has relatively easy access to the proxy mechanism, 
disaffected stockholders find themselves at a disadvantage in 
2 
terms of cost, time, and information if they try to unseat 
the incumbents. 
In the opposite situation, if one small group of stock­
holders owns a large amount of the outstanding shares of 
stock, the difficulties of controlling the corporation's man­
agement are not so severe as they are in cases of widespread 
stockholdings. If, on one hand, the group controls more than 
fifty percent of the stock, then it controls a clear majority 
of the votes and encounters no problems in ousting an unsatis­
factory management. The only problem it may encounter is in 
receiving accurate, complete information from the managers, 
but even this problem would be minimized to the extent that 
managers are aware of the potential that the group has for re­
moving managers who provide it with misleading or incomplete 
information. If, on the other hand, the group owns a large 
(by some as yet to be defined criterion) amount, but less than 
a simple majority of the stock, it will find controlling the 
managers somewhat more difficult than if it did own a majority 
of the stock, but this control will be less difficult to exer­
cise than it would be for firms which are ^  facto manager con­
trolled. 
The number of people constituting an effective group or 
coalition of stockholders is crucial for this discussion. If 
the group is comprised of just one person, usually the corpora­
tion's founder, there is no problem. Even perhaps two or 
three persons might be able to resolve most of their disagree­
3 
ments with ease and be able to effectively control a firm. 
But there might be some question as to whether a larger group 
could form an effective coalition of stockholders. There may 
be so much dissension within the group that management could 
gain ^  facto control even if the group is small. This possi­
bility seems quite likely in the case of firms such as Dow 
Chemical, in which 8? descendants of the firm's founder own 
slightly more than ten percent of the voting stock. 
The problem has generally been resolved in the past by in­
cluding in the group all persons who have close ties through 
their families or businesses. This criterion, though subject 
to question, would allow the Dow descendents to be considered 
an effective coalition. It also would allow the board of 
directors of a corporation to be termed a group for these pur­
poses, For lack of any a priori basis for establishing any 
particular number as the appropriate maximum size for an ef­
fective coalition, the present study has adopted the above cri­
terion, that all persons who have close ties through their 
families or businesses may constitute an effective coalition. 
It is understood that in cases like that of Dow this criterion 
may be less than satisfactory,^ 
The seminal study of the separation of ownership from con­
trol in large corporations was performed by Berle and Means 
(1932), In their work, they classified firms into one of the 
Ipor a discussion of coalitions see J, M, Buchanan and G. 
Tullock (1965). 
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following five types of ultimate control: 
(1) Privately owned — the group owned at least 
eighty percent of the voting stock 
(2) Majority controlled — the group owned between 
fifty and seventy-nine percent of the voting 
stock 
(3) Minority controlled — the group generally 
owned between twenty and forty-nine percent 
of the voting stock 
(4) Controlled through a legal device: 
(a) pyramiding 
(b) nonvoting common stock 
(c) stock classes with unequal voting rights 
(d) trusts 
(5) Manager controlled — a residual category con­
taining all firms not assigned to one of the 
other categories. 
Berle and Means studied the 200 largest nonfinaneial 
corporations in 1929, Size was measured by the book value of 
a firm's assets. 
They distinguished between immediate control and ultimate 
control. Immediate control referred to whether any group 
owned enough shares of the company's stock to control the 
company. The type of ultimate control was determined if the 
immediate control was held by another firm. The objective of 
this distinction was to find a coalescing group of stockholders, 
if it existed, that might be able, ultimately, to control the 
firm in question. 
The general results of the Berle and Means study can be 
summarized by saying that in 1929 only 34$ of the 200 largest 
nonfinancial corporations, ranked by assets, were controlled 
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in some measure by their stockholders (Table 1.1). Of course 
this figure is only approximate because some of the firms con­
trolled through a legal device may simply have been using that 
legal device as a manifestation of some degree of owner control. 
Lamer (1966), updated the Berle and Means study using 
basically the same criteria in an attempt to make his study 
comparable to that of Berle and Means, He used the 200 largest 
firms in 1963, Size was again determined by the book value of 
a firm's assets. The two minor changes in criteria made by 
Lamer were that the joint minority-management control category 
was not used and the minority control category was extended 
downward to include firms in which a group owned between ten 
and forty-nine percent of the voting stock. No reason was given 
for the first change; the second change was made because, "In 
view of the greater size of the 200 largest nonfinancial cor­
porations in 1963 and the wider dispersion of their stock, this 
lower limit [20#] to minority control seems too high" (Larner, 
1966, p. 799)# Larner made two exceptions to these criteria: 
"The Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company is 
classified as management-controlled even though the 
Stone & Webster Company holds of record an 11 per­
cent stock interest, since the latter is not repre­
sented on Transcontinentales board of directors. 
On the other hand, May Department Stores Company is 
classified as minority-controlled even though the 
May family has only a 3,9 percent stock interest, 
since members of the May family hold the offices of 
chairman, vice-chairman, and president, and occupy 
five seats on the board of directors" (p, 779)» 
The general results of Lamer*s work, shown in Table 1,2, 
can be summarized by saying that in I963 only 11,5 percent of 
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Table 1.1, The types of control of large corporations in 
1929* 
Type of Number of Percent of 
ultimate corporations corporations 
control 
Private 12 6 
Majority 10 5 
Minority 23 
Legal 41 21 
Management 88i 44 
Receivership 2 1 
Total 200 100# 
^Sources: A, A, Berle and G. C, Means (1932, p, 115); 
R, J. Lamer (I966, p, 781). 
^The one-half arises from some firms which Berle and 
Means found to be jointly controlled by two firms which 
were ultimately controlled by management and a minority 
group, respectively. 
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Table 1.2, The types of control of large corporations in 
1963® 
Type of Number of Percent of 
control firms firms 
Private 0 0 
Majority 5 2.5 
Minority 18 9 
Legal 8 4 
Management 169 84.5 
Total 200 100# 
^Source: R. J, Larner (1966, p, 781). 
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the firms studied were controlled to some extent by their 
stockholders. 
The present study uses a different sample of firms and 
different criteria for classifying firms as to type of con­
trol. The firms studied were the 500 largest industrial 
firms, in terms of sales volume, in 1965#^ Each of these 
firms was placed into one of three categories according to 
the following criteria: 
(1) Strong owner control — the group owned at 
least thirty percent of the voting stock 
(2) Weak owner control — the group owned between 
ten and twenty-nine percent of the voting 
stock 
(3) Management control — a residual category 
containing the remainder of the firms. 
The distinction between strong and weak owner control was 
made because it was hypothesized that possible differences in 
the strengths of control in owner controlled firms might lead 
to different behavior on their part. The cut-off point of 
thirty percent was selected somewhat arbitrarily, but with the 
supposition that a figure near thirty percent would mark the 
point at which the primary group of owners would find the 
ease of control changing and at which the incentives affecting 
firm behavior might begin to take on different strengths. 
These reasons will be developed in greater detail in Chapter V. 
The results of the classifications made for this study 
1Fortune, July 15, I966, 
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are presented in Table 1.3, Two points of clarification must 
be made before these results can be analyzed. First, not all 
of the 500 largest firms In 19^5 were Included, either In 
1965 or 1969, because data were not available for some of 
them.^ Second, the data for I969 is compiled for those firms 
still in existence in I969 which were among the 500 largest in 
1965. Seventy-five firms were not included in the 1969 study 
because eleven of them had missing data and because sixty-four 
of them were merged or acquired out of existence. 
The data reported in Table 1,3 show two things of interest. 
First, size and the extent of owner control appear to be nega­
tively correlated. Second, during the latter half of the 
196o*s, the extent of owner control diminished. These two 
aspects of the data will be looked at in turn. 
From Table 1,3 It can be seen that in I965, according to 
the criteria presented previously, only 24 of the 125 largest 
firms were controlled in some degree by their owners while in 
each of the other size categories at least 44 of the firms 
were owner controlled. This difference appears to be quite 
significant, but its significance can be given a more rigorous 
statistical basis using a normal approximation test of the 
equality of the means from two binomial populations (Huntsberger, 
1967, p, 219), The null hypothesis for such a test is that the 
proportion of firms which are owner controlled among the 
^Data were missing for nine firms in both years, for three 
firms in I965 only, and for two different firms in just I969, 
See Appendix A, Table A,l, 
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Table 1,3, The types of control of the 500 largest corpora­
tions In 1965 and. for the same firms in I969 
Numbers of firms in each category 
1965 1969 
Rank 
Strong 
owner 
Weak 
owner 
Manage­
ment 
Strong 
owner 
Weak 
owner 
Manage­
ment 
1-125 8 16 101 5 15 99a 
126-250 22 23 75b 16 25 72 
251-375 16 32 73 20 21 63 
376-500 22 22 78 15 26 48 
Totals 
488 
*The row totals for I969 do not sum to 125 because of data 
inavailability, merger activities, and size-rank changes for 
some firms. 
^The row totals for 19^5 for the lower three size classes 
do not sum to 125 because of data inavailability. For further 
information on the firms included and the type of control of 
each firm, see Appendix A, 
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largest 125 firms is the same as the proportion of owner 
controlled firms in the remaining size categories. The test 
statistic employed is 
Z= 
- (Pl - P2) 
\1p*(i-P»)(1 + 1 ) 
"l *2 
where is the number of owner controlled firms in the 
first size class, 
X2 is the number of owner controlled firms in the 
remaining size classes, 
n^ is the number of firms in the first size class, 
n2 is the number of firms in the remaining size 
classes, 
Pj^ and P2 are the true but unknown proportions in 
the respective populations (p^ - P2 = 0 under the null 
hypothesis), and 
Xi + Xp 
The calculated value of Z is -3*70 which is significant, 
for a one-tailed test, at the .00011 level and falls within 
the critical region of a test performed at the standard five 
percent level of significance,1 Thus, the null hypothesis is 
rejected, and the conclusion is that the proportion of owner 
controlled firms among the 125 largest firms in this 
^Before any of the tests in this study were performed, it was 
decided that a five percent level of significance would be used. 
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sample! is significantly less than the proportion of owner 
controlled firms in the remaining size categories. 
To make certain that averaging among the lower three 
size classes did not cause the rejection of the hypothesis, 
just the first two size classes can be compared. When the 
same test is applied to these data, Z equals -3,22, which is 
significant at the .00064 level (and again falls within the 
critical region of the standard tests performed at the five 
percent level of significance). One can conclude from these 
two tests that the proportion of owner controlled firms in the 
largest size class is significantly different from that of the 
second class and from that of the second, third, and fourth 
classes combined. The Importance of these results is twofold: 
they support the previously quoted suggestion by Lamer which 
implies that very large corporations involve so much capital 
If one is merely interested in the extent of the 
separation of ownership from control of the 500 largest firms 
in 1965, then the firms studied are a population, not a sample. 
In that case, statistical inference tests like the one used 
here and In the remainder of this chapter are unnecessary. The 
observed numbers and the percentages of firms in each category 
are sufficient evidence on which to base conclusions. 
If, though, one wishes to predict these numbers and propor­
tions for another point in time assuming that other conditions 
are approximately equivalent, the I965 list of the 500 largest 
firms can be thought of as a sample from all possible lists 
over time. Alternatively, the I965 list might be viewed as a 
sample from a conceptual population of all possible lists which 
might have existed in 19^5» assuming that random elements de­
termined the make-up of the observed list for that year. If 
either of these latter lines of thought is adopted, the statis­
tical tests are not only justified, but they are mandatory for 
the drawing of conclusions from the observed data. This dis­
cussion of statistical samples is also applicable to tests per­
formed later on the effects of the separation of>ownership 
from control. 
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that only under Infrequent circumstances would one group be 
able to amass enough wealth to gain control of them; and they 
suggest that any test of the effects of the separation of 
ownership from control on the profit performance of a firm 
should take account of size. 
It is tempting to perform similar statistical tests on 
the data to compare the percentage of firms which were owner 
controlled in 19^5 with that percentage in 1969# The samples 
in these two years are not strictly comparable, though, be­
cause of the aforementioned difficulties with the I969 data 
(the decline in the size of the I969 sample due to merger and 
acquisition activity). To perform such tests correctly, the 
percentage of the 500 largest firms In 19^5 which were owner 
controlled must be compared with that percentage of the 500 
largest firms in 1969. By using the same firms for both time 
periods, many large firms were systematically excluded from 
the 1969 sample. However, even a study of the same firms over 
time leads to some interesting results. Table 1,4 shows some 
of the reasons for the changes in the number of firms classi­
fied into each category in Table 1,2.^ In no case did the 
strength of owner control increase from I965 to I969 nor did 
any firm which was strong owner controlled in I965 become man­
agement controlled in I969, 
In general the trend noticed by Lamer for an increasing 
^The two tables are not comparable because data were not 
available for some firms in only one of the years under con­
sideration, See Appendix A, 
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Table 1.4. Changes in control; merger activity 
Size 
classes 
Number of firms, 
experiencing a 
change in the 
type of control 
Number of firms 
acquired or merged 
out of existence 
in 1965 
Strong owner 
to weak 
owner 
Weak owner 
to manage­
ment 
Strong 
owner 
Weak 
owner 
Manage­
ment 
1 1 3 2 0 3 
2 1 2 2 1 15 
3 0 1 1 2 17 
4 2 0 2 1 18 
15 
number of large corporations to become manager controlled 
seems to have continued through the 196o*s. Of additional 
Interest is the apparent differential impact of mergers and 
acquisitions on owner and management controlled firms. To 
test the significance of this differential impact, the same 
normal approximation to the binomial which was used earlier 
can be applied to the null hypothesis that the frequency of 
owner controlled firms merged out of existence was the same 
as the frequency of management controlled firms merged out 
of existence. When the test statistic is calculated without 
regard to size classes, it equals -2,75, which is well within 
the critical region of a five percent test, indicating that 
the two frequencies are significantly different. In other 
words, this test suggests that management controlled firms 
are more likely to be merged out of existence than are owner 
controlled firms. 
The results of this test are subject to question, though, 
because there are fewer owner controlled firms in the largest 
size class and because firms in the largest size class are 
less likely to be merged or acquired out of existence. Con­
sequently the same test was performed using only the firms 
in size classes two, three, and four. In this case, the 
value of the test statistic was -3,7, also significant at the 
five percent level. Together these two tests strongly suggest 
that management controlled firms, especially in the smaller 
size classes, are much more likely to be merged into or ac­
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quired by other firms than are owner controlled firms. Some 
suggestions explaining this phenomenon will be presented in 
later chapters. 
Before a comparison Is made of the three reported studies 
of the extent to which ownership is separated from control, 
some of the differences not already mentioned between the 
present study and the previous two should be highlighted. 
First the populations from which the samples were taken are 
different. Berle and Means and Larner studied nonflnancial 
corporations. Including industrial corporations, utilities, 
corporations providing primarily transportation services, and 
retailers. The present study, since it is based on Fortune's 
list of the 500 largest industrial corporations, omits all 
nonlndustrlal firms. By using a more limited population, the 
present study is biased to some extent against a large group 
of firms classed as utilities and transportation corporations 
which have a relatively high ratio of assets to total revenue. 
In some respects, however, this bias may offset the bias of 
including these firms in the population and measuring their 
size by the book value of their assets, a bias which might in 
some sense include too many firms with a high asset to sales 
ratio. 
Another difference between the present study and the pre­
vious two Is the manner in which size is measured. It was 
pointed out in the previous paragraph that measuring size by 
the book value of a firm's assets may impart a bias into the 
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classificatory scheme. By measuring size In terms of a firm's 
sales, the present study risks an opposite bias, that of In­
cluding what may be regarded as too many firms which have a 
relatively high ratio of sales to assets. 
To get an Idea of the Importance of these two differences 
(populations studied and size measures) a comparison of the 
two samples can be made. Of the 200 firms studied by Lamer 
In 1963f one was merged out of existence by I965» and 90 were 
not Included In the Fortune sample because they were not In­
dustrial corporations. Of the remaining I09 firms, 98 were In 
the largest size class of the sample taken from Fortune, ten 
were In the second size class, and one was In the third; none 
was In the last size class. 
This comparison suggests that the different size measures 
are not of much Importance and that sales and assets are fairly 
highly correlated. The more Important of the two differences 
seems to be the type of firm studied. It Is hoped that the 
present study, by deleting many regulated and semi-regulated 
utilities and transportation firms from its population, will 
reduce the number of explanatory variables necessary In 
studying profit performance, for a priori one would expect the 
profit performance of a regulated firm to differ from that of 
an unregulated firm. 
Another difference between the present study and Larner*s 
is that no exceptions were made in classifying the firms by 
control. Lamer classified May Department Stores as owner 
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controlled because the May family controlled the firm while 
owning only 3»9 percent of the voting stock, but such family 
control is an invalid basis for calling the firm owner con­
trolled, The firm quanitatively is no different from any 
other manager controlled firm whose directors own 3*9 percent 
of the stock, Earner's discussion of other family controlled 
corporations is more nearly consistent with the classificatory 
scheme of the present study: 
"Five companies on the I963 list which are 
classified as management-controlled appear to be 
controlled, or at least very strongly influenced, 
by a single family within their management. Yet 
these families owned only a very small fraction 
of the outstanding voting stock. The five 
companies and their controlling families are: 
IBM (Watson), Inland Steel (Block), Weyerhauser 
(Weyerhauser), Federated Department Stores 
(Lazarus), and J, P. Stevens (Stevens), Federated 
Department Stores is the best illustration of 
this. In 1963 its chairman of the board, its 
president, and five of its I9 directors were 
members of the Lazarus family, even though the 
combined stock interest of the entire family was 
only 1,32 percent. Since the present basis of con­
trol by these families appears to be their 
strategic position in management and the tradi­
tional identification of the corporation with the 
family rather than any appreciable amount of stock 
ownership, these companies are classified as mana­
gement-controlled" (p, 785). 
The logic of the last sentence of the above quotation 
should be extended to some higher percentage of ownership 
than 3»9 percent, though, because even at that low level a 
family management has no more pecuniary incentive to perform 
in the other stockholders' interests than a nonfamily manage­
ment holding the same percent of the voting stock. The pre­
sent study attaches no relevance to whether the controlling 
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group is a family or a group of business associates and 
thereby bases its classifications on the percent of voting 
stock owned by the controlling group, 
Earner's second exception (Transcontinental Gas Pipeline) 
has somewhat greater validity in that it emphasizes that 
ownership of at least ten percent of the voting stock is not 
a sufficient condition for owner control. If a group owns at 
least ten percent of the voting stock but is not involved in 
any way in the management or direction of the corporation, it 
could well have a difficult time controlling a management 
which has easy access to the day-to-day corporate operations 
and to the proxy mechanism. The difficulty with making such 
exceptions, however, is that some members of the management 
or the board of directors of a corporation, while not members 
of the group owning a large block of shares, may be acting as 
agents for the group. Discerning such a relationship would be 
difficult, if not Impossible; consequently, this study used 
the ten percent ownership as an arbitrary cut-off point to 
approximate the conditions sufficient for weak owner control. 
One final difference among these three studies is the 
manner in which firms were treated if the controlling group 
was a foreign corporation. The first two studies made no 
attempt to discover the type of ultimate control of the firm; 
they just classified all such firms as controlled through 
pyramiding or by a minority of the stockholders. The present 
study, however, tried to determine the ownership and control 
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conditions of the foreign corporations in an attempt to get 
a more accurate measure of the type of ultimate control.1 
The general conclusions one can draw from these three 
studies are that the frequency of owner control of large cor­
porations seems to have declined from 1929 up through 1969, 
and that the size of a firm and its type of control are 
strongly correlated negatively. These two conclusions are 
probably related since firms have grown in size over time. 
The correlation between size and the type of control may be 
due either to the previously mentioned difficulty of amassing 
enough wealth to own at least ten percent of the stock of a 
very large corporation or to the possibility that managers 
derive more utility from growth and bigness than do owners. 
Which explanation is more likely to be correct is left for 
later discussion. 
^See, for example, the discussions of Shell Oil Company and 
American Petrofina in Appendix A. 
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CHAPTER II. SUGGESTED EFFECTS OF 
THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM CONTROL 
The extent of the separation of ownership from control 
described in Chapter I has no relevance for economic theory 
and decision making unless this separation leads to different 
behavior corresponding to differently controlled firms. This 
chapter initially develops a decision-making model which in­
corporates the separation of ownership from control. Then 
this model is used to explain other writers' opinions about 
the possible economic effects of the separation of ownership 
from control. 
Some of the reasons which might exist for these diflferaices 
in behavior can be seen through a process in which first a 
small, owner controlled and managed firm is analyzed. Even in 
such a simplified case as this, the maximization of the firm's 
profits may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for the maximization of the owner's utility. The reason for 
this lack of equivalency between the two maximizations is that 
taxes will influence his decisions at the margin. Suppose, for 
example, that the owner Is considering taking a vacation. If 
he does so, he must not only pay for the vacation but also pay 
the income taxes on somewhat more than the income used for that 
vacation. If, however, he can meet some actual or prospective 
business associates or customers during that vacation, he can 
consider part or all of the expenses of the trip (depending 
on how honest he is) as business expenses. This latter 
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alternative would understate the profits of his firm, but 
the total value of goods and services which he could purchase 
would Increase because, while he must still pay for the 
vacation, he no longer would have to pay taxes on that portion 
of Income which would otherwise have been used to finance the 
vacation. 
In equation form, the decision criterion would be 
2.1 UiTi I Una' 
where U , Is the utility the owner would expect to receive by 
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choosing the alternative which would Increase his firm's pro­
fits and Is the utility he would expect to receive by 
choosing the alternative which would decrease his firm's pro­
fits.^ 
The terms of equation 2.1 can be broken down in the 
following manner: 
2.2 U(Yi)+U(Ni)^(Yd)+U(Na)-U(C), 
where UfY^) is the utility he would receive from his Income 
(net of taxes) received by selecting the profit-increasing 
alternative, U(Nj^) is the utility generated from non pecuniary 
sources by this alternative, such as a feeling of pride that 
he was earning the highest possible profits in his firm; 
U(Ya) is the utility he would receive from his net Income 
^Equations 2,1-2,4 are based on a model of revolution pre­
sented by G. Tullock In a seminar at Iowa State University, 
April 20, 1971 
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under the alternative which would reduce the firm's profits, 
U(%) is the utility he would derive from non pecuniary 
sources by decreasing the firm's profits (in the above example, 
this utility would come from the vacation), and -U(C) is the 
expected loss in utility, both pecuniary and non pecuniary 
the owner would have to suffer if the profit-reducing alter­
native involved illegal or semi-legal activities at which he 
might get caught.1 
Equation 2,2 can be broken down still further: 
2,3 U(Yd+AiT(l_t))+U(Ni)>U(Ya)+U(Nd)-Pc(U(Yo)+U(Nc)). 
This equation is based on the fact that the income received 
from the alternative which Increases profits has a lower limit 
equal to the income received from the alternative which de­
creases profits. Added to this income is the difference in 
profits between the two alternatives, times one minus the tax 
rate at which these additional profits would be taxed. The 
equation also makes explicit the estimated probability of the 
owner's getting caught at some Illegal activity, P^, and the 
potential loss of utility from a loss of income due to such 
things as fines, Y^, and from a loss of nonincome, utility-
producing items, Ng, such as the prestige lost by being 
branded a criminal. 
If the left side of equation 2,3 is greater than the 
right side, the decision maker will choose the alternative 
^U(C) is a positive quantity. The minus sign attached to it 
shows that there is a possible loss of utility. 
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which increases the firm's profits; if the right side is 
greater, he will choose the other alternative? and if the two 
sides are equal, he will be indifferent between the two alter­
natives. In the example of the vacation-business trip, if 
U(Ni) and are approximately zero, the owner will probably 
choose the profit-reducing alternative because U(Nd), the 
utility of the "business trip," would be greater than 
U(AiT(l-t)), since AiT(l-t) income would not be able to pur­
chase a vacation of as high quality or quantity as he could 
otherwise have. In cases in which the owner must suffer some 
disutility from the profit-reducing alternative, e.g., having 
to spend some time with unpleasant business and associates 
during what otherwise would be a pleasant vacation, U(Na) is 
lower than in the former case, and the direction of the in­
equality is less clear-cut. 
When a corporation is considered in which a manager is not 
a significant stockholder, equation 2.3 must be expanded to 
allow for additional incentives affecting him. Here, A-n must 
be reduced not only by the corporation profit taxes which must 
be paid on Air, but also by the amount of A r which will not 
accrue to the manager and by the personal income taxes to be 
paid on that portion of A ir which does accrue to him. Let t^ 
be the corporation profits tax rate, let d be the percentage 
of A 'TT which the manager expects will not accrue to him,^ and 
^The manager would not receive the full benefits of A tt if 
some of this increase were kept by the owners or if some of 
it were paid to employees other than himself. 
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let tp be the personal income tax rate applicable to the man­
ager. Clearly d is in probability terms. Equation 2.3 as it 
relates to a manager's choice now becomes 
2.4 U(Yd+j4^(l-tn)(l-d)(l-tp))+U(Ni)%U(Ya)+U(Na) 
-P<,g(U (ïog)f U (Nog) ) -Pcgn("(?cgn)+U(Ncgn> > 
-PcgnXPcgo(«(?csol+"(Ncgo))-Pco("(%co)+"(Noo))-
The term involving the probability and disutility of b^g 
caught has been revised to allow for the different probabilities 
and punishments of being caught by the government or the owners, 
Ppg is the probability that the manager will be caught and pun­
ished directly by the government if the profit-reducing alter­
native includes illegal activities. U(YQg) and U(Nç^) repre­
sent the loss of utility caused by being caught and punished 
by the government, and they include whatever actions may be 
taken by the owners to further punish the manager, even though 
the owners themselves may not be punished for his indiscretion. 
Pcgn is the probability that the manager's action will be 
detected by the government but that only the corporation, not 
the manager, will be punished by the government. Even if the 
owners do not detect and/or punish him in turn for his action, 
he may suffer some loss resulting from the overall loss of 
profits and stature suffered by the corporation if his action 
is deemed Illegal by the government. 
In addition, the manager must consider the possibility 
that if Pcgr' positive, the owners will try to determine 
who within the organization performed the illegal act and will 
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try to punish him themselves, ^cgn * ^ cgo represents this 
probability, and UfY^go) + UCN^go) are the losses the manager 
expects if such an event were to occur. 
Finally, is the probability that even in the absence 
of government action the owners will detect and punish the 
manager for selecting the profit-reducing alternative. 
Some of the other terms in equation 2.4 take on an ex­
tended meaning when the ownership and management roles are not 
performed by the same person. A'n(l-t^)(1-d) includes possible 
bonuses and increased pay based on outstanding performances. 
It also includes the portion of the increased profits which 
the manager expects to receive if he owns a small amount of 
stock in the corporation. U(Nj[) Includes the utility gained 
by a profit-increasing manager from obtaining a promotion and 
from increasing his good will with the owners, in addition to 
the possible good feeling of a job well done, 
Nd can take on many forms. It may include such things 
as prettier-than-average secretaries, thlcker-than-average 
carpets, bigger-than-average desks, or generally plush sur­
roundings, It may also include such other perquisites as club 
memberships, first-class travel, or the provision of a company 
car for personal use. 
The Yg terms cover not only the lost income due to fines 
Imposed on Illegal activities, but also the potential cut in 
pay because of a possible demotion or because a new job must 
be found. The terms include, in addition to the possible 
stigma of being branded a criminal, the possible loss of status 
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In the firm because of a demotion or because of falling out 
of favor with the owners. In his deliberations as to which 
alternative to select, the manager must estimate probability 
distributions for d, N^, and all and terms since these 
terms are not known to him with certainty. And these prob­
ability distributions may change from situation to situation. 
Consider now a manager faced with the decision of whether 
to pay for his vacation out of his net Income or to call it a 
business trip and to let his company pay for It. In this 
example is the cost of the business trip; this amount 
would be added to the firm's profits if the manager were to 
pay for the vacation himself. He might expect d to be some­
what close to one if he believes there is little reason for the 
owners to bestow gifts on him for doing what they think he 
ought to do anyway. If he expects d to be near one, he might 
also expect to be near zero for similar reasons. Conse­
quently, in this case, the left side of equation 2.4 may differ 
very little from the first term on the right side of the 
equation. 
The decision, then, reduces approximately to a considera­
tion of whether all but the first term of the right side of 
2.4 sum to more than, less than, or just zero, U(N^) would be 
comprised of the utility gained from the vacation plus the 
utility gained from "putting one over" on the owners, minus 
the disutility created by the scorn the manager receives from 
associates who know about and disapprove of his actions, minus 
the disutility generated by just his fear of being caught, and 
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minus the disutility resulting from any actions he may feel 
are necessary to minimize his chances of being caught, 
The probabilities of the manager's being caught and pun­
ished and the probability distributions of the \ and 
terms will depend on a number of things. A list of their 
determinants should probably Include the scrutiny with which 
the Internal Revenue Service studies the tax returns of large 
corporations and the extent to which various managerial per­
quisites are tolerated by the owners. 
Besides providing a formalization of the incentives in­
volved in some of the decisions made by managers,^ equation 
2.4 serves as a basis for discussions of theories suggested by 
previous writers as to why the separation of ownership from 
control might or might not affect a firm's profitability. For 
example, Adam Smith noted that the grant of a perpetual mono­
poly merely enables, "...the company to support the negligence, 
profusion, and malversation of their own servants, whose dis­
orderly conduct seldom allows the company to exceed the ordi­
nary rate of profits in trades which are altogether free" 
(1937, p. 712). In such a situation Smith believed that the 
expected loss of utility from not maximizing profits was near 
zero because regardless of the probability of being caught, no 
%he model would have to be expanded considerably to Include 
illegal and quasi-legal activities within firms which would 
increase their profits rather than reduce them. This expansion 
was not attempted here because most discussions of the effects 
of the separation of ownership from control are concerned with 
profit-reducing activities. 
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punishment of any significance could be imposed from outside 
the firm. By eliminating competitors, the grant of a perpetual 
monopoly would eradicate potential punishment which might 
otherwise result through the Interplay of market forces; and 
by Implicitly Including the stockholders among the group of 
malversants. Smith eliminated another potential source of pun­
ishment. Under such assumptions, the conditions are quite con­
ducive to non-profit-maximizing behavior. 
The fact that Smith chose a monopoly situation for his 
example Is not unimportant. It suggests that owners are willing 
to tolerate what might be called internal inefficiencies on the 
part of managers up to the point at which a firm's profit rate 
is reduced to the perfectly competitive rate of return but not 
beyond that point. In the absence of profit-reducing activities 
by the owners, the and terms of equation 2.4 are near 
zero so long as the firm's profits are at least as great as the 
"normal rate of return," but these terms are significantly posi­
tive once the firm's profits become subnormal. Of course these 
terms may also be near zero while the firm's profits are sub­
normal if owners participate in profit-decreasing activities 
too. 
Other writers have also pointed out the possibility of 
non-profIt-maxlmlzlng behavior in corporations which have a 
separation of ownership from control. Papandreou states that, 
"Rationality is consistent with the maximization of other 
things as well as profits" (1952, p. 206). He further points 
out that stockholders rarely are able to completely control a 
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largp corporation (pp. 197-198). An implicit conclusion to be 
drawn from these two points is that managers maximize their 
utilities subject to a constraint exercised by the stock­
holders. In terms of equation 2.4, Papandreou's first state­
ment suggests that in general UfY^) + UfN^) is greater than 
the left side of the equation. His second statement indicates 
that he believes the various terms on the right side of the 
equation to be substantially less than one and to provide only 
a slight constraint for non-profit-maximizing behavior by 
managers• 
Gordon also views the P^ terms as constraints on the pro-
fit-decreasing behavior of managers: 
"The development of the large corporation has 
obviously affected the goals of business decision­
making. .. . Almost certainly the personal and 
group goals of higher and lower executives are a 
part of the total value system — the desires for 
security, power, prestige, advancement within the 
organization, and so on. One result, almost 
certainly, is that the maintenance of satisfactory 
profits is a more accurate statement of the profits 
objective than is complete profits-maximization. 
Perhaps it is not inaccurate to say that profits 
are viewed as the basic constraint subject to which 
other goals can be followed. Subject to this con­
straint, some profits will be sacrificed in pur­
suit of other goals" (I96I, p. xllj. 
That firms might satisflce, seek only a satisfactory pro­
fit rate, rather than maximize has been argued strongly by 
Simon (1957» 1959f 1962). Among the reasons that one might 
observe satisficing behavior by firms, Simon includes, "It is 
often observed that under modern conditions the equity owners 
and the active managers of an enterprise are separate and 
distinct groups of people, so that the latter may not be 
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motivated to maximize profits" (1959» P* 262). 
Berle, too, suggests that managers must only satifice in 
order to keep stockholders from organizing to attempt a change 
in management. 
"Save in the diminishing number of enterprises 
whose founding adventurer or his family still holds 
an aggregate block of stock sufficient to dislodge 
a management if they are displeased, stockholders 
physically cannot, and by law are not permitted, to 
enter the decision-making process. ... It is main­
tained, with truth, that the opinions of stock­
holders do have influence; that stockholders at 
meetings can raise •pertinent and sometimes em­
barrassing questions, sometimes with devastating 
effect* [quoted from Peterson (1965» P» 22)] and 
that they constitute a substantial special public, 
some of whom at least scrutinize the management. 
Yet sporadic and only occasionally effective use 
of this scrutiny does not add up to 'control* or 
anything approaching it. At best, the scrutiny is 
a variety of post-audit. This is an instance of an 
old word (*control*), apt in the days of pluto­
cratic 1890*s, used by neoclassicists in quite dif­
ferent sense as applied to the discontinuous, 
occasional, quasi-political corporate processes of 
corporate government today. Practically its entire 
content now is that stockholders like to see divi­
dends and market values rise, and disliking the 
contrary, complain, seek to find the causes, on 
extremely rare occasions organize changes, when 
there is trouble. 
"oB.One need not jump to the conclusion that the 
administrators of corporations are therefore *ir­
responsible, • But again their responsibility 
differs in content. They are responsible to the 
impersonal institutional collective known as *the 
company;' they are secondarily responsible to the 
direct desire of stockholders at any given moment 
to enhance their immediately tangible take or to 
have losses explained. Stockholders act like an 
unorganized, usually inert, political constituency. 
They are a * field of responsibility* — far, in­
deed, from an entrepreneurial controlling force" 
(Berle, I965» pp. 30-31). 
In the language of equation 2,4, Berle is saying that so 
long as a firm reports profits which are by some criterion 
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satisfactory, the PQ terms of equation 2.4 are near zero. Only 
when a firm's profit performance becomes unsatisfactory do the 
PQ terms take on values significantly greater than zero, and 
even then they have values substantially less than one, 
Kaysen supports this view and extends it to say that 
rational managers would, for reasons other than fear of stock­
holder revolts, find it to their advantage to avoid situations 
in which profits become unsatisfactory: 
"It is clear that in a large corporation, even 
the knowledgeable stockholder, with substantial 
holdings, who himself sits as director though not 
an officer, must in general accept the analysis 
of the issues and the choice of alternatives which 
the officers make. To be sure, his presence, and 
the anticipation of it in turn shapes the way the 
officers themselves look at the issues. But, un­
less stockholders are in the position of selecting 
the officers in practice — e,g,, the DuPont 
situation in General Motors, before the divesti­
ture — it is the perspective and judgments of the 
officers which are central. Issues are complex, 
decisions can be seen only in terms of alternatives 
which themselves are posed by the processes of 
staff work under the control of the officers, al­
ternatives which fall outside the perspective of 
management judgement can rarely be brought into 
focus by an occasional outside question. And, of 
course, the case we are positing is no longer the 
typical one; the director representative of large 
stockholders is declining in importance, as com­
pared with the inside board. So the representa­
tive stockholder, certainly in terms of numbers, 
and probably in terms of shares, is not really 
able to do more by his direct influence on the 
representative large corporation than constrain 
management from obviously foolish or unprofitable 
actions. Management, in general needs no such 
outside constraint; on any theory of its own in­
terests, the constraint will be provided internally" 
(Kaysen, I965» PP. 46-4?), 
Probably the best statement about the values of the PQ 
terms has been made by Monsen and Downs (I965)# They point 
out that the terms are small if the firm is doing well, but 
are large if its performance is unsatisfactory: 
•*.. .although a very poor management perfor­
mance may result in a rebellion, a very good one 
does not usually cause a powerful movement among 
stockholders to reward their managers with lavish 
bonuses. Hence the punishment for grievous error 
is greater than the reward for outstanding success. 
This asymmetry between failure and success tends 
to make the managers of a diffused-ownership firm 
behave differently from the managers of the type of 
owner-managed firm envisioned by traditional theory" 
(p. 226). 
One way in which such a difference in behavior may manifest 
itself is in the tendency of profits to vary less in manager 
controlled firms than in owner controlled firms. According to 
Monsen and Downs, 
"Top management abhors fluctuating earnings 
for the following reasons: 
a) If the earnings in a given year decline, 
the price of the stock may fall. This would be 
repugnant to all owners — including the top 
managers themselves — and might cause the 
owners to throw out top management, especially 
if the stock market in general has risen, 
b) Stocks with fluctuating earnings generally 
have lower price-earnings ratios than those with 
steadily rising earnings. It is clearly in the 
interest of all owners — including top managers 
with stock options — to maintain high price-
earnings ratios" (p. 232). 
The first reason given is quite consistent with their 
hypothesis quoted earlier, that managers in manager controlled 
firms behave differently from those in owner controlled firms. 
The second reason, however, Is inconsistent with that hypoth­
esis as regards fluctuating profits, for if owners, too, abhor 
fluctuating profits, no difference in the variation of profits 
over time should exist between differently controlled firms. 
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Monsen and Downs also suggest other possible manifesta­
tions of the asymmetric economic forces affecting managers, 
Several of these are 
"Top managers will use their roles in the 
firm to enhance their own personal prestige 
and stature. As a result, they will contribute 
to local causes and participate in community 
affairs more than they should from a purely 
profit-maximizing point of view. 
"...Expense accounts are likely to be more 
extravagant in managerial firms than they would 
be if managers really maximized returns to owners. 
Although expense-account benefits and salaries are 
both deductible, salaries are a much more visible 
and easily checked form of management compensa­
tion. Therefore, managers will seek to expand 
expense-account benefits in order to raise their 
total compensation without attracting the atten­
tion of owners. This will result in greater 
total compensation for them than is required to 
retain their services. The fact that such non-
salary benefits will influence their choices 
among firms (and hence may appear to be a 
necessary part of their compensation by each 
firm) does not destroy this argument. Managers 
as a group are probably extracting rent because 
of inflated expense accounts; that is, they are 
compensated more in all managerial firms than is 
necessary to keep them from becoming non-managers. 
Thus what may appear as true costs to individual 
firms are still an excessive reduction of profits 
among all managerial firms compared with what 
profits would be if truly maximized. 
"...Managerial firms are likely to respond more 
slowly to declines in profits than they would if 
they really pursued profit maximization. Since 
managers wish to preserve their personal preroga­
tives (such as large expense accounts) and do not 
suffer directly from lower profits, they will be 
willing to 'ride out* a sudden decline in profits 
without cutting back expenditures in the hope 
that it will be temporary. In contrast, true 
proflt-maxlmlzers would exhibit no such inertia 
but would immediately alter their existing be­
havior patterns. However, if lower profits con­
tinue, even managerial firms will adjust their be­
havior so as to avoid having lower yearly earnings 
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cause any decline in stock prices (if pos­
sible)" (pp. 233-234). 
The leading contemporary proponent of what have come 
to be called theories of managerialism — theories implying 
different performances by differently controlled firms — is 
Oliver E. Williamson (1963)* 
"...in the absence of vigorous competition in 
the product market and where the separation of 
ownership from control Is substantial, there is 
no compelling reason to assume that the firm is 
operated so as to maximize profit. ...where dis­
cretion in the decision-making unit exists, this 
will ordinarily be exercised in a fashion that 
reflects the individual interests of the decision­
makers" (p. 55). 
Williamson lists four basic motives or economic incen­
tives which influence managers: 
'1. Salary. 
2. Security. 
3. Dominance: 
a. status. 
b. power, 
c. prestige. 
4. Professional 
These motives are related to economic activity by what 
Williamson terms "expense preference." 
"By expense preference I mean that managers 
do not have a neutral attitude toward all classes 
of expenses. Instead, some types of expenses 
have positive values attached to them: they are 
incurred not merely for their contributions to 
productivity (if any) but, in addition, for the 
manner in which they enhance the individual and 
c o l l e c t i v e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  m a n a g e r s "  ( p .  3 3 ) ,  
Expense preference is revealed by managerial behavior in 
three realms : staff, emoluments, and discretionary profit. 
Williamson assumes, 
"...that the management has a positive expense 
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preference for staff •,• [because] ... being a 
means to promotion, expansion of staff serves 
to advance both salary and dominance objectives 
simultaneously. In addition, staff can contri­
bute to the satisfaction of security and pro­
fessional achievement objectives as well, ••• 
As long as the organization is able to satisfy 
its acceptable level performance requirements, 
the tendency to value staff apart from reasons 
associated with its productivity produces a 
predisposition to extend programs beyond the 
point where marginal costs equal marginal bene­
fits" (pp. 3^-35). 
Emoluments "...are economic rents and have associated 
with them zero productivities. They are not a return to 
entrepreneurial capacity but instead result from the strategic 
advantage that the management possesses in the distribution 
of returns to monopoly power" (p. 35)» Emoluments can be in 
the form of salaries and/or perquisites, but probably at 
least part of them will be in the form of perquisites because 
of the tax incentives discussed earlier in this chapter and 
because, "...perquisites are much less visible rewards to the 
management than salary and hence are less likely to provoke 
stockholder or labor dissatisfaction" (p. 35)* Williamson 
does not mention another reason why managers would prefer to 
take some of their emoluments as perquisites. This reason is 
that majiagers may not have much of a choice in the matter. 
If they give up some perquisites, their salaries may not in­
crease significantly, and if they seek additional perquisites, 
their salaries may not fall significantly. 
Discretionary profits, that portion of a firm's profits 
which exceeds the minimum profit constraint imposed explicitly 
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or implicitly by stockholders, are sought by managers because 
they help finance growth which in turn increases the likeli­
hood of acquiring additional staff and emoluments. Discre­
tionary profits are also sought because they provide the mana­
gers with a feeling of self-fulfillment and professional 
success (p. 36), Another reason, not mentioned by Williamson, 
that managers might seek discretionary profits is that their 
salaries are in most cases a positive, monotonie function of 
the firm's profits. 
These three basic types of expense preference are formal­
ized by Williamson into an objective function for the firm as 
an entity: 
"maximize: u = u(S, m, tr^ - - t) 
subject to: > iTq + T" (p.52), 
Where 
U is the firm's utility function, S is staff, M is mana­
gerial emoluments, iTJ. is reported profit, is the minimum 
profit constraint (after taxes) imposed by stockholders, and 
T is taxes, tt^. - ir^ - t represents discretionary profit. 
This model has two serious drawbacks. First, not only is 
it non operational in the sense that it cannot be directly 
tested (a problem also with equation 2.4), but it even lacks 
explanatory power for individual decision making. At least the 
model developed in the present study highlights the Important 
variables to be considered by each manager, but Williamson's 
model is developed for the firm as a whole. And this point 
leads to the second serious drawback of Williamson's model. 
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The model assumes that a utility function exists for the 
firm, but there is no reason to assume that such a function 
has the properties of transitivity and convexity usually at­
tributed to an individual's utility function. The firm is 
made up of a number of people, each with their own preference 
systems, and each trying to influence the firm's actions. 
Something akin to a social welfare function might be attribu­
table to a firm, but since such a function is a composite of 
individual preferences, it may permit nontransitive or seem­
ingly inconsistent preferences to coexist and even be realized. 
Arrow (1951) has shown that under a one-man, one-vote 
social choice mechanism, preferences may be intransitive for 
a group faced with more than two alternatives. While a firm 
probably does not employ such a social choice mechanism, so 
long as several of its employees can affect its actions, the 
potential exists for intransitive composite preferences. For 
example, suppose A has ten votes, B has seven votes, and C has 
four votes, and the three of them must choose between alter­
natives X, Y, and Z. Suppose further that they would rank the 
alternatives as follows: 
X Y Z 
A 1 2 3 
B 3 1 2 
C 2 3 1 
In an election between X and Y, X would receive 14 votes 
and Y would receive 7 votes ; X would be preferred to Y. An 
election between Y and Z would yield 17 votes for Y and 4 votes 
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for Z; Ï would be preferred to Z, A contest between X and Z 
would result in 10 votes for X and 11 votes for Z; Z would be 
preferred to X. X is preferred to Y, Y is preferred to Z, but 
Z is preferred to X. A classic intransitivity exists even 
though the voters' preferences are not weighted equally. 
In a corporation, the weighting scheme of the social 
choice mechanism may not be formalized in the above manner, 
but so long as decisions are made collectively, this potential 
for intransitivity exists. Consequently, a collective utility 
function for the firm should be used with caution because it 
is not the same type of function usually discussed in theories 
of consumer behavior. 
In a series of articles by Leibenstein (1966, 1969) and 
Comanor and Leibenstein (I969), another type of profit-reducing 
behavior is discussed which is of relevance to the theories of 
managerialism. The concept of X-efficiency is developed, de­
pending on three things: "(1) Intra-plant motivational 
efficiency, (2) external motivational efficiency, and (3) non-
market input efficiency" (Leibenstein, 1966, pp. 406-407). 
Though the connection is not developed in detail by them, item 
(2) of X-efficiency, external motivational efficiency is of 
particular relevance. It encompasses (or can be extended to 
do so) both the pressure put on managers by stockholders to in­
crease profits and the pressure felt by managers because of 
potential competition in the product market. For firms in 
which ownership is separated from control and for imperfectly 
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competitive firms, the probabilities of profit-reducing acti­
vities being punished may be lower than they otherwise would 
be, and hence external motivational efficiency may be low. 
Several of the conclusions drawn from X-efflclency 
studies are 
"(1) Output of the firm Is not produced on 
what conventionally would be viewed as the pro­
duction possibility boundary but well short of it. 
(2) The distance between actual output and 
the production possibility boundary depends on the 
incentive-reward system within the firm. 
(3) Costs per unit of output are not minimized" 
(Leibenstein, I969, p. 622), 
One of the primary ways in which X-inefficiency is ex­
hibited is through an inertia with respect to technological 
change. Managers may have full knowledge of more profitable 
technologies but fail to Implement them because the status quo 
is satisfactory to everyone concerned. This is a different 
type of satlsficing, but is closely related to Simon's dis­
cussion of the term. In both cases less-than-maxinium profits 
are being earned because those involved find the status quo 
satisfactory. 
Comanor and Leibenstein suggest that X-lnefficlency may 
create costs as much as 18 percent greater than the minimum 
costs (1969» P* 307)» However, when asked about this figure, 
they both replied that it was just suggested for illustrative 
purposes.! What is of greater interest for the problem at 
Leibenstein; Sept, 14, 1970, Private communication, W. 
Comanor; Oct. 8, 1970. Private communication. 
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hand, though, is that the size of such a cost-effect dif­
ferential due to X-inefficiency may vary from firm to firm, 
depending on the type of control. 
The literature reviewed to this point suggests a number 
of different reasons why the right side of equation 2.4 might 
be greater than the left side. The authors included in this 
review all provide reasons why the separation of ownership 
from control might affect a firm's profit performance. Not all 
economists agree, however. Many argue that more often than 
not the potential gains to a manager for profit-reducing be­
havior are minimal and that the probabilities of his being 
caught and punished in some fashion for such behavior are high. 
For example, Peterson, in arguing that U(Njj) is probably low, 
says that 
"...objectives of prestige, power, and sense 
of accomplishment, as well as income, depend 
heavily for their realization on the firm's 
success, as determined by its profits. This 
attitude seems the more likely when managers 
live, move, and achieve their reputations in 
a business culture, or subculture, which resides 
in the mores and institutions which surround 
corporate operations. This is a culture of in­
come statements and balance sheets, of stress on 
per-share earnings and earnings growth, of 
securities analysts scrutinizing company perfor­
mance, of vast institutional investing which 
rests on expert appraisal of corporate quality 
and promise, of ratings by articulate manage­
ment consultants. It is a culture, also, whose 
high-quality press reiterates the marks of cor­
porate excellence and names names as it recounts 
the record of success and failure. And now it is 
a culture that the computer enters to sharpen 
guidelines to higher revenues and lower costs" 
(1965. PP. 12-13). 
If, as Peterson claims, U(Nd) is low, then the left side 
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of 2.4 in most cases may be greater than the right side, and 
there may be no observable difference in profit performance 
between owner controlled firms and manager controlled firms. 
In terms of Williamson's model, Peterson is saying that dis­
cretionary profits are very important in managers' utility 
functions because increased staff and emoluments depend on in­
creased profits. Peterson would go so far as to claim that 
the independent effect generated by a desire for staff and 
emoluments is insignificant relative to the effect of the de­
sire for increased profits. 
Peterson further argues that even if UfN^) is not in­
significant, when a corporation is viewed as a small part of 
a large economy, it becomes clear that there is very little 
latitude for discretionary behavior by managers. 
"The economics of managerialism appears 
weakest as it enters the area of system-wide 
control. ... Since the control problem is not 
grasped, the point is missed that the revenue-
cost decisions by which the firm survives and 
prospers are likewise the means by which, in 
its small province, it responds to the entire 
range of alternatives on the other side of the 
markets in which it sells and buys, thus play­
ing its part in causing the control to operate" 
(p. 13). 
In other words, Peterson believes that because of strong 
economic forces impinging on the firm and its managers from 
all directions, may be sufficiently low that even a sizeable 
potential would not be enough to persuade managers not to 
maximize profits. 
The size of the PQ terms is also believed by Peterson to 
play a significant role in a manager's decisions: 
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"Final assertion by stockholders of their 
legal position is through the proxy contest or 
the derivative suit. Both are belittled by 
critics as too infrequent to be meaningful; 
but this view misconceives their influence. 
Far from being an ordinary election, a proxy 
battle is a catastrophic event whose mere 
possibility is a threat, and one not remote 
when affairs are in conspicuous disarray. 
There is similar threat in stockholder suits 
that may be provoked by evidence of serious 
self-dealing. On the principle that legal 
prohibitions are to be judged not by guilt 
discovered but by guilt discouraged, these 
suits may, as has been said, have accomplished 
much in policing the corporation system" (p. 21), 
The point here is that the terms are not based on the 
fact that few proxy fights or derivative suits have emerged in 
the past. Rather, the emphasis is on the fact that the exis­
tence of only a few precedents may be sufficient to cause a 
manager's subjective evaluation of the terms to be fairly 
high. Such a possibility implies that managers might fre­
quently choose to maximize profits instead of running what 
they believe to be a high risk of being caught and punished. 
One of the reasons that managers may have little latitude 
for discretionary behavior is that the stock market provides 
an indirect control of their behavior. If managers suspect 
that they might ever want to increase the capital of the firm 
to finance additional growth through a new stock issue, they 
will want to receive a high price for the new issue. They can 
usually receive a high price if they report high profits. 
Along this line, Peterson says, 
"Most likely to be overlooked by noneconomists 
are the inherent limitations on self-dealing. It 
must not threaten the firm's success, through 
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which executive ambition must largely realize its 
aims. It must not seriously affront the stock­
holder as source of capital, for, though most 
capital is raised otherwise, the equity investor 
is not so unlikely a source as to warrant high­
handed treatment of him. And however capital 
is raised, self-dealing should not so dampen pub­
lic demand for outstanding stock as to make capi­
tal commitment seem unjustified" (p. 21), 
Baldwin (1964, p. 251) supports this view with the claim 
that institutional investors such as insurance companies, trust 
companies, and mutual funds have a full complement of research­
ers studying the relative profitability of different corpora­
tions and recommending various portfolio adjustments in re­
sponse to changes in relative profitabilities. These highly 
sophisticated investors, through their actions in the stock 
market, will affect the price of a firm's stock and because of 
this affect, impose capital constraints on the discretionary 
behavior of managers. 
This argument is extended by Hindley (1969) to include 
the market for corporate control. If managers do not maxi­
mize a firm's profits, others outside the firm will eventually 
become aware of this situation and through proxy fights, 
tender offers, or outright purchase will obtain control of the 
firm at a price which will be handsomely rewarded after the 
take-over is completed and the firm is made more efficient. 
Even the threat of such a take-over (and the subsequent re­
moval of the incumbent managers) will serve to limit mana­
gerial malfeasance0 A manager considering a profit-reducing 
activity must allow for the probability that he will be caught 
and punished not only by the present owners but also by 
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potential owners. This recognition of the importance of po­
tential owners, Hindley would argue, significantly increases 
the PQ terms of equation 2.4, and, consequently, will lead 
managers to decide that profit-maximizing activities are more 
likely to be in their own best interests. 
An important point to be gleaned from the arguments by 
Peterson, Baldwin, and Hindley is that not all economic actors 
Imposing constraints on a firm's management must be diligent, 
sophisticated, and well-informed, A small proportion of them 
at the margin will in most cases be sufficient either to dir­
ectly narrow the range for managerial discretion or to arouse 
others enough that collectively they can place limits on mana­
gement , 
In basic supply and demand analysis the Inframarginal 
economic units are satisfied with the status quo, and most of 
them are unlikely to react to small changes in price or quan­
tity, It is the marginal buyers and sellers who, in the end, 
determine an equilibrium price and quantity. Similarly for a 
large corporation, even if most of the stockholders are Infra-
marginal satlsfleers, those who are on the margin can affect 
managers* decisions with their behavior in the stock market. 
And if those on the margin happen to be owners or potential 
owners of as little as even one percent of the voting stock, 
they may feel motivated to attempt more direct action to bring 
a recalcitrant management into line, 
A quite different reason that profit performance may not 
be related to type of control evolves from the study of the 
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bureaucratic organization of large firms. All of the theories 
discussed to this point have dealt only with the link between 
stockholders and managers, but actually equation 2.4 is rele­
vant for decisions made by all employees of the firm. Cer­
tainly the terms of the equation take on different meanings for 
different employees, but the criterion is still applicable. 
For example, if a secretary is considering whether to use cor­
poration postage and stationery for personal correspondence, she 
will probably assume that U(Y(^) equals the first term on the 
left side of 2.4. U(Nj^) will be the utility she would receive 
from being honest and using her own stationery and stamps, 
while U(N(j) will be the utility she would receive from being 
able to spend her income in other ways and from the feeling of 
having exacted a higher real income from the firm. The Pg 
terms are probably of no importance in her decision, and the 
Pq terms would be reinterpreted to account for the probability 
of her being caught and punished by her immediate (or perhaps 
once-removed) supervisor. Such decisions are made dally 
throughout the entire organization but only rarely are given 
explicit recognition in discussions of the managerial hypoth­
eses. 
It might be said that a type of X-lnefflciency pervades 
the whole corporation, that all employees suffer from (enjoy?) 
inertia until sufficiently prodded to change, Monsen and 
Downs (1965) discuss the bureaucratic tensions within an organi­
zation, but probably the most complete treatment is provided 
by Cyert and March (1963). They deal not so much with the 
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inertia problems In a firm but more with economic rents re­
ceived by the various employees, 
"Because of [the] frictions In the mutual ad^ 
justment of payments and demands, there Is ordi­
narily a disparity between the resources available 
to the organization and the payments required to 
maintain the coalition. This difference between 
total resources and total necessary payments Is 
what we have called organizational slack. Slack 
consists In payments to members of the coalition 
In excess of what Is required to maintain the organi­
zation. Many interesting phenomena within the firm 
occur because slack is typically not zero. 
"In conventional economic theory slack is zero 
(at least at equilibrium). In treatments of mana­
gerial economics, attention is ordinarily focused 
on only one part of slack — payments to owners — 
and it is assumed that other slack is maintained at 
zero. Neither view is an especially accurate por­
trayal of an actual firm. Many forms of slack typi­
cally exist: stockholders are paid dividends in 
excess of those required to keep stockholders (or 
banks) within the organization; prices are set lower 
than necessary to maintain adequate Income from 
buyers; wages in excess of those required to maintain 
labor are paid; executives are provided with services 
and personal luxuries in excess of those required to 
keep them; subunlts are permitted to grow without 
real concern for the relation between additional pay­
ments and additional revenue; public services are 
provided in excess of those required" (pp. 36-37)» 
If all members of the corporation play the game implied 
In equation 2.4, organizational slack will be rife throughout 
the chains of command shown In Figure 2.1. Whatever slack 
exists solely because of the separation of ownership from con­
trol may be infinitesimal relative to the total slack within 
the firm. In this case, the separation of ownership from con­
trol would have no measurable effect on a firm's profits be­
cause of the widespread prevalence of profit-reducing activ­
ity throughout the firm, not because of the absence of such 
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Foremen and supervisors i 
Managers 
Production and clerical workers 
Stockholders, actual and potential 
PlRure 2,lo A simple organization chart 
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activity by managers. 
The arguments on both sides of the question can be sum­
marized as follows: if managers* utility functions include 
variables other than profits and if the probability is low of 
stockholder action against managers who engage in profit-re­
ducing activities, there will exist a correspondence between 
firms* profits and type of control. If, though, no such cor­
respondence Is observed, the managerial hypotheses cannot cate­
gorically be rejected. The hypotheses are Incorrect if managers' 
goals are closely tied to profits so that managers have little 
incentive not to maximize profits, or if managers subjectively 
evaluate the probability of action by dissident stockholders 
to be high. But it may also be that the managerial hypotheses 
are Just incomplete because they neglect the scope for dis­
cretionary action throughout the corporation. In this last 
case the theories of managerlalism would not necessarily be 
wrong; they would simply be of no consequence for large corpor­
ations. 
50 
CHAPTER III. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
RELATING TO THE EFFECTS OF THE SEPARATION 
OF OWNERSHIP FROM CONTROL 
There seems to be fairly general agreement among the 
authors cited in Chapter II on the basic logic of the theories 
of managerial!sm. The major disagreement among them is on 
the relative strengths of different economic forces. This dis­
agreement can be resolved only, if at all, by an appeal to 
evidence. The results of some recent empirical studies are 
discussed in this chapter. 
If a study of 22 franchise restaurants, all highly con­
trolled, directed, and standardized by the parent company, 
Shelton (1967) found that when the restaurants were run by 
managers employed by the parent company (C.M,'s), their average 
weekly sales were 99*6 percent of their sales when they were 
operated by franchisee-owners (F.O.'s). This difference is so 
minimal that it appears that the separation of ownership from 
control had little effect on the sales in these restaurants. 
The profits picture for these restaurants was different, 
though, 
"The average weekly profit for all the restau­
rants during C,M, supervision was only $56,81; 
under F.O,'s the profit was $271.83» or 478 per­
cent greater. Only two of 29 observations where 
F,0,*s were in charge showed losses; in contrast 
11 of the 24 cases where C,M,'s were running the 
restaurants showed loss operations" (Shelton, 
1967, p, 1257). 
In spite of what appeared to be very strong attempts by the 
parent company to standardize the operations in all of the 
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restaurants, in spite of the fact that C.Mt's were offered 
salary incentives for profitable performances, and in spite 
of the nearly equal sales volumes of the two classes, the sep­
aration of ownership from control at the restaurant level 
seems to have had a significant effect on the restaurants* pro­
fits. This finding led Shelton to the conclusion that, "These 
data were consistent with the beliefs of the parent company 
executive who said, 'We don't think there is much change in 
sales when a restaurant Is operated by a franchisee-owner in­
stead of a company manager, but we do think profits go up. 
This is because franchisee-owners just watch the little things 
closer; they utilize the cooks and waitresses better; they re­
duce waste" (p. 1257)* 
Applying such a conclusion to large corporations may be 
of questionable validity. Large corporations may suffer from 
more organizational slack throughout the firm or they may have 
economic incentives of different strengths affecting their 
managers. In the end. If one is concerned with profit rates 
in large corporations, one must study profit rates in large 
corporations. 
In the summer of 1968, two articles were published which 
addressed themselves to precisely this problem. Monsen, Chiu, 
and Cooley (I968), henceforth abbreviated MCC, found the profit 
rate of owner controlled corporations to be significantly 
higher than for manager controlled corporations. Kamerschen 
(1968) found there to be no significant difference in the pro­
fit rates of the two types of corporations. Much of the re­
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mainder of this chapter will be a discussion and comparison 
of the data, methods, and results of these two studies. 
The dependent variable studied by MCC was the ratio of 
net income to net worth because, "This ratio measures the ef­
fects of management's efforts to provide a return on the 
owners* investment. If separation of ownership and control 
affected management motivation and caused a slackening of man­
agement's attention to the owners' Interest, it would be evi­
denced in the comparative values of this ratio" (p. 440). 
The data used in the MCC study were divided into classes 
according to three criteria; the type of control of the firm, 
the primary industry in which the firm operated, and time. 
The two types of control studied, owner and manager, were 
fairly strictly defined: 
"Owner Control 
"1. One party owning 10 percent or more of the 
voting stock is represented on the board 
or in management or is otherwise known to 
control, 
"2. One party owns 20 per cent or more of the 
voting stick, 'Party* herein indicates an 
individual, family, family holding company, 
etc. 
"Manager Control 
"1. No single block greater than 5 per cent of 
the voting stock exists. 
——— and ——— 
"2. There is no evidence of recent owner con­
trol" (pp. 438-39). 
Owner control was defined in such a manner as to allow for 
smaller stockholdings if the owning party was actively in­
volved in the control of the firm. The proxy used for active 
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control was membership on the firm's board of directors or em­
ployment by the firm as one of the chief officers. If active 
control was not observed for the firm, MCC required that the 
party own at least 20 percent of the voting stock before the 
firm would be classified as owner controlled. 
It can be seen that these criteria, while mutually exclu­
sive, are not all-inclusive. Firms in which "the party" owns 
between five and ten percent of the voting stock and is actively 
involved in their control were excluded. Also excluded were 
firms in which no active control was exhibited by a party owning 
between five and 20 percent of the voting stock. These exclu­
sions were made, "...to screen out all intermediate types of 
control so that performance testing of these two basic control 
types could be meaningful" (p. 439).1 
MCC recognized that profit rates and profit performance may 
vary from industry to industry. To allow for this possibility 
in their statistical tests, they used twelve three-digit in­
dustries, as defined by the standard industrial classifications 
of the Bureau of the Budget, and selected their sample of firms 
to be studied only from these twelve broadly defined industries. 
The Industries chosen by MCC were 
Meat Products 
Canning and Preserving 
Industrial Chemicals 
Drugs 
Oil Refineries 
It was because of this potential importance of intermediate 
types of control that the present study, as explained in 
Chapter I, uses three classifications of control Instead of two. 
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Iron and Steel Works 
Nonferrous Metals 
Electrical Equipment 
Motor Vehicles and Equipment 
Aircraft and Parts 
Industrial Machinery 
Business Machinery, 
Because the observations were annual profit rates, MCC 
included a time variable to allow for the possibility that eco­
nomic fluctuations over the twelve-year period studied (1952 -
1963) might affect profit rates. 
In the selection of MCC's sample, "...twelve industries 
with three firms of each control type were selected from 
Fortune's list of 500 largest industrial firms, by sales, in 
1963* This sample then provided data from 36 firms of each 
control type taken over a twelve-year period.... Thus 432 
observations for each control type were analyzed,.." (p. 440). 
The sample was chosen in this manner so that an equal 
number of observations could be used for each cell of a 
factorial analysis. There is little reason, though, for such 
rigidity when computers are available. If the calculations 
had to be performed by hand, an equal number of observations 
in all cells might be considered a great time-saver, but the 
unnecessary use of a balanced experimental design can create 
more problems than it solves. Many of the industries included 
in the MCC study had more than three firms of each control 
type among the 500 largest corporations, and a decision as to 
which firms to use had to be made. MCC provide no information 
concerning the basis for their decisions in thes^ cases, and 
it is possible that some of their preconceptions may have 
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Influenced these decisions. The present study, because it 
uses an unbalanced model, alleviates these problems. 
As mentioned above, MCC employed a 2 x 12 x 12, three-
factor factorial analysis of the data. In a test of the sig­
nificance of each factor and of each possible interaction of 
the factors, they found control, industry, time, and the con-
trol-industry interaction all to be highly significant (at the 
0.0005 level or better). 
Because MCC felt that a firm's size might also influence 
its profitability, they extended their analysis to include 
size, measured by sales, and used analysis of covariance tech­
niques to test for the significance of the different factors 
and their interactions with size as the concomitant variable. 
Under the analysis of covariance tests, only control and in­
dustry remained significant at the 0.0005 level. MCC con­
clude that, "The fact that the control plus industry inter­
action was not significant in the test of this ratio indicates 
that the better performance of the owner controlled group was 
significant in all the industries tested" (p. 440). Such a 
conclusion may not be warranted, however, because of MCC*s use 
of so many (twelve) industry classifications. It may well be 
that if the industry classification were collapsed into only 
a few categories according to some structural criterion such 
as the concentration ratios or barriers to entry, a signifi­
cant interaction term would result. The result that size as 
a concomitant variable was not significant also casts some 
doubt on this conclusion. Generally, one would expect that if 
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the concomitant variable in analysis of covariance is not 
significant, the basic analysis of variance results would be 
used in forming conclusions. Furthermore, even the finding 
that size does not affect a firm's profitability is question­
able, a point that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Another test of interest was performed by MCC, "The 
authors felt that merely Including the 'time* variable in the 
model to remove the serial correlations in the time series 
data of twelve years each might not in all circumstances be 
adequate. .«• Therefore, more runs by the analysis-of-
varlance methods were conducted with every time series of 
twelve observations collapsed into a single average value over 
time" (p. 445). The results of this test were that the con­
trol factor was significant at the 0.08 level, but the industry 
factor and control-industry interaction were not significant. 
MCC conclude from this test that, "The F-values now are, in 
general, not quite so highly significant as before, but they 
are still significant" (p. 445). 
That highly trained economists and statisticians can 
draw such a conclusion indicates the strength of the biases 
they imparted to their study. There is a great deal of dif­
ference between significance at the 0.0005 level and at the 
0.08 level. The latter would not even be considered statisti­
cally significant» contrary to MCC's conclusion, if, as in the 
present study, a significance level of 0.05 had been estab­
lished before the test was run. Waiting to establish the 
critical region of a test until after the test statistic is 
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calculated Is Indefensible because it allows the researcher to 
establish a critical region which will yield results consis­
tent with his preconceived notions; to avoid such a bias, the 
researcher must select the size of the critical region before 
the test statistic is calculated. 
Because of the problems mentioned in the foregoing dis­
cussion, MCC's conclusion that owner controlled corporations 
are more profitable than manager controlled corporations must 
be viewed with extreme caution. These problems can be summa­
rized as follows: 
1. Using twelve different Industry classifi­
cations based on products overlooks the possi­
bility that fewer industry classifications 
based on market structure could have been used 
and may have produced more significant results, 
2. Conclusions based on the analysis of co-
variance instead of analysis of variance are 
questionable when the covariant studied is 
statistically insignificant. 
3. The finding that size as a covariant has no 
significant effect on profits is questionable in 
its own right. 
4. Tests of significance are subject to bias if 
the level of significance at which they are to 
be performed is not decided before the test 
statistic is calculated. 
Kamerschen (1968) combined the results of several other 
works for his study on the effect of the separation of owner­
ship from control. He initially limited his study to include 
only those firms studied by Lamer (1966), and used Earner's 
measures of control (discussed in Chapter I). He employed 
multiple regression analysis using ordinary least squares with 
the average rate of return after tax on year-end equity from 
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1959 to 1964 for each firm as his dependent variable. His in­
dependent variables were: 
1. Type of ultimate control in 19^3 as determined 
by Lamer. 
2. Change in ultimate control from 1929 to 1963, 
again from Lamer. 
3. The 8-firm concentration ratio for the 4-digit 
standard Industrial classification Industry 
in which the firm operated. The data for this 
variable were from Concentration in P&nu-
facturing Industries, Subcommittee on Anti­
trust and Monopoly (1963)» 
4. The barriers to entry to the industry in which 
the firm operated, evaluated by Mann (I966). 
5» The industry growth rate from 1947-53 to 
1957-60. 
6. The industry growth rate from 1957-60 to 
1960-64. These two growth rates were taken 
from Long Term Economic Growth, 1860-1965; 
U.S. Department of Commerce (I966). 
7, Total revenue in I963. 
8. Total assets, but Kamerschen nowhere says 
whether this variable is for I963 or is an 
average of 1959 to 1964. 
9, Net worth, again unexplained as to the time 
concerned. 
Variable 2, the change of ultimate control, merits further 
scrutiny, Kamerschen*s justification of its inclusion is that 
implicit in almost all the new theories of the firm [is 
the suggestion] that the increasing separation of ownership and 
management should be associated with less emphasis on profit 
maximization and more on other goals" (p. 444). What Kamerschen 
Ignores is the implicit ceteris parabus assumption. Over a 
period of time, though, of more than thirty years, one would 
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not expect all other things to remain constant. Interest rates, 
legal structures, etc., had changed; wars, recessions, and in­
flation had taken place; technologies had changed. Furthermore, 
if one wishes to study the effect of the change in control over 
time, one must logically, then, study the profits over that 
same time period for those firms in which control changed. 
Kamerschen did not do this. Interestingly, change of control 
is the only independent variable he included in all of his dif­
ferent regressions. 
The results of some of Kamerschen*s regressions are pre­
sented in Table 3.1. In none of the regressions was type of 
control, the concentration ratio, or the industry growth rate 
from 1957-60 to 1960-64 significant. Generally, change of con­
trol, barriers to entry, the industry growth rate from 19^7-53 
to 1957-60, total revenue, and total assets were significant. 
The sample used for these regressions included only 47 firms 
because not all of the primary studies on which Kamerschen re­
lied provided data for the same firms. 
The results of these regressions, however interesting, are 
questionable for a number of reasons. First, change of control, 
which should not have been included in the regressions, is in­
explicably significant, and its statistical significance may 
have detracted from the importance of the other, more Justifi­
able economically, variables. Second, multicollinearity quite 
likely was present, especially between the concentration ratios 
and barriers to entry and between the industry growth rates for 
the two different time periods. Again, it seems strange that 
Table 3.1. Kamerschen's empirical results ^  
Coefficients and (t-values) of the Independent variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
.060 
(-1.619) 
.152 
(2.708) 
.001 
(0.229) 
.190 
(3.102) 
.050 
(1.477) 
.030 
(-1.096) 
.138 
(2.497) 
.000 
(-0.017) 
.084 
(1.888) 
.113 
(2.230) 
.002 
(0.303) 
.107 
(2.162) 
.026 
(-1.030) 
.133 
(2.451) 
.000 
(0.025) 
.134 
(2.457) 
.107 
(2.162) 
.002 
(0.283) 
.114 
(2.235) 
^Source: Kamerschen (I968,  p. 443). 
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the Industry growth rates for 19^7-53 to 1957-60 were included 
in a study of profits from 1959 to 1964; no rationale for their 
Inclusion is presented by Kamerschen. It is even more surprising 
that these growth rates were found to have a significant effect 
on the profits studied while the contemporaneous growth rates 
were not. Such results, when no economic theory is available 
to bolster their importance, suggest that the correlations 
found are spurious. 
It is Interesting, in a general comparison of the results 
of MCC and Kamerschen, to note that Kamerschen found size, 
measured either by sales or assets, and industry structure, 
measured by barriers to entry, to have a significant effect on 
firms' profits, while MCC found size, measured by sales, and 
the industry groupings (in the last-reported statistical test) 
to have no significant effect on profits. In these two areas, 
Kamerschen*s results are supported by the findings of others. 
Hall and Weiss (I967) related the profits of the 500 
largest corporations from 1957 to I962 to 1/log assets of each 
firm. The reciprocal log relationship was employed because 
they believed any correspondence between size and profits 
would not necessarily be linear. After correcting for hetero-
scedasticlty (which neither MCC nor Kamerschen did), and in­
cluding measures of industry concentration and firm growth 
rates. Hall and Weiss found that the size of a firm, but not 
the concentration ratio of the industry in which it operated, 
had a statistically significant effect on profits. These re­
sults corroborate Kamerschen's findings and cast some doubt 
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on those of MCC. 
Barriers to entry were first extensively studied by 
Bain (1965), Mann (1966, 1970) further developed Bain's work 
and tested the relationship between profits and barriers to 
entry and a measure of concentration. Barriers to entry for 
each industry were subdivided into four categories: economies 
of scale barriers, promotional barriers (product differentia­
tion), absolute cost barriers due to patents or control of 
primary Inputs for the Industry, and capital barriers. In 
each industry, each type of barrier to entry was classified 
as very high (VH), substantial (S), or moderate-to-low (M-L), 
according to a somewhat (necessarily) subjective impression of 
the information Bain and Ifenn could obtain about each industry. 
These four subclassifications were then, again somewhat sub­
jectively, aggregated into one single classification for each 
Industry. These industry barriers to entry were also cate­
gorized as VH, S, or M-L. 
The concentration measure used by Mann was different in 
each of his studies. In his I966 article, he grouped the firms 
into two groups; those in an industry with an 8-flrm concen­
tration ratio greater than or equal to seventy percent, and 
those in an industry for which this ratio was less than seventy 
percent. In his 1970 article, Mann measured concentration with 
the index of disparity, a measure of the asymmetry of the mar­
ket shares of the four largest firms in each industry. 
The firms studied in each article were the leading firms 
in each industry for which measures of barriers to entry were 
calculated. Only those firms with at least 50 percent of their 
sales in a given industry were included, in order to avoid some 
of the problems of diversification by large firms. The sample 
studied in his 1970 article was further limited to include only 
firms operating in industries in which the 8-firm concentration 
ratio was at least 70 percent. 
In the first of these two articles (1966), rfenn found that 
the average rates of return (net income divided by net worth) 
from 1950 to i960 were l6.4 for firms in industries with VH 
barriers to entry, 11.3 in industries with S barriers, and 9»9 
in industries with M-L barriers. The firms were then regrouped 
into the two classes mentioned earlier with regards to con­
centration ratios. Msurin found that those firms in industries 
with a concentration ratio of at least 70 percent had an average 
rate of return of 13.3, while those in industries with lower 
concentration ratios had an average rate of return of only 9*0. 
He also reported that among the firms in industries with con­
centration ratios of at least 70 percent, those in industries 
with VH barriers to entry had an average rate of return equal 
to 16,4, those in industries with S barriers had an average 
rate of return of 11,1, and those in industries with M-L bar­
riers had 11.9» No tests for significance were performed on 
these data, but Mann concluded that the figures strongly indi­
cated the existence of a positive relationship between profit 
rates and VH barriers but that S barriers had no substantial 
effect over M-L barriers on profit rates. He also tentatively 
concluded that concentration might, independently of barriers 
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to entry, have an effect on profit rate. 
In his second article (1970), Mann actually tested for 
the significance of the effects of structural variables on 
profit rates. The variables used were 
Y = the average rate of return for a firm 
from 1948 to 1957» 
Yyh = the average rate of return for a firm 
in an industry with VH barriers to 
entry, 1948 to 1957. 
Xh = one if the industry in which the firm 
operated had VH barriers; zero otherwise, 
X2 = one of the industry in which the firm 
operated had S barriers; zero otherwise, 
X3 = the 1950 index of disparity for the 
industry in which a firm operated. 
Xi^  = one if the index of disparity was at 
least 6,0; zero if the index was less 
than 6,0, 
The results of five of Mann's regressions are presented 
in Table 3.2. As can be seen, firms in industries with VH 
barriers to entry had average rates of return which were 
significantly greater than did the other firms, but firms in 
industries with S barriers did not have profit rates signif­
icantly greater than the firms with M-L barriers. It can 
also be seen that the index of disparity in no regression had 
an effect which was significantly (at the five percent level) 
greater than zero, although X^. was nearly significant in both 
cases. It is not surprising that the results of these two 
studies are consistent with Kamerschen*s findings concerning 
barriers to entry and concentration since Kamerschen limited 
his sample to include only firms for which barrier-to-entry 
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Table 3,2. The effect of barriers to entry and asymmetry on 
profits ® 
depen­
dent 
varia­
ble 
intercept coefficients and (standard errors) 
for independent variables 
S2 
Xl X2 X3 X4 
Y 10,97 4,24 
(1.72) 
-0.29 
(1.72) 
.262 
Y 9.97 4,26 
(1.74) 
-0.29 
(1.74) 
0.17 
(0.24) 
.245 
Y 10.02 4.24 
(1.67) 
—0,10 
(1.68) 
1.90 
(1.28) 
.298 
^VH 12,04 0,55 
(0.42) 
.069 
^VH 13.18 4.06 
(2.31) 
.144 
^Source: Mann (1970, pp, 88-89), 
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data were available from Mann's I966 work. 
Mann warns his readers that his results cannot be taken as 
the final word on the subject, 
"But rates of return may be Inadequate indi­
cators of price-cost margins, the particular 
barrler-to-entry classification Into which an 
Industry was placed may be Incorrect, the period 
1950-1960 may be a short run for some of the In­
dustries In the sample, and some sufficient con­
ditions for the exercise of monopolistic pricing 
may not be fulfilled. More research would help 
to provide firmer conclusions" (19^6, p. 300). 
There are two additional problems with his research which 
Mann does not mention. One of these problems Is that by de­
riving barrler-to-entry measures for Industries and using only 
firms with at least fifty percent of their sales derived from 
one Industry, Mann may have permitted two different biases to 
enter Into his tests. The first bias is that some very large 
firms with only 49 percent of their sales in one Industry were 
excluded, but the monopoly power of such firms (for which 
barriers to entry is a proxy) may or may not be greater than 
that of the included firms. At any rate, including such firms 
in the tests may produce results different from those obtained 
by Mann. The second possible source of bias is that the as­
signment of each firm to only one industry overlooks the mono­
poly power a firm may possess from its operations in industries 
from which less than fifty percent of its total revenue is de­
rived. By way of example, consider the hypothetical firms A, 
B, and C. Suppose that A has 40 percent of its sales in an in­
dustry with VH barriers to entry, 40 percent in an Industry 
with S barriers, and 20 percent in an industry with M-L barriers 
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Firm A would have been excluded from Mann's studies because at 
least fifty percent of its sales were not from one Industry. 
Suppose that firm B has 51 percent of its sales in an industry 
with VE barriers and 49 percent in an industry with S barriers, 
while C has 49 percent of its sales in a VH-barrier industry 
and 51 percent in an S-barrier industry. Mann would have 
placed B in the VH category and C in the S category, even though 
the difference between the two is minimal. Ideally, one would 
like to eliminate these potential problems in studying the re­
lationship between monopoly power and profits. 
The other difficulty with Miann's studies, though it may be 
minor, arises from Mann's general reliance on Bain's earlier 
work. In cases for which Bain had trouble deciding the type 
of barriers to entry to an industry, he referred to the profit 
rates of the firms in that Industry. If these seemed greater 
than average. Bain placed the industry in a classification of 
higher barriers to entry; if they seemed less than average, he 
selected the lower barrier-to-entry category for that in­
dustry.^ To the extent that barrier-to-entry classifications 
were decided upon finally by an examination of the profit rates 
of firms in the industries, one must discount the economic 
significance of Mann's results. 
The empirical results of Williamson (1963) do not provide 
^See, for example, his discussion of the tire and tube indus­
try, p. 278, It should be noted, however, that in the course 
of the present study, a careful review of all barrier-to-entry 
classifications was made, and this bias appeared to be minimal. 
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much help in reconciling what might be called the MCC-
Kamerschen controversy, though they do yield some general in­
sights into manager behavior, Williamson's first set of evi­
dence comes from in-depth case studies of three firms to which 
he assigns the hypothetical names of Chemical Products, Inc., 
Midwest Processing Corp,, and General Manufacturing Co,, hence­
forth referred to as firms C, M, and G, respectively. 
Forty percent of firm C*s stock was held by the heirs of 
its founder, and this family was heavily represented on the 
board of directors and among the chief officers of the firm. 
Heirs of the founders of firm M also controlled over 40 percent 
of its common stock and were heavily represented on its board 
of directors, but they were not significantly present in the 
top executive positions in the firm. Firm G was widely held, 
with only one percent of its stock held by stockholders owning 
more than a thousand shares and no officer of the firm owning 
more than ,05 percent of the stock. 
Each firm had experienced a rather comfortable existence 
until the mid-1950*s when they all faced stagnating sales re­
cords and dwindling profits, Williamson found that each firm 
reacted, after two or three years, to these adverse conditions 
by embarking on cost-reduction and cost-control programs. That 
is, each firm attempted to regain its satisficing rate of re­
turn by decreasing some of the slack present in its organization. 
The lag in adjustment presumably occurred because the firms* 
managements did not want to embark on a massive program of re­
organization in response to what might be transitory conditions. 
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Williamson points out that any firm subjected to such 
adversities as these firms faced might be expected to try to 
reduce its costs. He felt, however, that the manner in which 
each of these firms cut their costs indicated that the cost 
reductions were made primarily in areas which were most likely 
to have a great deal of slack and discretionary over-expendi-
ture. The firms generally reduced their expenditures on pe­
ripheral staff, reducing the number of secretarial and cleri­
cal employees. They also restricted their research and develop­
ment expenditures to projects which had only high probabilities 
of being profitable. Additionally, they eliminated many intra-
firm services in order to make division managers, who then 
had to contract with other firms for these services, more 
conscious of the actual costs involved. Finally, they reduced 
a number of the previously provided managerial perquisites 
such as a company plane, executive dining rooms, high expense 
accounts, etc. 
Although the general responses of the firms were similar, 
interesting differences between them were evident. Firm C 
began its reorganization and cost reductions at all levels 
within the organization. Top management officials were re­
placed, and with this severing from past experiences, reorga­
nization and cost reduction throughout the firm was facili­
tated. It appeared that the owners of the firm decided to 
give up much of their active involvement in management and 
their management-related perquisites in order to guarantee 
themselves a future flow of income from their stockholdings. 
70 
In other words, even in a strong owner controlled firm (by 
the criteria developed in Chapter I), profit-reducing activi­
ties are engaged in unless or until the firm is subjected to 
the rigors of competition. 
Firm M was also strong owner controlled, but its managers 
were not members of the owning group. If the theories of 
managerialism are correct, one would anticipate that initially 
in such a firm the cost-reduction programs would be imple­
mented primarily at the bottom of the organizational pyramid, 
with managerial perquisites reserved for reduction only if the 
Initial phases of cost reduction are insufficient. Precisely 
this sequence of events was observed in Firm M. 
Firm G showed a response to adversity similar to the re­
sponse of firm M with one slight variation. Firm G's division 
managers had previously controlled much of what went on in the 
corporation, and when adverse conditions became evident to the 
top managers, they had sufficient information about and con­
trol of the divisions and their managers to require rather 
sweeping changes at the division levels without jeopardizing 
their own positions. That is, in a manager controlled cor­
poration, slack within the firm was reduced up to the level 
of the top management, but the separation of ownership from 
the control by top managers left the latter in a relatively 
Immune position. 
Each of these case studies suggests that in the absence 
of adversity, organizational slack is prevalent throughout a 
firm regardless of its type of control. The studies further 
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suggest that unless top managers have an extremely strong in­
terest in the firm.'s profits and unless they fear that profit-
reducing expense preferences by themselves will have such a 
detrimental effect on the firm's profits that they might lose 
their jobs due to bankruptcy of the firm, they will strive to 
regain a satisficing rate of return without significantly 
altering their own total compensations, again regardless of the 
type of control of the firm. 
Case studies provide interesting insights into economic 
phenomena, but because they concern themselves with specific 
Instances, they lack a statistical rigor which might be avail­
able from cross-section analyses of a larger number of corpora­
tions. In recognition of this fact, Williamson provided addi­
tional evidence and tests relating to the leading firms in 
each of 26 Industries for 1953» 1957» and I96I. These tests 
studied the compensation of the top executive of each corpora­
tion because, "Under the utility maximizing hypothesis, a posi­
tive expense preference toward emoluments exists. In parti­
cular, executive salaries should be correlated with the oppor­
tunities for discretion" (p. 129). 
The actual model tested by Williamson was 
X = ttQ U 
where X = the compensation of the top executive in each 
firm. 
S = the general administrative and selling expense 
of the firm. Williamson believed that this 
measure would proxy for management's expense 
preference for staff. 
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C = the concentration ratio in the firm's 
industry. 
H = the height of the barriers to entry into 
the firm's industry, VH and substantial 
barriers designated as one class, M-L 
barriers as another class. 
B = the proportion of the seats on the board 
of directors filled by the officers of 
the firm. 
U = a random error term. 
Natural logarithms were taken of both sides of the equa­
tion, and ordinary least squares regressions were run for each 
year. The results, presented in Table 3.3» are not impressive, 
X appears to be highly dependent on S, but such a result 
cannot be taken as a confirmation of Williamson's hypothesis 
that managers have a positive expense preference for staff. 
Some of the correlation between these two variables is spurious 
because the compensation of officers makes up part of the gen­
eral administrative and selling expenses. The correlation 
that might remain if this bias were corrected can easily be 
explained by profit-maximization theories because one would 
expect the top executives of larger firms with larger staffs 
and expenses to have to be better organizers, coordinators, 
and managers. If indeed they are better managers, they would, 
in a competitive market for managers, be able to demand higher 
compensations. A further problem is that in his regressions, 
Williamson treats staff as an independent variable, but his 
entire theoretical development of expense preferences treats 
discretionary expenditures on staff as a dependent variable. 
A better test (but not performed either by Williamson or in 
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Table 3.3. Estimated 
Williamson 
coefficients and 
•s model & 
(standard errors) of 
1953 1957 1961 
ai 0.228 0.240 0.218 
(0.061) (0.052) (0.054) 
«2 0.503 0.513 0.422 
(0.157) (0.143) (O.I52) 
*3 0.446 0.221 0.200 
(0.110) (0.114) (0.126) 
*4 0.137 0.139 0.053 
(0.118) (0.101) (0.120) 
^Source: Williamson (1963, P» 133)» 
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the present study) would "be a regression of staff on those 
economic forces which might constrain management's expense pre­
ference for staff, such as industrial structure and the type 
of control. A final problem with Williamson's S variable is 
that if his hypothesis is correct that managers have a posi­
tive expense preference for staff, S should be correlated with 
Î * 
his other independent variables, and the multicollinearity pre­
sent would bias his estimate of the a's. 
The C and H variables, besides potentially suffering from 
the obvious problem of multicollinearity, also have the prob­
lem mentioned concerning the studies by MCC, Kanerschen, and 
Mann that they do not account for diversification by large 
firms selling in more than one industry. The significance of 
these variables in Williamson's regression does suggest, 
though, that some of the monopoly profits earned by large cor­
porations accrue to their managers, implying that the market 
for managers is not perfect and that managers of firms with 
monopoly power extract a rent from the firms* owners.^ 
That the concentration ratio was more significant in the 
regressions than barriers to entry may be due to two economic 
effects in addition to whatever statistical effect may have 
been caused by multicollinearity. First, the managers of firms 
in highly concentrated industries may find that their small 
numbers facilitate communication between them, permitting them 
^This implication suggests also that at least a portion of the 
relationship between executive incomes and staff might also be 
due to an imperfect market for managers. 
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as a group to collude against the owners of their firms to ex­
tract higher rents. Second, if Williamson had grouped the in­
dustries into a class with VH barriers and a class with S or 
M-L barriers, the barrier-to-entry variable may have been more 
significant. This possibility is suggested by Mann's tests 
presented earlier in this chapter, but which had not yet been 
performed when Williamson did his study. 
The variable used for the composition of the board of dir­
ectors has problems associated with it, too. The main diffi­
culty with it is that it fails to distinguish between manager 
controlled firms in which the managers are well-represented on 
the board and owner controlled firms in which members of the 
owning group are also officers of the firm. In both cases the 
proportion of officers holding seats on the board of directors 
would be high, but the type of control of the two firms would 
be different. For example, this measure would fail to dis­
criminate between firms C and G of Williamson's case studies 
even though C was strong owner controlled and G was manager 
controlled. Because this variable is an inadequate proxy for 
one of the types of constraints to which managers may be sub­
ject, it is not surprising that the variable is statistically 
insignificant, and this insignificance cannot be construed as 
evidence that the separation of ownership from control has no 
effect on managers' behavior. 
Williamson also thought that managers have a positive 
preference for growth in order to enhance their power, pres­
tige, and salaries. If so, he reasoned, one should observe 
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that firms with a higher proportion of officers on the board 
of directors would retain more earnings than other firms. To 
test this hypothesis, he used the two largest firms in each 
of the industries previously studied to construct paired ob­
servations. Under his hypothesis, firms with higher manage­
ment representation on the board should report higher retained 
earnings; industries in which this higher-higher relationship 
actually existed were assigned the value of one, and the other 
industries were assigned the value of zero. A normal approxi­
mation to the binomial was used to test for the significance 
of this relationship with the result that only in I961 was it 
significant at the five percent level, but a test of the total 
observations for the years 1953t 1957» and I96I was also signif­
icant at the five percent level. 
Because the observations may not have been Independent 
over time, the use of totals for all three years may be in­
valid. Williamson says, 
"A chi-square iest for association was used, 
A low value ofXris consistent with the hypothesis 
that the observations between successive four-year 
intervals are independent. The value of be­
tween 1953 and 1957 is 0.0065, and between 1957 and 
1961 is 0.62. Sampling randomly from independent 
populations, values as high or higher than this 
would occur 95 percent and 45 percent of the time 
respectively. Hence the hypothesis of independence 
is supported, the pooling of the observations is 
justified, and the best test for the composition-
of-the-board effect [on earnings retention policy"] 
is that of all three years combined" (p. 137). 
To test for the size of this effect, Williamson re­
gressed the log of the ratio of the retained earnings of the 
two firms in each industry on the log of the ratio of their 
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board compositions. In no year was the coefficient of the 
independent variable significant at the five percent level, 
and surprisingly, Williamson did not combine the observations 
for all three years into one regression. 
No definitive conclusions can be drawn from the studies 
discussed in this chapter as to whether the separation of own­
ership from control significantly affects the profit performance 
of large firms. Sheldon's study, while of interest, may not be 
generalizable to large firms. MCC's work, though indicating 
the existence of an effect, is marred by their failure to 
establish critical regions for their tests before performing 
them and by their industry classifications which do not very 
clearly allow for industrial structure effects. A major prob­
lem associated with Kamerschen's regressions is his inclusion 
of the questionable variable measuring the change of control 
from 1929 to 1963. And Williamson's regressions suffered 
from misspecification,! potential multicollinearity, and the 
use of indefensible proxies for the constraints on managers. 
The studies by MCC, Kamerschen, Mann, and Williamson are 
also subject to the criticism that diversification by large 
corporations was treated inadequately and that no tests for 
heteroscedasticity were performed. Hall and Weiss did attempt 
some corrections for these two problems, but they did not test 
the managerial hypotheses. 
^The inclusion of the dependent variable, staff, with the in­
dependent variables. 
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In summary, the implications of the results of each of the 
reviewed studies can be related to equation 2.4. 
Shelton. In small firms like restaurants, the terms 
seem very high for all employees. The owners maintain such 
close control of the firm that internal inefficiencies are 
quickly discovered and removed, 
MÇC. In large corporations, the terms appear to be 
smaller for management controlled firms than for owner con­
trolled firms, d may also be higher for the former than for 
the latter. If is important for managers of large corpora­
tions, and is near zero, these relative sizes of PQ, d, 
and Ni are consistent with MCC's findings that profit rates 
of management controlled firms are less than those of owner 
controlled firms. 
Kamerschen. His results suggest relative sizes of P^, d, 
N(i, and which are quite different from those implied by 
MCC's results. If owner controlled corporations and manage­
ment controlled corporations report essentially the same pro­
fit rates, one explanation may be that d is the same in all 
corporations, that Nj^ is high, Is low, and/or P^ Is high 
for all managers. An alternative explanation may be that the 
sizes of these variables are correctly listed in the discussion 
of MCC's results, but that these variables are Important for 
decisions by all employees in the corporation. This alter­
native explanation would rely on the assertion that the effect 
of organizational slack overpowers any effect emanating from 
the separation of ownership from control. 
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Williamson. The three case studies reported by 
Williamson suggest that PQ is relatively low in all large 
corporations, regardless of their types of control, so long 
as they are earning normal profits. They further suggest that 
is low for all employees when these firms are reporting 
satisfactory rates of return. changes differentially by 
the corporations' types of control when their profits become 
subnormal for several years. Then increases for most non-
management employees, and it also seems to increase more for 
managers of owner controlled firms than for management con­
trolled firms. 
In the next chanter a behavioral model of the firm will 
be constructed, incorporating the main features of the mana­
gerial hypothesis. This model will be built in such a manner 
that its implications can be subjected to direct empirical 
testing. The tests performed on this model have the advantage 
that they are derived from an explicit model and that they re­
fine and correct the work described in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV. A SYNTHESIZED FORMAL MODEL 
OF THE MANAGERIAL HYPOTHESIS 
Of all the theories discussed in Chapter n, only 
Williamson's went so far as to develop a formal model of the 
behavior of the firm. This model, though, as was pointed out, 
has some rather serious drawbacks and is incomplete in its 
omission of a variable for industrial structure. In this 
chapter, an attempt is made to synthesize the various argu­
ments put forth by advocates of the theories of managerialism 
and to formalize them in such a manner that meaningful, i,e,, 
testable, hypotheses can be generated. This model will be 
developed starting with very simple and extreme assumptions, 
but as its development progresses, some assumptions will be 
relaxed and some additional variables will be included. 
Initially, consider a firm which is completely con­
trolled and managed by its owner(s). Suppose that a necessary 
condition for owner maximization of utility is the maximi­
zation of the profits actually reported by the firm (this sup­
position will be relaxed later). This model deals with re­
ported profits rather than economic profits or with the pro­
fits a firm might potentially earn if it were to maximize 
economic profits because data are available for only .the first 
of these. If, however, reported profits are maximized, as 
supposed above, they are equal to what will later be called 
potential profits, but again the concept of economic profits 
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Is Ignored.1 
The profit function for the above firm Is 
4.1 s R(çt) ~ C(q) 
where ttjj - reported profits, 
R(q) Is the firm's total revenue as a function 
of the firm's rate of output, 
C(q) Is the firm's total cost as a function 
of the rate of output, 
> 0 for the relevant region of output, 
§§ > 0' 
If the owner(s) of this firm are In equilibrium (l.e,, 
slmultemeously maximizing utility and equation 4,1 can 
be rewritten as 
4.2 irg = Rfq*) - C(qJ 
where the ° refers to an equilibrium value and q^j Is the 
profit-maximizing rate of output. 
If corporation Income taxes are made explicit In the 
model, the equilibrium reported profits become 
= BCq*) - C(qm) - t[R(qj^) - CCq^)] 
or 
1 
Basing this model on reported profits has the additional 
benefit that then It can be directly related to equation 2,4. 
A fT on the left side of that equation refers to possible In­
creases In reported profits. 
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4.3 = (l-t)[R(qjji) - C(qjjj)] 
This model can now be expanded to include the structure 
of the industry in which the firm is operating» To some extent 
industrial structure has been taken into consideration with 
the condition on equation 4.1 that <0. The equal sign 
a? * 
holds under perfect competition, and the less-than sign holds 
under any form of imperfect competition. But industrial 
structure also affects firm behavior by potentially changing 
the profit-maximizing rate of output from what it might have 
been under perfect competition and by potentially providing 
a total revenue function which is different from what it 
might have been under perfect competition, A formalization 
of these possibilities is 
4.4 ttI . (l-t)[R(B,qjj(B)] - C(qjB))] 
where B is an indicator of the industry's structure. B can 
be thought of as a measure of the monopoly power held by the 
firm — the greater the monopoly power, the higher Is B, 
Hi, the partial derivative of the total revenue function 
with respect to the function's first argument, ^  0. This 
indeterminacy is built into the model because it is con­
ceivable that as a firm gains monopoly power, the demand 
curve for its output may rotate clockwise, and hence some 
portions of it represent rates of output which generate less 
total revenue than would be generated under the former demand 
conditions. An example of this possibility is demonstrated 
In Figure 4.1. If the firm changes from being a perfect 
R3 
MC 
Price 
per 
unit 
MR 
0 Rate of 
output 
FiCTre 4,1, Perfect competition and monopolistic comDctition 
compared 
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competitor to being a monopolistic competitor, all rates of 
output for which the monopolistic competition demand curve 
(B) Is below the perfect competition demand curve (A) repre­
sent situations In which < 0. However, by gaining monopoly 
oB 
power, a firm may also gain a much larger share of the market 
and shift Its demand curve upward, say to B', so that for all 
relevant rates of output ÊE > 0. ÔB -
^ w, also. As shown In Figure 4.1, an Increase In a 
firm's monopoly power may lead to a reduction of Its profit-
maximizing rate of output (from to Qg). If, though, the 
firm gains a larger share of the market with Its addltlon&l 
monopoly power. Its profit-maximizing rate of output may In­
crease, say to Qgi. Hence the Indetermlnancy. 
Prom the above conditions It can be seen that 
9qm 
It Is assumed, though, that ÊS - Ê2 > 0 because an Increase In 
9B ÔB -
a firm's monopoly power is presumed never to decrease the 
potential profitability of the firm. 
Suppose now that there is some separation of ownership 
from the control of the firm. This separation, according to 
the managerial hypothesis, will have the effect of permitting 
greater latitude to the managers in the operations of the 
firm. The managers may find that their utility is enhanced by 
85 
reporting lower-than-maxiraum profits and. using the difference 
between the maximum potential reported profits and the actual 
reported profits for their own ends. In terms of equation 2,4, 
managers may find U(N^) sufficiently high relative to U(Ni) 
and the terms that they would report only a portion of 
the profits and use the remainder for emoluments. 
With this further development, reported profits may di­
verge from potential profits, and may only be something 
of a quasi-equi 1 ibrium. The owners may no longer have suffi­
cient control of the firm to enforce policies leading to pro­
fit maximization, but reported profits represent an equilibrium 
which allows for the political and economic realities of the 
situation; they represent the results of the implicit (or, 
in some cases perhaps, explicit) games and bargaining between 
owners and managers. 
The effect of this separation of ownership from control 
will first be incorporated into the model under the assumption 
that it does not affect the firm's rate of output (this assump­
tion will also be relaxed later). Justification for this 
assumption is provided by the pricing studies conducted by 
Kaplan, Dirlam, and Lanzillottl In which firms stated that 
while they do not maximize profits, they could not increase 
their profits by changing their pricing policies (1958, pp. 
130, 269). Williamson (1963) also lends support to this 
assumption by saying, "Thus, it is possible that the manage­
ment first selects that physical combination of factors that 
maximize profits and then absorbs some amount of actual profit 
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as cost. These absorptions may be correlated with the same 
measures of discretion and taste as would be expected under 
the utility maximizing theory [see Chapter II]" (p. 12?). 
Under this assumption, the model becomes 
4.5 = (l-t)(l-K)[R(B,qni(B))-C(qjB)] 
where K is the portion of potential profits not reported but 
instead used for emoluments. 
It was pointed out in Chapter II that even the owners of 
owner controlled firms may have an incentive, due to income tax 
laws, not to report their potential profits but to reserve a 
portion of them for emoluments. That such conditions might 
prevail in reality was further indicated in the discussion in 
Chapter III of Williamson's case study of firm C. Firm C, it 
will be recalled, was owner controlled and managed but per­
mitted the existence of excess costs until it faced adverse 
market conditions. 
If owners, too, seek emoluments, as indicated above, the 
supposition that profit maximization is a necessary condition 
for maximization of utility must be dispensed with. K, the 
portion of profits reserved for emoluments, can be related to 
three measurable quantities : the strength of managerial con­
trol, the structure of the industry in which the firm is 
operating, and the ratio of expected profits to a minimum pro­
fit constraint: 
4.6 K = K(T, B,  le)  
•"c 
where T - the strength of managerial control. 
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= expected potential profits, and 
ttq z the satisficing minimum profit constraint. 
^ > 0 because as managerial control of the firm in­
creases, the managers have more freedom to withhold more of 
the potential profits as emoluments (Pqo equation 2,4 is 
lower). Strictly construed, the managerial theories might 
be interpreted as saying that T = 0 implies K = 0, but a 
more realistic model should allow for the seeking of emolu­
ments by owners and by other employees of the firm besides the 
managers. Consequently, the assumption for the present model 
is that T « 0 Implies K > 0, depending on the values of the 
other arguments of the K function. 
Ay 
^ > 0 because a firm with a high degree of monopoly will 
be less subject to economic constraints of the market than if 
it had a low degree of monopoly power. Furthermore, a firm 
with a high degree of monopoly power may wish to avoid the 
possibility of adverse public opinion which might arise if 
they reported all of their monopoly profits (Hall and Weiss, 
1967, p. 321), in spite of the fact that high profits per se 
are not a violation of antitrust laws. As Stigler suggests, 
"...the magnitude of monopoly elements in wages, executive 
compensation, royalties, and rents is possibly quite large" 
(1956. p. 35). 
Alchian and Kessel also suggest that ^  > 0: 
3B -
"All monopolies are subject to regulation or the 
threat of destruction through antitrust action. 
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And one of criteria that the courts seem to con­
sider in evaluating whether or not a firm is 
a 'good* monopoly is its profitability. It 
behooves an unregulated monopoly, if it wants to 
remain one, not to appear to be too profitable" 
(1962, p. 165). 
"If wealth cannot be taken out of an organi­
zation in salaries or in other forms of personal 
pecuniary property, the terms of trade between 
pecuniary wealth and nonpecuniary business-
associated forms of satisfaction turn against 
the former. More of the organization's funds 
will now be reinvested (which need not result in 
increased wealth) in ways that enhance the man­
ager's prestige or status in the community. Or 
more money can be spent for goods and services 
that enhance the manager's and employees' utility. 
There can be more luxurious offices, more special 
services, and so forth, than would ordinarily 
result if their costs were coming out of per­
sonal wealth" (p, l64),l 
It will also be recalled, from Chapter II, that Adam 
Smith (1937) suggested that the grant of a perpetual mono­
poly leads to less than profit-maximizing behavior. And in 
a now famous statement. Hicks added that "the quiet life is 
the best of all monopoly profits" (1935, P® 8), 
Some interaction between T and B may exist in their 
effect on K and hence If T is low, representing strong 
owner control, as the firm's monopoly power increases, the 
above arguments predict that K should increase. But if T 
increases at the same time, managers have even more oppor­
tunities for discretion at their disposal, and K might in­
crease even more. Formally this interaction can be stated 
as > 0, 
ÔBÔT 
^Alchian and Kessel would argue that for some managers, 
U(N^) in equation 2,4 is negative. 
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The equal signs are allowed for in the assumptions 
about M and 9K because a firm, although it may be manager 
3T 9B 
controlled and be in an industry with a high concentration 
ratio and VH barriers to entry, may face such adverse condi­
tions (e.g., a declining market or a cut-back in government 
purchases) that the very survival of the firm depends on the 
absence of discretionary expenditures. For this reason and 
for the reason that even the owners of a widely held corpora­
tion may vote out of office the incumbent managers if re­
ported profits are unsatisfactory, the term is included 
in the model as a determinate of K. 
If > 1, those involved in the management and con­
trol of the firm expect the profits to be sufficiently high 
to permit their pursuit of emoluments. But if < 1 but 
near 1, K cannot necessarily be expected to equal zero be­
cause even under these only slightly adverse conditions, 
utility may be maximized through profit-reducing behavior due 
to the Impact of taxes on economic incentives. Only if 
is substantially less than one might K be reduced to zero, 
as indicated by the three case studies performed by Williamson. 
If « 1, one would expect the terms of equation 2.4 
to increase significantly under the managerial hypothesis. 
Equations 4.5 and 4.6 can be combined to yield 
>*.7 = (l-t)Ll-K(T,B,^)]LB(B,q„(B))-0(q„(B))] .  
To this point, the discretionary use of profits has been 
incorporated into the model only as a proportion of the 
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potential profits; the assumption so far has been that firms 
will operate at the profit-maximizing rate of output. It may 
be, though, that the discretionary expenditures on perquisites 
would increase the firm's output beyond the profit-maximizing 
rate. Additional business trips, Lear jets, limousines, ex­
penditures on good will, etc,, might all increase the output 
of the firm. In addition, more output than might result 
from various division and department managers* attempts to 
build their own empires within the firm with little regard for 
the effects these attempts could have on the firm's profits. 
The size of this output effect depends on T, B, 
and qjjj. The equilibrium rate of output is 
^•8 Qo = Sm + -pt q^,) 
where q^ is the equilibrium rate of output, and f is the out­
put effect. Various partial derivatives of f are initially 
assumed to have the following signs; 
fg > 0, where fg is the partial derivative of f with 
respect to its second argument, and 
> 0, because in each of these cases, an increase 
in the argument of f permits more opportunity for a discre­
tionary, profit-reducing increase in the firm's rate of out-
^ > 0, also under the assumption that as a firm grows, 
"9m 
so will its range for this potential output effect. 
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ô^f 
It can also be assumed that where X represents T, B, 
or TTg/iTg, Is negative if the output effect generates dimin­
ishing marginal utility. Further specifications are that 
ÔR 
5f 
> 0 ,  
5? > 0' 
a^c 
> 0» and 
~ ~ in equilibrium because the output effect pre-
of of 
sumably pushes the firm beyond the profit-maximizing rate of 
output, into the region in which its marginal costs are greater 
than marginal revenue. 
With equation 4.8 substituted into the revenue and cost 
functions of equation 4.7» the complete model can be written 
as 
4.9 = (l-t)[l-K(T,B,^)] 
{R[B.qni(B)+f(T.B,^.qjj,(B)]-
The key elements of equation 4.9 are K and f, the variables 
which reflect profit-reducing behavior in firms. In equation 
2.4, this behavior was shown to depend on relatively high 
values of d and UfN^) and relatively low values of U(N^) and 
the various terms. The theories of managerialism suggest 
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that the relative strengths of these terms In equation 2,4 
vary with the type of control of the firm so that profit-
reducing behavior Is more prevalent In manager controlled 
firms than in owner controlled firms. This prediction is 
captured in equation 4,9 with the assumptions the ^  > 0 and 
0 .  
ÔT " 
The influences of B and '^e/'^c K are Included in equa­
tion 4,9 so that the ceteris paribus assumption will be main­
tained In the statistical tests of this model, ^ > 0 and 
fg > 0 reflect the possibility that firms with a high degree 
of monopoly power will be satisfied with normal-profits and 
that their potential monopoly profits will be subsumed in 
emoluments. In such firms, the decision makers would view 
the Pg as being near zero, and, if they fear that excessive 
profits may attract too much attention from the Justice De­
partment, U(Nj^) ml^t even be negative, 
> 1 represents a necessary condition for satls-
ficing behavior. So long as this condition is met, the 
terms of equation 2,4 will be small, but if < i, the 
Pqo terms will become larger. If « 1, the P^Q terms 
may approach values of one, and consequently K and f will be 
very small. 
Although equation 4,9 relies on the probabilities and 
utilities of equation 2,4, it has the advantage over theories 
which stop with utility functions in that its form leads 
directly to the derivation of testable hypotheses. The chief 
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additional assumptions necessary for tests to be performed on 
equation 4,9 are that the model applies to all large corpora­
tions and that variables excluded from the model have an in­
significant effect on reported profits. 
Meaningful hypotheses are derived from this model by con­
sidering partial derivatives and cross-partial derivatives of 
TTg with respect to some of the variables on the right side of 
equation 4.9» For example, 
âf = - % (l-t)(H-C)+(l-t)(l-K)(P - §;) ^  
e 
In this section, the arguments of the functions will be 
omitted from the equations unless they are necessary for clar­
ity. The signs inserted below the various parts of the 
equation indicate the assumed values of their corresponding 
parts under the managerial-discretion model of equation 4.9» 
?VlT® 
These assumed signs, when taken together, predict that R 
9 T 
< 0, as indicated by the circled negative sign below the 
equation. The model predicts that,ceteris paribus, manager 
controlled firms should report lower profits than owner con­
trolled firms. Such a prediction clearly can be tested by an 
appeal to evidence. 
Consider now the effect of an interaction between an 
exogenous change in the corporate income tax rates and the 
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type of control. 
4.11 
V 
+ 
tJ 
+ 
e 
This equation predicts that firms controlled by managers 
should report smaller changes in reported profits in response 
to a tax change than should firms controlled by owners. This 
prediction along with that of equation 4.10 is depicted 
graphically in Figure 4.2. The lines on this figure repre­
sent the relationship between reported profits and tax rates. 
The line labeled T-high represents this relationship for 
manager controlled firms. That its slope is less negative 
than the slope of the line labeled T-low (owner controlled 
firms) shows the meaning of the positive sign predicted by 
equation 4.11, While an increase in the corporate tax rate 
will decrease the reported profits for all firms, it is pre­
dicted to decrease them less for manager controlled firms 
than for owner controlled firms. 
The derivation of meaningful theorems concerning mono­
poly power is more difficult because it is not immediately 
obvious what signs should be attached to the partial deriva­
tives. 
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PiOTre 4.2. The effect of taxes and the type of control on 
reported profits 
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-ii; ^  - If < V If; 1^)] 
These terms can be rearranged into a more manageable form, 
4.13 îllS - (l-t)(l-K)[Ri+  ^- ÊÇ_ 23s 1 ÔB 1 3%% as 9q J m Ô B 
Ô 
- 11 (l-t)(R-C) 
" + + + 
e 
@ 
The three terms on the right side of equation 4.13 might 
be called, respectively, the potential-profit effect, the 
emolument effect, and the output effect. The potential-profit 
effect is unambiguously positive; firms with a higher degree 
of monopoly power are predicted to have higher potential pro­
fits. This effect is mitigated by the emolument effect; firms 
with a higher degree of monopoly power are predicted to seek 
more emoluments and thus use a greater portion of potential 
profits for perquisites and salaries. The output effect is 
9q 
ambiguous because of the unknown sign of —S, As a result of 
9B 
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the different influences of these three effects, the sign of 
9tt2 
also appears to be ambiguous. 
o B 
To obtain at least a tentative prediction of the sign of 
equation 4,13, the utility theory of equation 2,4 underlying 
the model must be relied upon. Assume for the moment that 
those in control of firms have similar utility functions. 
Assume further that the marginal utility of additional re­
ported profits for these people is positive. This assumption 
is reasonable if those in control of firms derive additional 
status, power, prestige, or increased salaries from reporting 
Increased profits. It is also reasonable if the additional 
reported profits provide them with a source of additional 
money income which provides more utility than would the al­
ternative discretionary use of additional potential profits. 
This second condition is possible if a controlling manager 
owns at least one share of stock in his corporation and stands 
to benefit from an enhanced value of his stock through in­
creased dividends or capital gains. 
Economic theory of individual behavior predicts that 
under these assumptions, if the alternatives facing decision 
makers are dlvisable, some of each alternative (increased 
and increased emoluments and output) will be taken when the 
opportunity presents Itself, so long as the costs of the al­
ternatives are neither zero nor Infinite. These costs, or 
more precisely these opportunity costs, will be finite and 
positive if and only if the probabilities attached to equation 
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2.4 are neither zero (implying an infinite opportunity cost of 
increasing and a zero opportunity cost of increasing emolu­
ments) nor one. If all of the above conditions are satisfied, 
as seems a reasonable approximation to the theories of mana-
gerialism, then a portion of the potentially greater profits 
resulting from greater monopoly power will be reported. In 
other words, these conditions imply that the potential-profit 
effect would be strong enough to override the emolument effect 
(and the output effect if it is negative). 
Two possible exceptions to this tentative result are note­
worthy, both dealing with the possible fear of prosecution 
for antitrust violation felt by firms with an extremely high 
degree of monopoly power. The first exception deals with the 
phenomenon, discussed earlier, that monopolies may find it 
advantageous not to appear to be too profitable. In this 
case, a firm with very high monopoly power may not wish to re­
port any more profits than a firm with somewhat less monopoly 
power. Additional for the former may carry with it absolute 
disutility. If so, the emolument effect would be very strong 
and would just offset the potential-profit effect and the out­
put effect (if positive) so that = 0, This possibility 
Ô B 
is shown in Figure 4,3» in which the graph reflects a posi­
tive relationship between and B until B reaches point A, 
the point of antitrust fear. Since point A probably affects 
only the firms with extremely high monopoly power, its in­
fluence on an overall test of the effect of monopoly power on 
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PiOTre ^.3* The point of antitrust fear of reported profits 
which are too hi%h 
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tr may well be minimal. At any rate, the model predicts 
(under the tentative results concerning that firms with 
9 B 
B > A will report higher profits than those with B < A, 
The other possible exception to the tentative conclusion 
is that firms with an extremely high degree of monopoly power 
may be apprehensive of controlling too large a share of their 
market. Like excess profits, size in itself is not a per se 
violation of antitrust laws, but also like excess profits, size 
or market share may be thought by a monopolist to be a weapon 
which could potentially be used against him. 
For a monopolist in this position, fg may be negative, 
and even f itself may be negative. The relationship between 
f and B, independent of the indirect influence of B on f 
through qjjj, is shown taking these variations into account in 
Figure 4,4, As the monopoly power of the firm increases from 
zero to C, f > 0 and fg > 0; between C and D, f > 0 but fg 
> 0; and if B > D, both f and fg are negative. 
Ignoring for the moment 3 f ^^m. if 0 < B < C, the out-
put effect pushes the firm beyond the profit-maximizing rate 
of output and is negative. If C < B < D, the output effect 
pushes the firm back toward the profit-maximizing rate of 
output and is positive. If B > D, not only is fg < 0, but so 
is f. And if f is negative, ^  > 0, so that as the out-
or oi 
put effect pushes the firm below the profit-maximizing rate 
of output, it is negative. This discussion, however, must be 
considered as academic because of the remaining ambiguity of 
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Fifrure 4,4, The point of antitrust fear of output which is 
too lar^e 
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ô f 
To the extent that B > C only in extreme cases, f and 
fg can generally be assumed to be positive. The previous 
discussions of the potential-profit effect and the emolument 
effect and their implicit inclusion of the output effect can 
then generally be accepted. The tentative conclusion that 
a-TT® 
> 0 still seems reasonable, but it must remain tentative 
because of its underlying assumptions and because of these 
possible exceptions. 
Next consider the response of it° to a change in taxes, 
depending on the degree of monopoly power. 
St - -
e 
+ H (H-C) 
@ 
- ( i - K ) ( f | | - ! ^ )  
Clearly the sign of equation 4.14 is the opposite of the 
sign of equation 4.13. For the same reasons that 4.13 was 
tentatively concluded to be positive, 4.14 is tentatively con­
cluded to be negative. With a negative sign for the 
5Bât 
model predicts that will be more responsive to taxes for 
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firms with high monopoly power than for firms with low mono­
poly power. This prediction may seem surprising in light of 
the greater dampening effect K has on for firms with high 
monopoly power, but since these firms are assumed to have re­
ported higher profits before the tax change, a proportional 
change in 11° for all firms will change the reported rrofits 
n 
of those with high monopoly power by a greater absolute amount 
even though the proportional changes are predicted to be the 
same for all firms. 
A negative sign for is shown in Figure ^.5 along with 
ÔBat 
Q_0 
a positive sign for R. The line labeled B-high shows that 
a s  
for all possible tax rates, TT° is higher for firms with a high 
degree of monopoly power than for those with a low degree of 
monopoly power. It also shows that the reported profits of 
the former group of firms would react more strongly than those 
of the latter in response to a change in the corporation pro­
fit tax rate. 
In addition to the four testable hypotheses generated in 
equations 4.10 - 4.14, it is also possible to use this model 
to predict an interaction effect between the type of con­
trol and the degree of monopoly power. 
0 
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Flprure 4,5, The effects of taxes and monopoly power on 
reported profits 
105 
ÔR ^ ÔC t 
+ (l-t)(l-K) AI 9(V as " 9B ^  
9 T  "  
© 
2 
—— . (l-t)(fi—c) ÔBÔT 
- + 
0 
9 f 
# (1-t) (#-#)# 
- + 
e 
- + 
11^3. 
+ + —, 0 — +,0 + + + ? 
© 
+(i-t)(i-K)(§% - ac) ^  
0 
© 
106 
The signs attached to the first, third, and fourth terms 
of this equation are clear from the previous assumptions con­
cerning the model. The second term is negative if 
S) 
^ 0 9  f  
This sign is plausible if the output effect pushes the firm 
beyond its profit-maximizing rate of output, as has been assumed 
for all but extremely high values of B. The seventh term is 
negative if 2 > 0, This should be true for the same reason 
8 T 
that is assumed positive in the third term monopoly 
ÔBÔT 
power and managerial control interact to create an even 
broader range for discretionary behavior than either one could 
produce in the absence of the other.^ 
The remaining three terms, the fifth, sixth, and eighth, 
are ambiguous because of the presence of in them. Relying, 
9 B 
though, on the general discussions of equations 4.13 and 4.14, 
one may still be able to decide upon a tentative prediction 
of the sign of 
3BÔT 
The first two terms of equation 4.15 represent what was 
previously termed the potential-profit effect. The third and 
fourth terms represent the emolument effect. And the last 
^gain the assumption is made that the exceptions to fp>0 are 
not generally important. 
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four terms represent the output effect. Now If equation b,l5 
= o 
is viewed as the partial derivative of R, equation 4.10, 
Ô T 
with respect to B, each of these three monopoly power affects 
can be seen to apply to equation 4,15 in the same manner that 
they applied to equation 4,13. Earlier it was demonstrated 
that in general, under conditions which are a fair approxima­
tion to those implicit in the theories of managerialism, the 
potential-profit effect is sufficiently strong to more than 
compensate for any opposite influences which may arise from the 
emolument and output effects. When this result is applied to 
equation 4.15, the tentative prediction is derived that the 
negative signs of the first two terms dominate the equation 
and that the interr^ation between monopoly power amd mana­
gerial control exerts a downward pressure on tt® in addition 
to the downward pressure exerted by managerial control alone, 
a2^o 
This tentative prediction that < 0 is depicted 
ÔBÔT 
graphically in Figure 4,6, The curve labeled B-high is always 
above that labeled B-low under the assumption that ^R > 0. 
Ô B 
Both curves approach the dashed line asymptotically to show 
the assumption that 
of firms with a high degree of monopoly power will have more 
freedom than their counterparts in firms with low monopoly 
power to engage in profit-reducing activities because they 
are less subject to the constraints of competition. 
On the basis of a positive relationship between a firm's 
B-high curve, repres f\2 o < 0, indicates that managers 
OBOT 
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Figure 4.6. The effects of monopoly power and types of con­
trol on reported profits 
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revenue function and its potential profits and a negative re­
lationship between its cost function and its potential profits, 
four additional related predictions can be derived. Consider 
first the interaction between shifte in the revenue and cost 
functions with the type of control. Assume that these functions 
shift in such a manner that f, and ^  are constant func­
tions. That is, assume that for every combination of values 
of T, B, "TQAC, and the value of f after the shift is equal 
to its value before the shifts took place; the f function does 
not shift, although the value of f itself may change if q^ 
changes. Similarly, the value of ^  is the same for each 
value of f before and after the shifts. These assumptions, 
while perhaps somewhat strong, permit one to ignore the out­
put effect (the second term) of equation 4,10 in considering 
this interaction, 
-  +  +  - +  +  +  - +  +  +  +  
0 
The first term represents just the effect of a shift in 
the revenue function for a constant q^. The second term 
allows for a consequent change in the profit-maximizing rate 
of output. And the third term takes into account the effect 
that a change in q^ would have on the value of f and hence on 
R. The negative sign attached to equation 4.l6 predicts that 
a shift of the revenue function will have a greater impact on 
the reported profits of owner controlled firms than on the 
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reported profits of manager controlled firms. 
Figure 4.7 shows that ^R. while negative, is more nega-
a  T  
tive if the revenue function shifts upward. The greater dis­
tance between the lines labeled R-high and R-low when T is 
low than when T is high indicates that a shift of the revenue 
function will have a greater effect for owner controlled firms 
than for manager controlled firms. 
The interaction between T and shifts of the cost function 
is similar to its interaction with the revenue function; 
ÉI=i (i-tkfd-t) %+f(i-t) i 
+  +  +  +  +  + +  +  +  
© 
Again the first term shows just the effect of a shift in the 
cost function if were to remain constant. The second term 
shows the effect of a possible change in directly on C. And 
the third term shows the possible effect of a change in q^ on 
f and iT°, If the cost function were to shift upward, tt® 
would fall, but it would fall by less for manager controlled 
firms than for owner controlled firms. These two negative 
.2^0 
changes combine to give ^R a positive sign as shown in 
ôTôC 
Figure 4.8. 
In response, then, to exogenous forces affecting either 
their revenue and cost functions, manager controlled firms are 
predicted by equations 4,l6 and 4.17 to display more stable re­
ported profits than owner controlled firms. If the two functions 
Ill 
V 
R 
Figure 4.7. The effects of types of control and different 
revenue functions on reported profits 
IT 
R 
Figure 4.8. The effects of types of control and different 
cost functions on reported profits 
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shift together, though, no such prediction can be made because 
these effects may cancel each other. 
Suppose that the firms are operating during a period of 
demand-pull inflation in an economy which has sufficient 
rigidities to create lags in the inflationary effects. Under 
these conditions first the firms' revenue functions would 
shift upward, and then their cost functions would shift upward 
with a lag. Consequently, the -n® of owner controlled firms 
R 
would initially increase by more than the of manager con-
K 
trolled firms. Then, as the inflationary pull affected all 
firms* cost functions, the it° of owner controlled firms would 
fall by more than the of manager controlled firms. 
R 
If the economic policy-makers of the country then at­
tempted to reduce the rate of inflation by constricting aggre­
gate demand, the same effects in the opposite direction would 
be predicted by equations 4.16 and 4.17. Over a demand-deter-
mined business cycle, then, the reported profits of firms 
under each type of control might move as shown in Figure 4,9. 
In other words, tt® should have a greater variance over time 
for owner controlled firms than for manager controlled firms. 
And if the swings of the business cycle were induced by tax 
rate changes, this effect would be reinforced by the effect 
of equation 4.10. 
Finally, consider the interaction between monopoly power 
and shifts in the revenue and cost functions. In addition 
to the assumptions made about the output effect concerning 
equations 4.16 and 4.17, assume also that — and — are 
ÔB ÔB 
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R 
T-low 
T-hlgh 
time 
Figure 4.9. The effect of types of control on reported 
profits over a demand-oriented business cycle 
nu 
constant functions with respect to shifts in the revenue or 
cost functions. In other words, assume that the effects of 
monopoly power on the revenue function and the cost function 
are independent of these functions. With this assumption and 
the earlier ones, the potential-profit effect and the output 
effect can be ignored when considering shifts of the revenue 
and cost functions. 
The terms and signs of these two equations are analogous 
to those of equations 4.l6 and 4.17. These interactions are 
shown graphically in Figures 4.10 and 4.11. The explanations 
of these graphs follow the same lines as the explanations of 
Figures 4.6 and 4.7. 
Through a demand-oriented business cycle with the lags pre­
viously mentioned, the reported profits of firms with a de­
gree of monopoly power should show less variance than those of 
firms with a low degree of monopoly power, as depicted in 
Figure 4.12.1 
^Implicit in this prediction is the heroic assumption that aH 
firms will experience similar shifts in their revenue functions 
over the business cycle. Accelerator theories of investment 
suggest, though, that this is not the case, especially if a con-
par is on is made between capital goods industries with high mono­
poly power and food industries with low monopoly power. 
e 
a2 o 
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Figure 4,10, The effects of monopoly power and different 
revenue functions on reported profits 
TT, C-low 
Cd 
B 
Figure 4.11, The effects of monopoly power and different 
cost functions on reported profits 
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time 
4.12. The effect of different degrees of monopoly 
power on reported profits over a demand-
determined business cycle 
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The predictions derived from equation 4,9 can be summarized 
follows : 
1 ÔIT^ 
• s <0. Manager controlled firms are predicted to 
a T 
report lower profits than owner controlled firms, 
cet, par. 
2 ,  
^ > 0. The reported profits of manager controlled 
OTôt 
firms are predicted to be less responsive to tax rate 
changes than are owner controlled firms, cet, par, 
3. Ottd 
—i >0, Firms with a high degree of monopoly power 
O 5 
are predicted to report higher profits than are firms 
with a low degree of monopoly power, cet, par. 
4. 
< 0, Firms with a high degree of monopoly 
ôSdt 
power are predicted to be more responsive to tax rate 
changes than are firms with a low degree of monopoly 
power, cet, par, 
5. 
< 0, This interaction between monopoly power QTdB 
and type of control predicts that the effect of 
^ R < 0 will be greater among those firms with a high 
Ô T 
degree of monopoly power, cet, par. Alternatively, 
it predicts that the effect of > o will be less 
âTI 
among those firms which are manager controlled. 
6. The variance of reported profits over a deraand-
determined business cycle is predicted to be less 
for manager controlled firms than for owner con­
trolled firms, cet, par. 
7, The variance of reported profits over a demand-
determined business cycle is predicted to be less 
for firms with a high degree of monopoly power 
than for firms with a low degree of monopoly power, 
cet, par. 
The next chapter explains the data used to test these 
predictions. If the model developed in this chapter is a 
fair representation of the managerial hypothesis, and if this 
hypothesis is correct, these predictions should be bom out 
by the evidence. 
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CHAPTER V. THE DATA USED TO TEST THE EFFECTS OP 
THE SEPABATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM CONTROL 
In order to test the predictions of the model developed 
in Chapter IV, suitable measures had to be devised for each of 
the variables. Suitability was judged on the basis of economic 
relevance, data availability, and statistical convenience. Be­
cause factorial analysis was used in these tests, the statisti­
cal convenience criterion primarily meant the amenability of the 
data to grouping into potentially significant different classes. 
Data for T, the type of control, were obtained from 
Moody's Industrial Manual (1961-19 70), Value Line (1971)» Larner 
(1966), MCC (1968), and Standard and Poor's Corporation Records 
(I97I). It was tempting to use a continuous measure for T such 
as T = 1-W or T = l/W, where W is the percent of stock owned by 
the group owning the largest number of shares outstanding. 
These alternatives were rejected for three reasons : 
1. The Securities and Exchange Commission requires 
that W be reported to the public only if it is at 
least ten percent. T would have had to be estimated 
in some arbitrary fashion for most firms which had 
W < 10%, 
2. The figures which are reported if W > 10^ are 
only approximate. Buying and selling by members of 
the group changes W, and new stock issues may also 
change W. 
3. Who makes up the group, and consequently the 
precise size of W, are frequently judgment matters. 
These problems exist with any measure of T, but if the 
firms are assigned to only a few categories, these errors in 
measurement are likely to be relevant primarily for just those 
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firms near the borderlines of the categories. 
This study was concerned only with ultimate control. 
Firms were called ultimately strong owner controlled if W > 
30"^, weak owner controlled if 10^ < W «r 30'^» or management 
controlled if W < 10%,^ 
The criterion used in classifying firms as manaprement 
controlled was necessitated by a general lack of data if W < 
lOX. Owner controlled firms were divided into the two sub­
categories of weak owner control and strong owner control be­
cause it was hoped that the weak owner control category could 
2 be utilized to include "...the gray inbetween companies..." 
eliminated from the MCC study. 
Monsen's criticism of Kamerschen for including all o%ner 
controlled firms in his study has some strong points to re-
commend it.^ These points can best be demonstrated by refer­
ence to equation 2.^, particularly the term, AT(i-t^)(l-d) 
(1-tp). 
Suppose the manager of a firm has the opportunity to 
reduce his firm's costs by one hundred dollars ( A = .-3100). 
If the firm is manager controlled, this manager my believe 
that d is very near one. The only pecuniary reward he might 
expect to receive would be a possible salary increase or bonus, 
^Por a more detailed discussion of the classification scheme 
see Chapter I. 
J, Monsen, Kay 1, 1969. Private communication, 
^Tbid. 
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and this would be reduced by tp percent. 
If this manager were also a weak owner with W « 10%, he 
would expect d to be approximately .9, subject to variation due 
to a possible salary increase or bonus. In this case he could 
expect to be rewarded with approximately (l-tp)5 dollars, 
assuming t^ = ,5 and d « ,9» Fifty of the one hundred dollars 
would be taken in taxes, and forty-five dollars of the remainder 
would accrue to other stockholders• The owner-manager may feel 
that reducing costs by one hundred dollars so that he can receive 
only three or four dollars would not be worth his while, espe­
cially if the expenditures to be reduced involve items which 
provide him with more utility than his expected three or four 
dollars could provide. In such a situation, a weak owner con­
trolled firm may behave essentially the same way a manager con­
trolled firm does. 
If the manager of a weak owner controlled corporation is 
not also an owner, d for him would be near one, as in the manager 
controlled firm, but the Pco terms will be higher than they 
would be in a manager controlled firm. If, again, W = 10#, it 
is likely that the owning group will attempt to enlist the aid 
of management to maintain what might otherwise be extremely 
weak general control. One way they might do this would be by 
lowering d and the terms to a range more like that found 
in owner-manager weak owner controlled firms. The only dif­
ferences between the owner-manager case and the nonowner-
manager case would be that nonowner-managers might feel s]i#±]y 
more constrained through slightly higher terras, but they 
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would also have less incentive to increase reported profits be­
cause d for them would be slightly higher than for owner-
managers. In both cases, though, it is possible that these 
firms with an intermediate type of control behave more like 
manager controlled firms than like strong owner controlled firms. 
It was recognized from the outset that a dividing line 
between weak owner control and strong owner control must be 
arbitrary. Clearly there would be little, if any, difference in 
the behavior of firms in which W = 30^ and W = 29.9^. A similar 
argument could be made if the dividing line had been set at 20# 
Instead of 30#, The higher figure was chosen for this study 
because of a desire to segregate from the rest those firms 
which almost certainly would be subject to the Incentives pre­
dicted to exist In owner controlled firms. If there is a pro­
fit performance difference between owner controlled and manager 
controlled firms, a comparison of just the strong owner con­
trolled firms and manager controlled firms as defined in this 
study should detect it. The only drawback with these classifi­
cations is that the weak owner control category may Include 
some firms which are very similar to manager controlled firms 
and some other firms which are more like strong owner controlled 
firms. This drawback was accepted because of the primary 
interest in comparisons of the two extreme groups. 
Monopoly power was measured by the height of barriers to 
entry into the industries in which the firms operated. This 
measure was selected rather than concentration ratios for three 
reasons: 
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1. Previous studies by Mann (1966, 1970), Hall 
and Weiss (196?), and Kamerschen (1968) all indi­
cate that concentration ratios have a smaller 
effect on profits than do barriers to entry. 
2. Concentration ratios are generally available 
only on a national basis, but the relevant markets 
for many industries are regional or local, 
3. It is difficult to imagine many situations in 
which high concentration ratios would be indicative 
of meaningful monopoly power in the absence of at 
least substantial barriers to entry. 
Information concerning the height of barriers to entry 
into many industries was taken from Bain (1965)» Mann (I966, 
1970), and Shepherd (1970). For industries about which these 
three economists disagreed or for which none of them estimated 
the height of the barriers to entry. Independent estimates of 
the barriers were made (see Appendix B). 
Because many of the 5OO largest corporations in I965 
carried on business in more than one industry, an attempt was 
made to allow for this diversification in deriving a measure 
of each corporation's monopoly power. Industries with M-L 
barriers were assigned the value of zero; with substantial 
barriers, 0.5; and with VH barriers, 1,0, Then the percent of 
a corporation's sales in each industry was multiplied by the 
value assigned to that industry's barriers to entry, to measure 
the amount of monopoly power obtained by a firm in each of the 
industries in which it had sales.^ Then these weighted 
^Ideally, in studying the relationship between profits and 
barriers to entry, one would like to weight the fraction of a 
corporation's profits generated in each industry by that 
Industry's entry barriers. Unfortunately such a disaggregation 
of profits is only rarely (Footnote continued on following page,) 
123 
ine£isui*6s W6r6 siinunôd. to obtain a msasups of each corporation s 
overall monopoly power B. This weighting scheme, although 
somewhat arbitrary, was employed to determine whether diversi­
fication distorted Mann's results (I966, 1970). To facilitate 
factorial analysis and, to some extent, to mask the errors 
which might be present in the determination of industries' 
entry barriers and corporations' sales, the corporations were 
then divided into the following three classes: 
1. 1.00 > B > ,667 
2. .667 > B > .333 
3. .333 > B > 0. 
An alternative weighting technique was used to measure 
monopoly power based strictly on Mann's findings. In this al­
ternative technique, sales in industries with VH barriers were 
weighted by 1.0, but all other sales were weighted by zero. 
Under this technique, only a very few firms would have been 
assigned to the category of ,667 > B > .333; consequently, the 
•'•(Footnote continued from preceding page,) reported, possibly because 
of the indeterminancy arising from joint products. The break­
down of a firm's sales by industry is by no means universal, 
even though it is considerably more prevalent than a break­
down of profits. For firms which reported only the industries 
in which salés were made, but not the percentages of sales in 
each, subjective estimates of these percentages were necessi­
tated, based on the verbal descriptions provided by Moody's and 
Value Line, In three cases estimates were made on the basis 
of Moody's information before the reported percentages in 
Value Line were discovered. Each of these estimates was very 
close to the reported figure. White Motor Corp, was estimated 
to receive 10^ of its total revenue from farm machinery; the 
actual figure was \S%o GAP Corp. was estimated to receive 
25^ of its total revenue from photographic and reproduction 
materials; the actual figure was And Howmet was estimated 
to receive 50'^ of its total revenue from aluminum fabrication; 
the actual figure was also 50^. 
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corporations were assigned to just two categories under this 
alternative: B > #50» and B < .50« 
Two considerations led to the belief that size would be 
an essential variable to be included in the statistical tests 
of the predictions generated in Chapter IV. (1) The results 
of Chapter I showed a strong tendency for owner controlled 
firms to be absent from the largest size class; (2) Hall and 
Weiss (1967) found a significantly positive relationship be­
tween size and reported profits. These considerations appeared 
important enough that size had to be included in order to 
satisfy the ceteris paribus assumptions of Chapter IV. 
The corporations studied were assigned to four different 
size classes according to their sales ranks from Fortune. 
These classes were the 125 largest firms, the next 125, etc. 
One unfortunate feature of factorial analysis, is that 
each possible combination of factors must have at least one 
observation associated with it. After the classifications by 
type of control, monopoly power, and size were made, it was 
discovered that several of these combinations had but one ob­
servation, Consequently no other independent variables could 
be included in the statistical tests and still allow for the 
effects of these variables, because additional classifications 
would have created some empty cells. As a result, a proxy 
measure for TT@/rTQ, though it was developed, was excluded from 
the statistical tests of the model.^ 
^It is for this reason also that predictions involving 
were not derived in Chapter IV. 
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The dependent variable discussed in Chapter IV was re­
ported profits. The statistical tests, however, used as the 
dependent variable the profit rate, the ratio of reported pro­
fits to net worth. This change was made for two reasons. (1) 
different firms make use of leverage to different degrees and 
may report different profits even though their net worths are 
the same; but (2) as MCC said, "This ratio [reported profits/ 
net worth] measures the effects of management's efforts to pro­
vide a return on the owners* investment" (p. 440), and among 
these efforts must be included the use of leverage. 
Data were collected for the years I96I - 1969# The time 
period was then subdivided into two periods to allow for 
possible business cycle effects on reported profit. The 
expansion part of the cycle was considered to cover I96I -
1966; the contraction, I967 - 1969# This subdivision also 
permitted the allowance for changes in T, B, and size from 
a-o 
one time period to the next. To test the predictions R < 0, 
0 T 
01Tn 52^0 
—— > 0, and a < 0, each firm's average profit rate was 
9 S ôTas 
used for each time period. 
Tests of the response of reported profit rates to tax 
rate changes were performed separately for the early 1960*s, 
during which several different reductions in the tax rate 
were instituted, and for the late 1960's, during which the sur­
tax Increased the tax rates. The dependent variable used in 
the first set of tests, involving tax reductions, was the 
average of the reported profit rates in 1964 and I965 minus 
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the average reported profit rates in I96I and I962, The 
averages of two years before and after the tax reductions were 
used to help diminish the randomness present in single-year 
data. These years were selected so that most of the tax re­
ductions implemented during the early I960*s would be included 
in the time span, but it was recognized that some indirect 
effects of tax-rate changes would also affect the data over 
such a relatively long period. The second set of tests, in­
volving the surtax, employed the average reported profit rates 
in 1966 and 1967 minus the average reported profit rates in 
1968 and 1969. 
Finally, to test the effects of the type of control and 
the strength of monopoly power on the variation of reported 
profit rates over a business cycle, the sample standard devia­
tion of reported profit rates was calculated for each firm for 
the period I96I - I969.I 
Each of the measures discussed in this chapter was em­
ployed in factorial analyses to test the predictions derived in 
Chapter IV. The test procedures and results are discussed in 
the next chapter. 
^This period was shorter for those firms merged out of exis­
tence between I965 and 19^9, 
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CHAPTER VI. TESTS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE 
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP PROM CONTROL 
Factorial analysis was used to test the predictions of 
Chapter IV for several reasons. First, because of the strong 
likelihood of errors in the measurement of the independent 
variables, particularly type of control and monopoly power, 
it was recognized that using continuous measures for these 
variables would probably lead to biased and inconsistent esti­
mates of the strengths of these influences (Johnston, 1963, P» 
l49). Grouping the data into classes would reduce these biases 
and produce consistent estimators (Johnston, pp. 164 - I65). 
Second, factorial analysis was used because this study was con­
cerned only with significant differences between the levels of 
different factors. The varying strengths of these effects 
were considered to be of only secondary Importance at this 
stage of the analysis. 
The statistical model tested was 
Y = /I + Aj^ + T j + Sjj. + + A^Tj + A^S^ + A^B^ 
+ TjS% + TjBi + Sk-Bi + A^TjS^ + A^TjB^ 
+ AiS^Bi + 
The variables are explained in Table 6.1. 
The test was first performed using Y = average reported 
profits for each firm. The results are presented in Table 6.2. 
Type of control did appear to affect a firm's profit performance, 
as did the degree of monopoly power. None of the interactions 
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Table 6.1. The variable used in the statistical tests 
/I mean 
A time 
Al 1961-1966 for TTjj 
1961-1965 for Air Q 
^2 1967-1969 for TTg 
1966-1969 for ATTg 
T type of control 
Tl management 
T2 weak owner 
T3 strong owner 
S size, ranked by sales 
Si 1-125 
82 126-250 
S3 251-375 
84 376-500 
B monopoly power 
Bl low 
B2 medium 
B3 high 
G error term 
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Table 6.2. Analysis of variance (AOV) table 
average reported profits 
for tests on 
Source 
degrees 
of 
freedom (d.f.) 
correctea sum 
of 
squares (SS) F 
A 1 28.38 0.894 
T 2 341.56 5.376* 
S 3 138.59 1.454 
B 2 595.70 9.376* 
AT 2 1.28 0.020 
AS 3 66.40 0.697 
AB 2 79.77 1.256 
TS 6 205.99 1.081 
TE 4 259.61 2.043 
SB 6 270.80 1.421 
ATS 6 46.65 0.245 
ATB 4 23.07 0.182 
ASB 6 406.58 2.133 
TSB 12 375.43 0.985 
Error 853 27096.83 
®Significant at the five percent level. 
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was significant. The means for the different levels of the 
significant treatments are presented in Table 6,3* As pre-
Table 6.3. Average reported profit rates by type of control 
and by degree of monopoly power 
7^ = 10.373 
Tg = 11.689 
Tj = 11.004 
Bi = 9.961 
Bg = 10.588 
Bj = 12.364 
dieted by the model of Chapter IV, owner controlled firms re­
ported, on the average, higher profits than did manager 
controlled firms. The averages for monopoly power were also 
as predicted. The only unexpected result was that weak owner 
controlled firms reported higher profits than did strong 
owner controlled firms. It appears, in fact, that the in­
clusion of this intermediate type of firm was essential for 
the statistical significance of the control factor in the 
analysis. 
The results of this factorial analysis were believed to 
be of doubtful validity from the beginning, though, because 
previous studies, particularly by Hall and Weiss (196?), had 
found heteroscedasticity present. In regression analysis, 
the present of heteroscedasticity will not bias the estimates, 
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but it will make ordinary least squares estimators inefficient. 
In factorial analysis, unequal variances amon# the different 
treatments mean thùc in the calculation of the F values, the 
error mean square in the divisor averages over all treatments, 
diminishing thn F values from what they should be in some cases, 
increasin# them in others. 
A simple test for heteroscedasticlty was applied, based 
on the ranges of the dependent variable in each of the 72 cells 
of the statistical model. However, because four of these cells 
had only one observation, the ranges in these cells would be 
zero. To alleviate this problem, the time variable. A, vjas ex­
cluded, and the model was collapsed to just 36 cell.-;, The range, 
as an estimator for the variance, was calculated for each cell, 
and a factorial analysis was performed on these data, to see 
whether the different treatments had different variances associ­
ated with them. Because there was only one observation per 
cell, the third-order interaction was treated as the error term 
in order to calculate the F values. The results of this test 
for the homogeneity of treatment variances, presented in 
Table 6.4, were derived from the following statistical model; 
Range 4 Tj + + TjS^ + T^B^ + S^B^ + s . 
Heteroscedasticlty was clearly present, and it was signif­
icant for type of control and size. The average ranges for 
each level of these two treatments are shown in Table 
The figures In Table 6,5 indicate that there is greater 
variation in /average reported profit rates across manager con­
trolled firms than across owner controlled firms. They also 
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Table 6*4. AOV table for tests of heteroscedastlcity among 
average reported profit rates for different 
treatments 
Source d.f. 88 F 
Mean 1 15273.25 
Treatments 23 
T 2 1939.55 23.07* 
S 3 714.53 5.67* 
B 2 274.70 3.27 
T x S 6 295.21 1.17 
T x B 4 90.77 0.54 
S x B 6 804.73 3.19 
Error 12 504.50 
*Significant at the five percent level. 
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Table 6,5, Average ranges of average reported profit rates by 
type of control and by size class 
R (Ti) = 30.43 
R (Tg) = 18.57 
R (T3) = 12.80 
R (81) = 13.21 
R (Sg) = 23.35 
R (Sj) = 24.73 
R (S^) = 21.10 
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confirm the finding of Hall and Weiss that there is less 
variation in profit rates across large firms than across 
small firms. The presence of significant heteroscedasticity 
by itself suggests that manager controlled firms perform dif­
ferently from owner controlled firms. One possible explana­
tion of this phenomenon is that managers of manager controlled 
firms have different utility functions and different evaluations 
of the PQ terms in equation 2.4 leading to different amounts of 
effort by them to maximize reported profits. In owner con­
trolled firms, the managers have less scope for discretionary 
action even if their utility functions are different, and their 
pQ terms will be consistently high, leading to reported profits 
by them which are closer to the maximum level. 
There are basically three methods of dealing with the 
problem of heteroscedasticity. The first of these is to use 
weighted regressions, calculating the weights from some external 
data source. This procedure was rejected for two reasons; (1) 
No external data sources were readily available to provide 
estimates of the variances associated with each treatment. (2) 
Although regressions were used to calculate the AOV table for 
the factorial analysis, the F tests would no longer be valid if 
weighted regressions were used. The usual F tests are con­
cerned with the equality of treatment means, but because the 
treatments would all be weighted differently, there would no 
longer be any reason to expect these means to be equal under 
the null hypotheses. 
The second method of dealing with heteroscedasticity 
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involves transforming the data so that the variances would not 
differ for different means. A comparison of the means in Table 
6.3 with the ranges in Table 6,5 showed, unfortunately, that no 
common transformation would suffice for this problem,^ 
To determine what type of transformation might be necessary, 
a graph of cell ranges and means was plotted (Figure 6,1). Al­
though the points were widely scattered, it appeared that a 
linear relationship between the ranges and means might exist, 
with R = 43.5 - 2W, The appropriate transformation of the data, 
assuming this relationship, is -•^ln(^3»5 - 2 y), where y is 
each observation. Unfortunately, many of the observations were 
greater than 21.75» and this transformation would >iot exist for 
these values. If, instead, the transformation, -#ln(80 - 2 y), 
were used, the natural logs would exist for all the transforma­
tions, but this function implies that R - 80 - 2y, which clearly 
is untrue! Similar problems arose with all transformations in­
volving logs and square roots. 
The third way to deal with heteroscedasticity is to con­
sider only contrasts between different cells or groups of cells, 
and forego a general factorial analysis. Each contrast then can 
be tested by subdividing the total error sum of squares into 
just that portion due to each contrast. 
"Such a procedure insures that any particular 
treatment comparison will be tested against the 
appropriate error. That is, the expected value of 
^See Ostle (3 963), p. 3^0» for a discussion of the common trans-
formations. 
Figure 6,1, The relationship between cell ranges and cell means 
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the 'error mean square for testing C^' will contain 
the same components of variance (other than treat­
ment effects) as the expected value of the mean 
square associated with Cj^, In other words, if we 
are faced wiuh different variances a ij (i = 1, ,,, 
b; j = 1, t), the procedure of subdividing S y y  
[the error mean square] will insure that the expected 
mean squares for a particular comparison and its 
associated error will each contain the same linear 
combination of the This, of course, provides 
us with unbiased tests for the comparisons under in­
vestigation" (Ostle, p. 377).1 
The use of contrasts has the additional advantage that 
precisely those treatments and combinations of treatments of in­
terest can be tested directly. The only problem with using con­
trasts with these data is that there are unequal observations 
in each cell. The F tests used for contrasts have one degree of 
freedom (df) in the numerator, but the appropriate df for the 
denominator is not immediately obvious. In the contrasts 
which follow, Satterthwaite's approximation was used to deter­
mine the df for the denominator (Ostle, pp. 302 - 303)»^ 
The first set of contrasts (Table 6.6) generally confirms 
the predictions of Chapter IV, Within this set, the first four 
contrasts are direct tests of the managerial hypothesis. As 
expected, because of MCC's results, the test of the effects of 
management control versus both types of owner control was not 
significant at the five percent level. In fact it was signifi­
cant at only the eight percent level, the same level of 
^An explanation of the procedure is provided by Ostle, p. 378. 
2 Heteroscedasticity also appeared in the tests of the change 
in profit rates and the variation of profit rates (see Appendix 
C)c Consequently only contrasts are reported here. 
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Table 6,6, Contrasts Involving average reported profit rates 
Contrast df^ P 
1, vs Tg and 6 6,933 
= 10.37 
Tg =, 11.69 
= 11.00 
2, Ti vs Tg 6 9.594b 
3. ?! vs T3 1 1.867 
4. Tg vs T3 1 1.400 
5. Bi vs Bg and 13 13.944% 
B^ = 9*96 
Bjg = 10,59 
B^ = 12,36 
6, Bi vs Bg 3 2.337 
7. Bg vs B3 9 11.321b 
8, T^Bi vs TgBi 1 0.059 
TjBi = 9.89 
= 9.70 
9. TiBi vs T3B1 1 0.799 
T3B2 = 10,59 
10, TgBi vs TjB^ 1 0.902 
_ A -
df are the degrees of freedom estimated for the denomlnetor 
In the P tests, 
^significant at the five percent level. 
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Table 6.6,- Continued; 
Contrast df®" 
11. T^Bg vs T2B2 1 7.503 
f^2 = 10.26 
T2B2 = 12.12 
12. TgBg vs TjBg 5 6.272 
^2 = 9'95 
13. T^Bg vs TgB^ and T^B^ 5 13.039^ 
= 11.41 
= 14.53 
fgB^ = 14.77 
14. T^Bj vs TgBj 3 5,109 
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significance found, by MCC. The only contrast of these four 
which was statistically significant was the one showing that 
weak owner controlled firms report higher average profit rates 
than manager controlled firms. This result shows the impor­
tance of including the Intermediate type of firms in the 
study. It also provides what might be construed as weak sup­
port for the managerial hypothesis. 
The next three contrasts of Table 6.6 studied the effect 
of monopoly power on reported profits. As expected, firms 
with a high degree of monopoly power reported average profit 
rates significantly greater than firms with a low degree of 
monopoly power. It appears, though, that this effect was 
most Important for those firms in the highest class of mono­
poly power. 
The remaining seven contrasts present results concerned 
with the interaction of type of control and monopoly power. 
As predicted by equation 4.15» managerlalism had little scope 
for action in firms with lower degrees of monopoly power; the 
forces of competition seemed to place a strong contraint on a 
manager's behavior In such firms. Contrasts 13 and 14, however, 
show that when the competitive constraint is removed, mana­
gerlalism is most likely to be significant. 
In summary, this first set of contrasts shows that the 
managerial hypothesis is supported by the evidence, parti­
cularly among firms with a high degree of monopoly power. It 
further shows that with respect to average reported profit rates, 
weak owner controlled firms behave more like strong owner con­
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trolled firms than like manager controlled firms. 
A similar set of contrasts was performed using average 
reported profit rates and B*, the measure of monopoly power 
Involving weights of one for VH barriers to entry and zero for 
all other barriers to entry. In the end, these contrasts were 
not much different from the contrasts of Table 6.6 comparing 
and B2 vs B^. Of the 7^4 observations In the B^ and Bg 
classes, 732 fell Into the B^ class; the other twelve moved to 
the Bg class. And of the I69 observations In the B^ class, 14 
moved to the bj class. The two different measures of monopoly 
power were not very different from each other In application. 
The contrasts Involving B* (Table 6.7) were performed 
only for those treatment means which reflected this change In 
the measure of monopoly power. The treatment means Involving 
only the type of control were unchanged from Table 6.6. As 
expected, because of the similarity In the measures of mono­
poly power, the results of these first two sets of contrasts 
are quite similar, showing that monopoly power affects pro­
fit rates and that the managerial hypothesis has Its relevance 
primarily among firms with a high degree of monopoly power. 
Contrast 6 was significant but contrasts 4 and 5 were not be­
cause T^Bg and TgB^ had high sample variances associated with 
them, while T^Bg had a low sample variance. 
The next two sets of contrasts are concerned with the 
response of profit rates to tax rate changes (Tables 6.8 and 
6.9). As predicted by equation 4.14, firms with a high degree 
of monopoly power had greater changes in profit rates than did 
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Table 6.7. Contrasts involving average reported profit rates 
and B* 
Contrast df ^ 
1. BÎ vs B* 17 22.577a 
bJ = 10.28 
bi = 12.70 
2. T^BJ VS T2BJ 4 4,412 
TpJ = 10.03 
Tp* = 11.11 
3. TgB* vs T3BJ 2 1.859 
f^B* = 10.24 
4. T^B* vs TgBj 3 4.978 
Tpl = 11.80 
Tp2 = 15.00 
5. T^bI vs T3BJ 2 12.06 
Tpl = 14.77 
6. T^bJ VS T2B2 and T^Bg 5 11.081* 
^Significant at the five percent level. 
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Table 6,8. Contrasts involving the response of profit rates 
to changes in tax rates 
Contrast df F 
1, and Tg vs T3 4? 3.165 
= 2,06 
= 2.12 
f3 = 1.53 
2. vs Tg 1 0.024 
3« vs T3 45 1.965 
4. vs and B^ 398 4.265 
§2 = 1.42 
bg = 2.17 
B3 = 2,52 
5» B^ vs Bg 112 3.188 
6. Bg vs B3 1 0.301 
7. B]^ vs B3 69 2.843 
8. T^Bi vs TgBi 16 1.024 
= 1*28 
Tpi = 1.90 
9. TnBi vs T3B1 11 1.064 
f^Bi = 1.34 
10. T^Bg vs TgBg 10 0.488 
Ï^Bg = 2.31 
T^2 = 1.93 
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Table 6,8 - Continued: 
Contrast df F 
11. T2B2 vs TjBg 1 0.094 
TjBg =1.76 
12. T1B2 vs T3B2 19 0,982 
13. T1B3 vs T2B3 2 0,343 
î^3 = 2.58 
fp3 = 3.13 
14. T1B3 vs T^B3 43 1,892 
T3B2 = 1.31 
15. T2B3 vs T3B3 16 6.II6& 
16. T2B3 and T2B2 vs T3B3 34 5.089 
^Significant at the five percent level. 
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Table 6.9. Contrasts, using B*, involving the response of 
profit rates to tax rate changes 
Contrast df F 
1. B* vs Bg 21 0.729 
bJ = 1.89 
b* = 2.41 
2. TgBi vs T3B* 9 0.745 
fpî = 1.95 
fpj = 1.90 
fp; = 1.57 
3. tIb| VS t?b| 4 0,760 
fjB| = 2.48 
fp2 = 3.32 
4. TgBg vs T3B2 16 7.I74& 
T3B* = 1.31 
^Significant at the five percent level. 
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firms with a low degree of monopoly power, although this effect 
was not statistically significant. The importance of the inter 
action between a high degree of monopoly power and type of con­
trol showed up again, as the only significant contrasts in 
Tables 6,8 and 6,9 were 15 and 4, respectively. 
These two contrasts, along with the means of T^, T2* 
T^, are particularly interesting because they show an effect 
which is just the opposite of that predicted by equation 4,111 
That equation predicted that the profits of manager controlled 
firms would be less responsive to tax rate changes than they 
would for owner controlled firms, but these tests show the 
reverse of this prediction to be true. The significance of 
these contrasts implies that type of control does have an im­
portant effect on a firm's profit performance, but they also 
suggest that the model in Chapter IV is incomplete. 
The results of these contrasts can be reconciled with 
the model using the concept of the profit constraint, tr^, and 
the PQ terms of equation 2,4, Suppose that the satisficing 
rate of return in manager controlled firms is quite low rela­
tive to that for owner controlled firms. Suppose further that 
the satisficing rate of return for weak owner controlled firms 
is greater than for strong owner controlled firms. Such a 
phenomenon might exist if weak owners fear that their position 
of control is shakey, and they wish to secure it by reporting 
higher profits. It may well be that they have not, in general, 
adapted themselves as well to a minority control position as 
have the managers of management controlled firms. 
w 
Three basic types of relationships will exist between 
PQ, and TTj^: 
(1) PresuF-^bly, for all firms will be high if < 
tTQ, If taxes change for a firm in this situation, nearly all 
of the change in potential profits will be reported. 
(2) Once the profit constraint is passed, though, the 
pQ terms will fall rather sharply. In this range, as the mana­
gerial hypothesis takes effect, a tax cut would produce only a 
small increase in reported profits, A tax increase for firms 
in this range would reduce reported profits by a relatively 
small amount because managers would be forced to give up most 
of their emoluments in order to meet the profit constraint. 
(3) Iff however, reported profits are well abo^-e the 
satisficing level, managers will have already acquired many 
emoluments, and tax rate changes will not affect their position 
as much as they would the position of the marginal raanagerla]jsts. 
Hence more of the change In potential profits for the last case 
is likely to be reported than for the second case. 
Figure 6,2 shows relationships between and 
which are consistent with the above suppositions and with the 
results of the contrasts, indicates that for firms with 
a low degree nf monopoly power, is low enough that managers 
for all types of firms must concern themselves primarily with 
reported profits, ^cm* ^cs' ''^cw Indicate the profit con­
straints for management, strong owner, and weak owner controlled 
firms, respectively, represents the average reported pro­
fit rate for .unnager controlled firms with a high degree of 
1 
0 
comp cm es cw 
Average Reported Profit Rates 
Figure 6,2. Hypothetical relationships between ttj,, -n , and P for 
firms under different types of control 
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monopoly power, and tTQ is the average reported profit rate for 
both types of owner controlled firms with a high degree of mono­
poly power. The curve labeled M shows the relationship between 
P and TT for manager controlled firms, while the curves labeled 
O H 
s and W show this relationship for strong owner and weak owner 
controlled firms. 
Because the satisficing profit rate is higher for owner 
controlled firms than for manager controlled firms, these curves 
show one reason why the latter would report higher profit rates 
than the former, particularly among firms with a high degree of 
monopoly power. That the curves are relatively flat near the 
average reported profit rates for both manager controlled firms 
and for weak owner controlled firms suggests that either mana-
gerialism has taken strong effect (in the former) or that (in 
the latter) even an increase in will not be sufficient to 
permit managerialism to take effect. In both cases, changes in 
potential profits will be more likely to be reported than for 
strong owner controlled firms, whose average reported profit 
rates are just at the point at which managerialism is beginning 
to take effect. 
Managers of management controlled firms, under this explana­
tion, would already be receiving large emoluments. Consequently, 
if emoluments are subject to diminishing marginal utility, much 
of an increase in potential profits would be used to satisfy 
these managers' desires for discretionary profits and would be 
reported. Managers of weak owner controlled firms in general 
have not yet reached the point at which they can feel free to 
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provide themselves with sizeable emoluments. Hence they would 
feel obliged to report nearly all of a change in reported pro­
fits. Furthermore, because PQ is still high for these managers, 
they would be expected to report even more of the changes in 
potential profits than would the managers of management con­
trolled firms, for whom is low. 
The managers of strong owner controlled firms, though, are 
at the point where they can begin to take advantage of increases 
in potential profits to increase their emoluments sizeably be­
cause for them PQ is falling rapidly. Similarly, they are the 
ones who must give up the most emoluments in the face of felling 
potential profits because then P^ would rise rapidly. 
Contrasts involving the variation in profit rates (the 
sample standard deviation of reported profits rates over nine 
years for each firm) are shown in Table 6.10. Contrasts 7 and 
10 show that very large firms have less variation in profits 
over time than do smaller firms. This result emphasizes the 
importance of heteroscedasticity for tests based on annual data 
rather than average data. Hall and Weiss took this problem 
into account, but MCC did not. 
Contrast 4 shows that while there was no significant dif­
ference between the variation in profit rates for firms with 
different degrees of monopoly power, those firms with greater 
monopoly power appeared to have a slightly greater variation 
in their profit rates. This result is the opposite of that 
predicted by equations 4.18 and 4.19. The most likely explana­
tion for this difference is that, as was pointed out In Chapter 
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Table 6,10. Contrasts Involving the variation in reported 
profits 
Contrast df F 
1. vs T2 and 31 8.644* 
= 3.72 
Tg = 2.92 
T3 = 2.74 
2. vs Tg 18 5*237 
3. Ti vs T3 25 7.875* 
4. vs ^ 1.738 
3% = 3.38 
^2 — 3.21 
= 4,09 
5. vs T2B1 and — 1.264 
= 4,20 
= 2,91 
= 2,23 
6. TiBi vs T3B1 30 7.512* 
^Significant at the five percent level. 
b^he degrees of freedom were not estimated for contrasts 
in which F was not significant even with infinite degrees of 
freedom in the denominator. 
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Table 6,10 - Continued: 
Contrast df 
7. vs and 62 7.97^ 
51 = 2.52 
52 = 3.^2 
s-j = 3.45 
S4 = 4.35 
8. vs S2 — 2.895 
9. S3 vs 8^ — 1.564 
10. vs 45 9.436* 
11. T^Sg and "T2S2 vs — 2.294 
TjS^ = 3.56 
= 3.69 
= 2 .68  
12. T2S2 vs T^Sg — 1,264 
13. vs TgSj and — 3.172 
= 4.05 
T2S3 s 2.58 
*^3^3 ~ 2,45 
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Table 6.10 - Continued; 
Contrast df P 
14. Tj^ Sj^  vs and T^ S^  
% = 5.04 
= 3.00 
T384 = 3.23 
15. T184 vs T284 
22 
21 
5.55 
5.89* 
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IV, firms with a high degree of monopoly power tend to be in 
industries having higher capital and scale barriers to entry 
and consequently higher average fixed costs. As the demand for 
their output changes, their profits will change by more than 
the profits of firms with lower fixed costs and greater short-
run flexibility, 
Managerialism also affects the variation in a firm's 
profit rate (contrasts 1, 3» 6, and 15)• It seems strongest 
among the smaller firms and appears to be independent of a low 
degree of monopoly power. But again the effect was the opposite 
of that predicted in Chapter IV: management controlled firms 
reported profit rates which were more variable, not less, than 
owner controlled firms. This result, in terms of Figure 6.2, 
is probably due to the fact that management controlled firms, 
regardless of their degree of monopoly power, have a lower 
than owner controlled firms. Because they are less subject to 
the control of stockholders, managers of management controlled 
firms can feel freer to permit wider variations in reported 
profits. This reasoning also explains why weak owner controlled 
firms would report a strong response in profit rates to a tax 
change but report a generally low over-all variation in profit 
rates. Because the managers of these firms are subject to a 
high PQ, they must report changes in potential profits due to 
tax rate changes, but they have little freedom to permit un­
justifiable profit variation. 
In conclusion, the managerial hypothesis is supported by 
the evidence. The results of all five sets of contrasts show 
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significant differences in the profit performances of firms 
under different types of control. The basic change that must 
be made in the model of Chapter IV to make it conform to these 
results is that cognizance must be taken of the different 
satisficing rates of return for differently controlled firms. 
These different profit constraints, along with the different 
strengths with which stockholders can enforce them, constitute 
a necessary extension of the managerial hypothesis to explain 
the empirical results of this study. 
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CHAPTER VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Managers of large corporations are subject to many moti­
vations and constraints. Among these are pressure from stock­
holders to report high profits and the competitive pressures 
of the market place. The strengths of these influences are 
reflected, in some degree, by a firm's profit performance. 
Profit performance has several facets. The one most 
commonly studied is simply the rate of return for each year or 
averaged over a period of time. Others studied here are the 
response of profit rates to tax rate changes and the variation 
in profit rates over time. For each facet of profit perfor­
mance, the separation of ownership from control has a signifi­
cant effect. 
Management controlled firms, on the average, reported 
lower profit rates than owner controlled firms, but this effect 
seemed particularly important among those firms with a high 
degree of monopoly power. For firms with lower degrees of 
monopoly power, the constraint of competition is so strong 
that It permits relatively little discretionary behavior by 
any managers. That is, most stockholders expect to receive 
a **normal" rate of return on their investments, and under 
highly competitive conditions the managers must devote most 
of their energies to satisfying this stockholder constraint. 
The PQ terms of equation 2.4 are fairly high under these con­
ditions, Is near one, and K of equation 4.9 is relatively 
low. 
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It appears from the evidence reported in Chapter VI that 
the term is crucial for managerial theories of the firm. 
The important extension achieved in this study has been to 
show that different profit constraints exist for rirms under 
different types of control, and that no single measurement will 
proxy adequately for for all types of firms. 
The importance of the different "^c's does not become evi­
dent, though, except among firms with a high deeres of monopoly 
power, for these are the only firms which have a potential for 
> 1, Eut even among these firms, only those which are 
management controlled appear to have passed the profit constraint 
substantially. The value takes on for each firm seems to 
depend on that firm's degree of monopoly power and the terms 
of equation and hence on the type of control of the firm. 
That K is probably not a constant but depends on the 
diminishing marginal utility of emoluments was shown by the 
second facet of profit performance — the response of profit 
rates of tax rate changes. It appears that once becomes 
greater than one, a firm's managers try to satisfy much of tineir 
pent up desire for emoluments» So as > i but near one, 
K is relatively large. After this initial desire is satisfied, 
though, K begins to fall as -increases. In other words, 
the assumption that > o for "n /r 1 does not appear to 
-^c 
be valid. Instead, the relationship is probably more like 
that shown in Figure 7,1, The initial Increase in K comes 
about because once the stockholders are satisfied, the P terms 
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7.1. The relationship between K and 
158 
fall, permitting managerialism to take effect. If a firm's 
expected profits are much greater than the constraint, re­
mains small, but its managers' desire for discretionary pro­
fits is stronger, reducing K. 
Within the category of firms having a high degree of mono­
poly power, those which are controlled by their managers tend 
to be those for which is lower and is so high that K 
is falling with increased This appears to be true because 
these firms exhibited a relatively high response of reported 
profits to tax rate changes yet reported relatively low aveiage 
profit rates» Strong owner controlled firms tended generally 
to have a > 1 but close enough to one that as increased, 
so did K. Consequently for these firms, as tax rates decreased, 
most of the increase in potential profits was taken up in in­
creased K and relatively little of the increase was reported, 
IflTeak owner controlled firms, because they reported high average 
profit rates and large responses to tax rate changes, appeared 
to have which was < lo K for these firms was low and 
constant so that most of the firms' potential profits were re­
ported, even in response to a tax rate change. 
It was Interesting, and somewhat surprising, that K had 
little effect on the third facet of profit performance, the 
variation of profit rates over time. The model of Chapter IV 
predicted, as did Monsen and Downs, that if K was high, a 
firm's profit rate would vary less over time than if K was low. 
That just the opposite appears to be the case suggests that 
is not a single given number for each firm, but that it has a 
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functional distribution associated with it, depending on the 
desires of the individual stockholders. Because there are so 
many, diverse stockholders of management controlled firms, none 
of whom has the power to enforce his personal the managers 
of these firms are free to let vary over a rather broad 
range without fearing significant repercussions. The managers 
of owner controlled firms, however, face a much more rigid 
profit constraint and feel obliged to try to maintain reported 
profits near or above that level. As a result, these firms will, 
in general, show less variation in reported profits over time. 
It is important that all three facets of profit perfor­
mance be considered in the study of corporation behavior. A 
consideration of just average reported profit rates and the 
change of reported profit rates in response to tax rate changes 
would lead one to the conclusion that classical, profit-maxl-
mizlng theories of the firm are a close approximation to reality 
for all firms with low monopoly power, regardless of their type 
of control. Such a conclusion, though, is clearly unwarranted 
in light of the effect which the separation of ownership from 
control has on the variation of a firm's profits over time. 
In general, these empirical results emphasize the impor­
tance of Simon's satlsficing theory of the firm. They also 
support, in a broad sense, most of the arguments presented in 
Chapter II that management controlled firms do behave differ­
ently from owner controlled firms. And if, among those firms 
with a high degree of monopoly power, the difference between 
the average reported profit rates of owner controlled firms 
l6o 
(14.5#) and of management controlled firms (11.5^) is taken as 
a rough measure of the "cost-effect differential" discussed by 
Comanor and Leibensteln, this differential is 20.7#» which is 
very close to their figure of 18#. 
Another important finding of this study is the existence 
of nonhomogeneous variances among the differently controlled 
firms. The importance of this finding is twofold: (1) It 
emphasizes the need for corrective measures for statistical 
analyses, even if varying annual fluctuations are eliminated 
by averaging. (2) It highlights the point made earlier, that 
management controlled firms frequently tend to have a much 
broader range for discretionary behavior than owner controlled 
firms have. Otherwise such big differences in the profit per­
formance of management controlled firms would not have been 
observed. 
Finally, the results of Chapter VI combined with those of 
Chapter I suggest that perhaps management controlled firms 
place a greater emphasis on increasing sales than do owner con­
trolled firms. Management controlled firms tend to report 
lower average profit rates, but also tend to dominate the 
largest size class of firms. Certainly one of the reasons for 
their dominance among the very largest firms is that only rarely 
can one person or group amass enough wealth to control such 
large firms, but it also seems reasonable that management con­
trolled firms become large by sacrificing profits. 
It may be unwise, though, to generalize these results for 
the I960's into the future, for the I960*s may have been a period 
l6l 
of transition. That manager controlled firms were merged or 
acquired out of existence at a greater rate than owner con­
trolled firms suggests that others in the economy were aware 
of their generally poorer profit performance. As the poorer 
performing manager controlled firms are absorbed by better 
performing firms and made subject to more stringent constraints, 
the differentials in profit performance observed for the i960's 
may disappear. 
This possibility seems unlikely, though, for two reasons. 
First, as the absorbing firms get larger, they will represent 
such large amounts of wealth that they, too, must eventually 
become management controlled, if they are not already. And 
second, equation 2.4 has enough logical power to discourage 
anyone from believing that management controlled firms of the 
future will perform a great deal differently or better than 
they have in the past. 
162 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Advertising Age . ,« 
1969 Magazines I969, Advertising Age 40, No, 42: 49-60. 
Alchian, A. and Kessel, R, 
1962 Competition, monopoly, and the pursuit of money. 
In National Bureau of Economic Research. Aspects 
of labor economics. Pp. 157-183. Princeton, N.J., 
Princeton University Press. 
Arrow, K. 
1951 Social choice and individual values. New York, 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Bain, J. 
1965 Barriers to new competition. Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 
Baldwin, W, 
1964 The motives of managers, environmental restraints, 
and the theory of managerial enterprise. Q.J.E. 
78: 238-256. 
Berle, A. 
1965 The impact of the corporation on classical economic 
theory. Q.J.E, 79: 26-40. 
and Means, G. 
1^32 The modern corporation and private property. New 
York, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G. 
1965 The calculus of consent, Ann Arbor, Mich., The 
University of Michigan Press. 
Comanor, W, and Leibenstein, H, 
1969 Allocative efficiency, X-efficiency and the measure­
ment of welfare losses, Economica. New Series, 36: 
304-309. 
Cyert, R. and March, J. 
1963 A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics 
1967 Comparable concentration ratios for 213 manufacturing 
industries classified by producer and consumer goods 
and degree of product differentiation 1947, 1954, 
1958, and 1963, Washington, B.C., Federal Trade 
Commission, 
163 
Financial World 
1968 Regional brewers battle for survival. Financial 
World 130, No. 14: 11-12. 
Forbes 
1969 Battle for survival. Forbes 104, No. 6: 95# 
Fortune 
1966 The 500 largest U.S. industrial corporations. 
Fortune 74, No. 2: 232-249. 
Gordon, R. 
1961 Business leadership in the large corporation. 
Berkeley, Calif,, The University of California Press. 
Hall, M. and Weiss, L. 
1967 Firm size and profitability. R. E. Stat. 49: 319-331» 
Hicks, J. 
1935 Annual survey of economic theory; the theory of 
monopoly. Econometrica. 3: 1-20. 
Hlndley, B. 
1969 Capitalism and the corporation, Economica. New 
Series, 36: 426-438. 
Huntsberger, D. 
1967 Elements of statistical inference. 2nd ed. Boston, 
Allyn and Bacon, Inc. 
Johnston, J. 
1963 Econometric methods. New York, McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., Inc. 
Kamerschen, D. 
1968 The influence of ownership and control on profit 
rates. A.E.H. 58: 432-447. 
Kaplan, A., Dirlam, J., and Lanzlllottl, R, 
1958 Pricing in big business. Washington, D.C., The 
Brookings Institution. 
Kaysen, C. 
1965 Another view of corporate capitalism. Q.J.E. 79: 
41-51. 
Lamer, R. 
1966 Ownership and control in the 200 largest non-
financial corporations, 1929 and 1963» A.E.R, 56: 
777-787. 
Leibensteln, H. 
1966 Allocatlve efficiency vs. X-efficiency. A.E.R. 56: 
392-415. 
164 
1969 Organizational or frictlonal equilibria, X-effi-
clency, and the rate of innovation. Q.J.E. 83: 
600-623. 
Mann, H. 
1966 Seller concentration, barriers to entry, and rates 
of return in thirty industries, I95O-I96O. R.E. 
Stat. 48; 296-307. 
1970 Asymmetry, barriers to entry, and rates of return 
In twenty-six concentrated industries, 1948 to 
1957* Western Economic Journal 8: 86-89. 
Marketing/Communications 
1970 Schlitz sets pace for beer's big 3* Marketing/ 
Communications 298, No. 1: 26-29* 
Monsen, R., Chlu, J. and Cooley, D. 
1968 The effect of separation of ownership and control 
on the performance of the large firm. Q.J,3. 82: 
435-451. 
. and Downs, A, 
1965 A theory of large managerial firms. J.P.E. 73t 
221-236. 
Moody's industrial manual 
1961- New York, Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 
1970 
Ostle, B, 
1963 Statistics in research. 2nd ed. Ames, Iowa, The 
Iowa State University Press. 
Papandreou, A. 
1952 Some basic issues in the theory of the firm. In 
Haley, B., ed. A survey of contemporary economics. 
Pp. 183-219. Homewood, 111., Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 
Peterson, S. 
1965 Corporate control and capitalism. Q.J.E. 79s 1-24. 
Shelton, J. 
1967 Allocative efficiency vs. X-efficiency: comment. 
A.E.R. 57: 1252-1257. 
Shepherd, W, 
1970 Market power and economic welfare. New York, 
Random House, Inc. 
165 
Simon, H. 
1957 Models of man. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
1962 New developments in the theory of the firm, A.E.R. 
52: 1-15. 
1959 Theories of decision making in economics and be­
havioral science. A.E.R. 49: 253-283. 
Smith, A, 
1937 The wealth of nations. Modern Library ed. New York, 
Modern Library, Inc. 
Standard & Poor's Corporation Records 
1971 New York, Standard & Poor's Corporation. 
Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys 
1971 New York, Standard & Poor's Corporation. 
Stigler, G. 
1956 The statistics of monopoly and merger. J.P.E. 64: 
33-40. 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Judiciary 
Committee 
1966 Concentration in manufacturing industries, I963, 
Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print, Off. 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 
1966 Long term economic growth, I860-I965, A statisti­
cal compendium ES4-No. 1. Washington, D.C. U.S. 
Govt. Print, Off. 
The Value Line Investment Survey 
1971 New York, Arnold Bernhard & Co., Inc. 
Vlllarejo, D. 
1962 Stock ownership and the control of corporations. 
Original not available for examination; reprinted 
from New University Thought. Detroit, Mich., The 
Radical Education Project. 
Williamson, 0. 
1963 The economics of discretionary behavior: managerial 
objectives in a theory of the firm. Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
l66 
APPENDIX A, DATA 
In this appendix all the firms included in the present 
study are listed along with each firm's values of the inde­
pendent variables which were used. The methods used to deter­
mine size values and type-of-control values are explained in 
Chapter I. The methods used to calculate the monopoly power 
values are explained in Chapter V. B refers to the method de­
vised in the present study, of weighted sales in Industries 
with VH barriers by 1.0, sales in industries with S barriers by 
0,5. and sains in industries with F-I, barriers by 0.0, B* re­
presents the measure suggested by Mann's results (1966, 1970); 
for this measure, sales in Industries with VH barriers are 
weighted by 1.0, but all other sales are weighted by 0,0. 
The codes in the last column of this table are included 
to present some further information about missing data and 
about other sources for measurers of the type of control. They 
should be interpreted as follows; 
a. The firm was acquired or merged out of existence 
between I965 and I969. There were 64 of these In all, 
b. Data were missing for this firm for some reason. 
In most cases, the firms were not listed in Moody's 
Industrial Manual (1961-19 70) or in Vnlue Line (1971). 
Three of the firms, though. Level Brothers, T. J. 
Llpton, and Olivetti Underwood, are subsidiaries of 
foreign corporations and data for these subsidiaries 
alone were not available. West Point-Pepperell is 
excluded in the early years because it did not exist 
then. Curtis Publishing is excluded for the later 
years because its net worth was negative, rendering 
its net income to net worth ratios meaningless, 
Co The independent findings of this study agree with 
Lamer on whether the firm falls into the broad class 
16? 
of manager control or owner control, either strong 
owner (SO) or weak owner (WO). 
d. This study agrees with MCC on the type of control 
of the firm. 
e. This study agrees with both Larner and MCC. 
f. The type of control determined by this study is 
at variance with that determined by either Larner or 
MCC. The classification of the firm by this study is 
defended in the discussion following the table. 
g. The type of control of the firm was determined from 
information in Moody's Industrial Manual (196I-I970), 
Value Line (1971)» Villarejo (I962), and Standard and 
Poor's Corporation Records (1971). 
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Table A.l. The firms studied, their size, and their type of 
control 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (6?) (65) (69) (65) (69) 
General Motors 1 1 1 M M cf 
Ford 2 1 1 SO SO e 
Standard Oil(NJ) 3 1 1 M M e 
General Electric 4 1 1 M M e 
Chrysler 5 1 1 M M e 
Mobil Oil 6 1 1 M M c 
U.S. Steel 7 1 1 M M e 
Texaco 8 1 1 M M c 
IBM 9 1 M M c 
Gulf Oil 10 1 1 WO WO e 
Western Electric 11 1 1 M M c 
Dupont 12 1 1 SO SO e 
Swift 13 1 1 M M e 
Bethlehem Steel 14 1 1 M M c 
Shell Oil 15 1 1 M M fg 
Standard Oil(Ind) 16 1 1 M M c 
Standard Oil(Cal) 17 1 1 M M c 
Westinghouse 18 1 1 M M e 
Intlo Harvester 19 1 1 M M c 
Goodyear 20 1 1 M M c 
Union Carbide 21 1 1 M M e 
Armour 22 1 1 M M c 
Procter & Gamble 23 1 1 M M c 
RCA 24 1 1 M M c 
General Telephone 25 1 1 M M c 
Boeing 26 1 1 M M c 
Kraftco 27 1 1 M M c 
No.Amer.Rockwell 28 1 M M c 
Lockheed Aircraft 29 1 1 M M e 
ITT 30 1 1 M M c 
Firestone 31 1 1 SO WO cf 
General Foods 32 1 1 M M e 
General Dynamics 33 1 1 M M e 
Monsanto 34 1 1 M M c 
Eastman Kodak 35 1 1 M M e 
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Table A.l, - Continued: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (65) (65) (69) (6$) (69) 
Phillips Petroleum 36 1 1 M M e 
Continental Oil 37 1 1 M M c 
United Aircraft 38 1 1 M M c 
Caterpillar Tractor 39 1 1 M M c 
Borden 40 1 1 M M c 
Republic Steel 41 1 1 M M c 
Burlington Industries 42 1 1 M M c 
International Paper 43 1 1 M M c 
Sinclair Oil 44 1 M - ae 
American Can 45 1 1 M M g 
Sperry Rand 46 1 1 M M c 
Union Oil 47 1 1 M M c 
Continental Can 48 1 1 M M c 
Uniroyal 49 1 1 M M c 
Cities Service 50 1 1 M M c 
Armco Steel 51 1 1 M M e 
Dow Chemical 52 1 1 WO WO c 
Alcoa 53 1 1 WO WO e 
Allied Chemical 54 1 1 M M c 
National Steel 55 1 1 WO WO df 
Tenneco 56 1 1 M M c 
McConnell Douglas 57 1 1 WO M S 
Reynolds Tobacco 58 1 1 M M c 
W, R, Grace 59 1 1 WO WO c 
3M 6o 1 1 WO WO c 
Anaconda 61 1 1 M M c 
Jones & Laughlin 62 1 1 M M c 
American Motors 63 1 M M e 
B. P, Goodrich 64 1 1 M M c 
Singer 65 1 1 WO M cf 
CPC International 66 1 1 M M c 
Inland Steel 67 1 1 M M c 
Ralston Purina 68 1 1 M M g 
General Tire & Rubber 69 1 1 WO M cf 
FMC 70 1 1 M M c 
Sun Oil 71 1 1 80 SO e 
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Table A.l, - Continued; 
Corporation 
(1) (2) (3) 
Rank Size Size 
by Class Class 
Sales 
(65) (65) (69) 
(4) 
Type 
of 
Con­
trol 
iiiL 
(5) 
Type 
of 
Con­
trol 
lâ2L 
(14) 
Codes 
Litton 
PPG Industries 
Deere 
01 in 
Coca-Cola 
American Cyanamid 
Celanese 
Colgate-Palmolive 
Grumman 
Textron 
Owens-Illinois 
Wilson 
Borg-Wamer 
Youngstown-Lykes 
Douglas Aircraft 
Jo P. Stevens 
National Lead 
Bendix 
American Home Products 
Reynolds 
National 
Metals 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
Cash Register 92 
Weyerhauser 93 
Allis-Chalmers 94 
Campbell Soup 95 
Crown Zellerbach 96 
American Brands 97 
Tidewater Oil 98 
Genesco 99 
Eaton Yale & Towne 100 
Honeywell loi 
Morrell 102 
Atlantic Richfield I03 
Beatrice Foods 104 
Signal Companies 105 
Kennecott Copper 106 
TRW 107 
2 
2 
2 
1 
M 
WO 
WO 
wo 
wo 
M 
M 
M 
WO 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
WO 
M 
M 
M 
SO 
M 
M 
SO 
WO 
M 
M 
SO 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
WO 
WO 
WO 
WO 
M 
M 
M 
WO 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
WO 
M 
M 
M 
SO 
M 
M 
WO 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
c 
c 
e 
c 
c 
c 
s 
d 
S 
c 
ad 
c 
c 
ag 
c 
c 
c 
e 
e 
c 
c 
e 
g 
c 
c 
ac 
g 
g 
c 
ad 
e 
g 
g 
e 
g 
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Table A.l, - Continued: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation. <65) (65) (69) (65) (6?) 
Pullman 108 1 2 M H g 
White Motor 109 1 1 M M g 
Standard Brands 110 1 1 M M d 
St. Regis Paper 111 1 2 M M c 
Whirlpool 112 1 1 M M g 
National Biscuit 113 1 2 M M g 
Amer.Smelting & Reflng .114 1 2 M M e 
Martin Marietta 115 1 1 M M cf 
Standard Oil (Ohio) 116 1 1 M M c 
Kimberly-Clark 117 1 2 M M c 
Kaiser Alum.& Chemical 118 1 1 SO SO e 
Georgia Pacific 119 1 1 M M c 
United Merchants &Mfrs .120 1 2 M M g 
General Mills 121 1 2 M M g 
American Standard 122 1 1 M M g 
Marathon Oil 123 1 2 M M c 
Mead 124 1 1 M M g 
Pfizer 125 1 2 M M g 
Kaiser Industries 126 2 SO bc 
Carnation 127 2 1 SO SO g 
Hercules 128 2 2 M M d 
Continental Baking 129 2 - M - ag 
K. J. Heinz 130 2 2 SO SO d 
Motorola 131 2 2 WO WO d 
Pepsico 132 2 1 M M g 
Rockwell-Standard 133 2 — M ag 
Ogden 134 2 1 WO WO g 
Natl.Distillers & Chem, 135 2 2 M M c 
Raytheon 136 2 1 M M g 
Sunray DX 137 2 - M — ac 
Babcock & Wilcox 138 2 2 M M g 
Johns-Manvilie 139 2 2 M M g 
Hygrade Food Products 140 2 3 WO WO g 
American Metal Climax 141 2 2 WO WO c 
Zenith 142 2 2 M M g 
Central Soya 143 2 2 M M g 
l?p. 
Table A.l. - Continued; 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (65) (69) (69) (65) (69) 
Quaker Oats 144 2 2 r M F 
Scott Paper 145 2 2 T.- M K 
Phelps Dod/re 146 2 2 ¥' c 
Philip Morris 147 2 2 i': M g 
Burroughs 148 2 2 V M d 
Lever Brothers 149 2 - - - b 
McG raw-l'ld ison 150 2 2 WO WO g 
Time 151 2 2 wo wo K 
U.S.PIywood-Champi on 
Papers 152 2 1 I-'i M F. 
Ashland Oil 153 2 1 wo M rif 
Hunt Foods 154 2 - 30 - î-.d 
Budd 155 2 2 WO WO r, 
Pillsbury 156 2 2 M F er 
Avco 157 2 2 WO WO pr 
Horme1 158 2 2 SO so d 
Tn^ersoll-Hand 159 2 2 F l". F 
Texas Instruments 160 2 2 •'10 wo n: 
Johnnon & Johnson 161 2 2 30 so p: 
American Sugar 162 2 2 ¥ K r. 
Uel r-^onte 163 2 2 r M d 
Champion Papers 16^ 2 - so - BP 
Anheuser-Busch 165 2 2 WO wo F. 
Boise Cascade 166 2 1 M b] g 
Otis Elevator 167 2 2 M I- F 
Container Corp. of 
America 168 2 - M - ag 
Combustion Engineering 169 2 2 !•! M F 
Dana 170 2 2 WO wo d 
Xerox 171 2 1 K K F 
Clark Equipment 172 2 2 n K F 
Interco 173 2 2 p M F 
Bri s t ol-Myers 174 2 1 Tvi M F 
Pruehauf 175 2 2 K M F 
A MF 176 2 2 M M F 
Warnnr-Lambert 177 2 2 r M F 
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Table A.l, - Continued; 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (65) (65) (69) (65) (6?) 
IPL 178 2 
Air Reduction 179 2 
Timken 180 2 
Armstrong Cork 181 2 
Koppers 182 2 
Crane 183 2 
Mack Trucks 184 2 
Kellogg 185 2 
Agway 186 2 
Dart Industries 187 2 
A. 0. Smith 188 2 
Foremost Dairies 189 2 
Dresser Industries 190 2 
Seagram & Sons 191 2 
Avon 192 2 
Carrier 193 2 
Amerada Hess 194 2 
Rohm & Haas 195 2 
Pet , 196 2 
Sherwin-Williams 197 2 
Diamond International 198 2 
Worthington 199 2 
General American 
Transportation 200 2 
Corning Glass Works 201 2 
Northrop 202 2 
Gillette 203 2 
LTV 204 2 
Allegheny-Ludlum 205 2 
Owens-Corning Plberglas206 2 
Magnavox 207 2 
Merck 208 2 
Cerro 209 2 
Stauffer Chemical 210 2 
Westvaco 211 2 
Archer-Daniels-Midland 212 2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
M 
M 
WO 
M 
M 
WO 
M 
SO 
M 
SO 
WO 
M 
SO 
wo 
M 
SO 
SO 
SO 
M 
M 
M 
M 
SO 
M 
M 
M 
M 
SO 
M 
WO 
M 
WO 
M 
M 
•M 
WO 
M 
M 
WO 
SO 
M 
SJ 
M 
S3 
WO 
M 
WO 
SO 
SO 
M 
M 
M 
80 
M 
M 
M 
M 
80 
M 
WO 
M 
WO 
M 
M 
ad 
g 
d 
g 
g 
g 
ag 
g 
b 
g 
g 
ag 
g 
c 
g 
d 
S 
d 
g 
g 
g 
ag 
g 
g 
g 
g 
g 
g 
g 
d 
g 
g 
g 
g 
174 
Table A.l, - Continueds 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (65) (65) (69) (65) (69) 
Kerr-McGee 213 2 2 WO WO g 
International Multi-
foods 214 2 3 wo M g 
West Point-Pepperell 215 2 3 — — M bg 
Eli Lilly 216 2 2 SO SO g 
Consolidation Coal 217 2 - M «M ac 
Brunswick 218 2 2 M M c 
Richfield Oil 219 2 - M - ac 
Crucible Steel 220 2 - M - ag 
Cudahy 221 2 3 M M fg 
Ethyl 222 2 2 WO WO g 
Kaiser Steel 223 2 2 SO 80 g 
Oscar Mayer 224 2 2 so 80 g 
U.S. Gypsum 225 2 2 M M g 
ACF Industries 226 2 3 M M g 
Glidden 227 2 - M - ag 
Sterling Drug 228 2 2 M M d 
General Cable 229 2 3 M M g 
Libby McNeill & Libby 230 2 3 K M g 
Admirai 231 2 3 80 80 d 
Essen International 232 2 2 — — WO bg 
Grinnell 233 2 — M MM ag 
Midland-Ross 234 2 3 M M g 
Land 0'Lakes Creameries235 2 - - b 
Pacific Car & Foundry 236 2 2 M M g 
Liggett & Myers 237 2 2 M M g 
P. Lorillard 238 2 — M — ag 
Lowenstein & Sons 239 2 3 80 SO g 
Revere Copper & Brass 240 2 3 M M g 
Philadelphia & Reading 241 2 M ag 
Flintkote 242 2 3 M M g 
Union Camp 243 2 2 M M g 
Collins Radio 244 2 2 WO WO g 
Cummins Engine 245 2 2 SO 80 g 
H, K. Porter 246 2 3 so 80 g 
Cannon Mills 247 2 3 wo WO g 
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Table A,l, - Continued: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (14 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by- Class Class of of Cod 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (65) (65) (69) (65) (69) 
Li bbey-Ovrens -Ford 248 2 2 M M g 
Rath Packing 249 2 3 M M g 
Newport News Ship­
building 250 2 — M — ag 
Skelly Oil 251 3 3 SO SO g 
Westinghouse Air Brakes252 3 - M - ag 
J. lo Case 253 3 3 M M S 
Norton 254 3 3 WO WO S 
Wheeling-Pittsburg 
Steel 255 3 2 M M g 
Addressograph-Multi-
256 graph 3 2 WO WO d 
Scovill Manufacturing 257 3 2 M M g 
Brown Shoe 258 3 3 M M g 
Consumers Co-op Assn 259 3 - - - b 
Inmont 260 3 3 M M g 
Int'l. Minerals & 
Chemicals 261 3 2 M M g 
Interlake 262 3 3 WO WO g 
Abex 263 3 M - ag 
National Gypsum 264 3 3 M M g 
North American Philips 265 3 2 M M g 
Crown Cork & Seal 266 3 3 80 80 g 
American Bakeries 267 3 3 M M g 
Cluett, Peabody 268 3 2 M M g 
Eltra 269 3 2 WO WO g 
Cone Mills 270 3 3 SO 80 g 
Emerson Electric 271 3 2 M M fg 
Springs Mills 272 3 3 - M bg 
Tecumseh Products 273 3 2 M M g 
Joseph Schlitz Brewing 274 3 2 SO 80 g 
Evans Products 275 3 2 M M g 
Dan River 276 3 3 M M g 
Revlon 277 3 3 WO WO g 
Hooker Chemical 278 3 — M — ag 
Hoover 279 3 3 SO 80 g 
Smith Kline & French 280 3 3 WO WO g 
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Table A.l, - Continued; 
(1 )  (2 )  (3 )  (4 )  (5 )  (14)  
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Code 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (65)  (65)  (69)  (65)  (69)  
Foster Wheeler 281 3  3  M M g  
Upjohn 282 3  3  SO so  g  
General Precision 283 3  - M - ag  
Kayser-Roth 284 3  2  SO so  g  
Kelsey-Hayes 285 3  3  M M g  
Abott Laboratories 286 3  2 M M d 
Englehard Industries 287 3  3  SO so g  
Ryan Aeronautical 288 3  - WO - ag 
Times-Mirror 289 3  3  SO so g  
Di Giorgio 290 3  3  M M g  
CEI Steel 291 3  3  M M g  
Sumbeam 292 3  3  M M g  
Campbell Taggert 293 3  3  M M g  
US M 294 3  3  M M g  
R.R.Donnelley & Sons 295 3  3  SO 80 g  
Parke Davis 296 3  3  M M d 
Stokely-Van Camp 297 3  3  WO wo d 
A.E. Staley Mfg. 298 3  3  so so g  
Schenley Industries 299 3 3 WO wo c 
MeLouth Steel 300 3 4 M M g 
McGraw-Hill 301 3 3 so SO g 
GAP 302 3 2 M M g 
Federal Mogul 303 3 3 M M g 
Richardson-Merrell 304 3 3 M M g 
Link-Belt 305 3 M - ag 
Chemetron 306 3 3 wo WO g 
Hershey Foods 307 3 3 so SO g 
Amerada Petroleum 308 3 M ag 
Diamond Shamrock 309 3 2 M M g 
Peabody Coal 310 3 - M ag 
Ex-Cell-0 311 3 3 M M g 
Beech-Nut Life Savers 312 3 M ag 
Potlatch Forests 313 3 3 M M g 
Carborundum 314 3 3 WO WO g 
Bemis 315 3 3 WO WO g 
Polaroid 316 3 2 wo wo d 
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Table A.l, - Continued: 
(1 )  (2 )  (3 )  (4 )  (5 )  (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (62)  ( 6 5 )  (69)  (65)  (69)  
Sunshine Biscuits 
Cincinnati Milacron 
ESB 
Colt Industries 
Lone Star Cement 
Gerber 
Cotton Producers Assn. 
American Enka 
Studebaker 
Cutler-Hammer 
Lear Siegler 
Stanley Warner 
Fairmont Foods 
Indian Head 
Emhart 
Amsted Industries 
Eastern Gas & Fuel 
Hupp 
Rockwell Manufacturing 335 
Sharon Steel 
Bell & Howell 
Iowa Beef Packers 
Blaw-Knox 
Pittsburgh Steel 
Gulf & Western 
McCall 
Fairchild Camera 
Outboard Marine 
Mohasco Industries 
Pabst Brewing 
Square D 
Castle & Cooke 
Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Purex 
Thiokol Chemical 
Cyclops 
317 3 - M - ag 
318 3 3 WO WO d 
319 3 4 M M g 
320 3 2 M M P 
321 3 3 M M g 
322 3 4 WO WO g 
323 3 - - — b 
324 3 3 M M g 
325 3 - M - ad 
326 3 4 M M g 
327 3 2 WO WO g 
328 3 - WO - ag 
329 3 3 M M g 
330 3 2 WO WO g 
331 3 4 M M g 
332 3 3 M M g 
333 3 4 WO WO g 
334 3 - M — ag 
 3 3 WO WO g 
336 3 3 M M g 
337 3 3 M M g 
338 3 2 M M g 
339 3 - M — ad 
340 3 - WO - ad 
341 3 1 M M g 
342 3 - SO — ag 
343 3 3 WO WO g 
344 3 3 WO WO d 
345 3 3 M M g 
346 3 3 M M g 
347 3 4 M M g 
348 3 2 M M g 
349 3 3 80 SO g 
350 3 3 M M g 
351 3 3 M M g 
352 3 3 M M g 
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Table A.l, - Continued; 
(1 )  (2 )  (3 )  (4 )  (5 )  (14)  
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (65) (65)  (69)  (65)  (69)  
Interstate Brands 353 3 3 N M g 
Murphy Oil 354 3 3 WO WO g 
Simmons 355 3 3 M M g 
Ward Foods 356 3 3 M M g 
Anchor Hocking 357 3 3 WO WO g 
Rayonier 358 3 - M — ag 
American Chain & Cable 359 3 4 WO WO g 
Granite City Steel 360 3 4 M M g 
Thomas J. Llpton 36I 3 
Stanley Works 3^2 3 
Hart Schaffner & Marx 3^3 3 
Eagle-Picher 3^^ 3 
Hewlett-Packard 3^5 3 
Kendall 3^6 3 
Trane 3^7 3 
Hammermill Paper 3^8 3 
Kern County Land 3^9 3 
Harsco 370 3 
Control Data 371 3 
Beaunit 372 3 
Pieldcrest Mills 373 3 
Jim Walter 37^ 3 
Pacolet Industries 375 3 
Rohr 376 4 
General Host 377 4 
Pennwalt 378 4 
Houdaille 379 4 
U.S.Pipe & Foundry 380 4 
American Petrofina 38I 4 
Keystone Consolidated 382 4 
Jonathan Logan 383 4 
National Can 384 4 
Ampex 385 4 
Ruberoid 386 4 
Falstaff Brewing 387 4 
Stewart-Warner 388 4 
3 M M g 
4 M M g 
4 WO WO g 
3 SO SO g 
4 WO WO g 
4 WO WO d 
3 M M g 
- M - ag 
3 WO WO g 
2 WO M g 
- M - ag 
4 M M g 
2 WO WO g 
— M' — ag 
3 M M g 
4 M M g 
2 M M g 
4 M M g 
— M - ad 
4 M M g 
4 M M g 
3 SO SO g 
3 M M g 
3 M M S 
- WO — ag 
4 WO WO g 
4 M M g 
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Table A,l, - Continued: 
(1) ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  ( 5 )  (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation ( 6 5 )  ( 6 5 )  ( 6 9 )  ( 6 5 )  ( 6 9 )  
Universal American 389 4 M ag 
SCM 390 4 2 M «f g 
Joy Manufacturing 391 4 4 M M g 
ITE Imperial 392 4 3 M M g 
Standard Packaging 393 4 4 M M g 
Cessna Aircraft 394 4 3 M M g 
Curtiss-Wright 395 4 3 M M d 
Hanna Mining 396 4 4 80 80 g 
Allied Mills 397 4 3 WO WO g 
Armstrong Rubber 398 4 4 M M g 
Koehring 399 4 3 M M g 
VUlean Materials 400 4 4 M M g 
Witco Chemical 401 4 4 SO 80 g 
Consolidated Cigar 402 4 - M - ag 
Arvin Industries 403 4 4 WO WO g 
New York Times 404 4 4 SO 80 g 
Rex Chainbelt 405 4 4 M M g 
Ideal Basic Industries 406 4 4 WO WO g 
Inland Container 407 4 4 SO so g 
Chesbrough-Pond's 408 4 4 M M g 
Western Publishing 409 4 4 SO 80 g 
Keebler 410 4 4 WO WO g 
Miles Laboratories 411 4 3 WO WO g 
Lukens Steel 412 4 4 so 80 d 
Riegel Paper 413 4 4 SO 80 g 
Cowles Communications 414 4 4 so 80 g 
St. Joe Minerais 415 4 4 M M g 
Kellwood 4l6 4 4 M M g 
Clark Oil 417 4 3 SO 80 g 
Rheem Manufacturing 418 4 M - ag 
Calumet & Hecla 419 4 — M — ag 
Grolier 420 4 4 WO WO g 
Sybron 421 4 3 WO WO g 
Woodward 422 4 M _ ag 
Ma re mont 423 4 4 WO WO g 
Warnaco 424 4 4 so 80 g 
KUP Sutherland 425 4 - M - ag 
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Table A.l, - Continued; 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Code 
Sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (65) (65) (69) (65) (69) 
Copperweld Steel kz6 4 4 M M g 
Champion Spark Plug 427 4 3 SO SO g 
American Optical 428 4 - M - ag 
Needham Packing 429 4 4 WO WO g 
Pibreboard 430 4 4 M M g 
Chicago Pneumatic Tool ^ 31 4 4 M M g 
Handy & Harman 432 4 4 WO WO g 
Endicott Johnson 433 4 4 M M g 
Cabot 434 4 4 SO SO g 
canada Dry 435 4 - so — ag 
Wrigley 436 4 4 so so g 
E. W. Bliss 437 4 - M - ag 
Crowell Collier & 
Macmillan 438 4 3 M M g 
Bucyrus-Erie 439 4 4 M M g 
American Biltrite 
Rubber 440 4 4 M M g 
Insilco 441 4 3 M M g 
Harris-Intertype 442 4 3 M M g 
Interpace 443 4 4 WO WO g 
U.S. Industries 444 4 1 M M d 
Warwick Electronics 445 4 4 M M g 
Great Western Sugar 446 4 M ag 
Collins & Aikman 447 4 4 WO WO g 
Roper 448 4 4 M M g 
U.S. Smelting 449 4 4 M M g 
Miehle-Goss-Dexter 450 4 - M - ag 
Certain-teed Products 451 4 4 M M g 
Harbison-Walker 452 4 « M ag 
H.H. Robertson 453 4 4 M M g 
Howmet 454 4 3 M M g 
Gardner-Denver 455 4 4 M M g 
Hobart Manufacturing 456 4 4 WO WO g 
Morton International 457 4 — — «. b 
Reichhold Chemicals 458 4 4 WD WO g 
Curtis Publishing 459 4 — M — bg 
Beech Aircraft 460 4 4 WO WO g 
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Table A.l. - Continued: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
sales Con­ Con­
trol trol 
Corporation (65) (65) (69) (65) (69) 
Hoover Ball & Bearing 461 4 4 M M S 
Colorado Milling 462 4 - M ag 
Air Products & Cheniioalsw3 4 4 M M g 
Commonwealth Oil 464 4 4 M M g 
Wagner Electric 465 4 — M — ag 
Maytag 466 4 4 WO WO g 
Standard Pressed Steel 467 4 4 SO WO g 
Olivetti Underwood 468 4 - - - b 
Trans Union 469 4 4 M M g 
Black & Decker 470 4 4 M M g 
Farmers Union Central 471 4 b 
Rheingold 472 4 4 M M g 
Federal Pacific Elec. 473 4 4 M M g 
Coastal States Gas 474 4 3 M M g 
Sobering 475 4 4 WO WO d 
Carpenter Technology 476 4 4 M M g 
Cooper Industries 477 4 4 M M g 
Ceco 478 4 4 SO WO g 
Dorr-Oliver 479 4 4 F M g 
Clevite 480 4 - M - ag 
Green Giant 481 4 4 WO WO g 
Fairchild Hiller 482 4 3 M M g 
U.S. Shoe 483 4 3 M M g 
Warner & Swasey 484 4 4 M M g 
Brockway Glass . 485 4 4 M M g 
Hanes 486 4 4 30 SO g 
Northwestern Steel & 
Wire 487 4 4 SO SO g 
Harnischfeger 488 4 4 SO so g 
Blue Bell 489 4 4 M M g 
Mead Johnson 490 4 - SO - ad 
Wyandotte Chemicals 491 4 SO ag 
Electrolux 492 4 - M - ag 
Great Northern 
Nekoosa 493 4 4 M M g 
Bunker-Ramo 494 4 3 M M g 
AMP 495 4 4 WO WO g 
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Table A.l, - Continued: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (14) 
Rank Size Size Type Type 
by Class Class of of Codes 
Sales Con­
trol 
Con­
trol 
Corporation (65) (65) (69) (6$) (69) 
Pitney-Bowes 496 4 3 M M S 
Signode 497 4 4 WO WO S 
Reeves Brothers 498 4 4 SO SO g 
Detroit Steel 499 4 4 M M g 
Island Creek Coal 500 4 — M ag 
Table A.2, The monopoly power of the 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (6f) 
General Motors 1 .95 .90 
Ford 2 .89 .77 
Standard Oil (NJ) 3 .50 .00 
General Electric 4 .65 .31 
Crysler 5 .90 .76 
Mobil Oil 6 .50 oOO 
U.S. Steel 7 .50 .05 
Texaco 8 .50 .00 
IBM 9 .90 .79 
Gulf Oil 10 .50 .00 
Western Electric 11 1.00 1.00 
Dupont 12 .51 .02 
Swift 13 .15 .00 
Bethlehem Steel 14 o52 .09 
Shell Oil 15 .50 .00 
Standard Oil (Ind) 16 .47 .00 
Standard Oil (Cal) 17 .50 .00 
Westinghouse 18 .68 .41 
International Harvestepl9 .66 .33 
Goodyear 20 .38 .03 
Union Carbide 21 .57 .13 
Armour 22 .17 .17 
Procter & Gamble 23 .65 .50 
RCA 24 .82 .70 
General Telephone 25 .83 066 
studied 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas­
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
1 1 .95 .90 1 1 
1 1 .89 .77 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .67 .34 2 2 
1 1 .90 .76 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .05 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 .90 .79 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
2 2 .51 .02 2 2 
3 2 .15 .00 3 2 
2 2 .52 .09 2 2 
2 2 .50 .50 2 2 
2 2 .47 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 2 .68 .41 1 2 
2 2 .66 .33 2 2 
2 2 .38 .03 2 2 
2 2 .58 .16 2 2 
3 2 .21 .17 3 2 
2 1 .65 .50 2 1 
1 1 .76 .57 1 1 
1 1 .83 .66 1 1 
Table A,2. - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
Boeing 26 1.00 1,00 
KraftCO 27 .00 ,00 
North American 
Rockwell 28 .95 .90 
Locldieed Aircraft 29 .98 .95 
ITT 30 .59 .48 
Firestone 31 .40 .00 
General Poods 32 .22 .20 
General Dynamics 33 .93 .88 
Monsanto 34 .50 .00 
Eastman Kodak 35 .97 .95 
Phillips Petroleum 36 .50 .00 
Continental Oil 37 .45 .00 
United Aircraft 38 .92 .92 
Caterpillar Tractor 39 .50 .00 
Borden 40 .11 .00 
Republic Steel 41 .50 ,00 
Burlington Industries 42 ,00 .00 
International Paper 43 .65 .40 
Sinclair Oil 44 .50 .00 
American Can 45 .40 ,00 
Sperry Rand 46 ,80 .66 
Union Oil 47 .50 ,00 
Continental Can 48 .26 ,00 
Uniroyal 49 ,41 .00 
Cities Service 50 .50 ,00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(62) (65) (69) (69) (69) (6?) 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
1 1 .76 .71 1 1 
1 1 .98 .95 1 1 
2 2 .59 .48 2 2 
2 2 .40 .00 2 2 
3 2 .22 .20 3 2 
1 1 .93 .88 1 1 
2 2 .52 .05 2 2 
1 1 .97 .95 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .45 .00 2 2 
1 1 .92 .92 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .11 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 
O 
2 
O 
.65 .40 2 2 
C 
2 
C 
2 .40 
1 0
 
1 0
 
1 
•
 2 2 
1 1 .80 .66 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .26 .00 3 2 
2 2 .41 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 ,00 2 2 
Table A,2, - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
Armco Steel 51 .50 .00 
Dow Chemical 52 .46 .00 
Alcoa 53 .49 .00 
Allied Chemical 54 .31 .00 
National Steel 55 .50 .00 
Tenneco 56 .41 .00 
McDonnell Douglas 57 1.00 1.00 
Reynolds Tobacco 58 .95 .95 
W. R. Grace 59 .30 .00 
60 .21 .11 
Anaconda 61 .88 .75 
Jones & Laughlin 62 .50 .00 
American Motors 63 .95 .90 
B. P. Goodrich 64 .50 .00 
Singer 65 .29 .26 
CPC International 66 .00 .00 
Inland Steel 67 .50 .00 
Ralston Purina 68 .00 .00 
General Tire & Rubber 69 .62 .24 
FMC 70 .59 .18 
Sun 011 71 .52 .05 
Litton 72 .62 .25 
PPG Industries 73 .72 .45 
Deere 74 .92 .84 
Olln 75 .50 .19 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas­
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
2 2 .48 .00 2 2 
2 2 .46 .00 2 2 
2 2 .49 .00 2 2 
3 2 .40 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .18 2 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
1 1 • 66 .66 2 1 
3 2 .27 .00 3 2 
3 2 .15 .00 3 2 
1 1 .88 .75 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .29 .26 3 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .62 .24 2 2 
2 2 .59 .18 2 2 
2 2 .52 .05 2 2 
2 2 .62 .25 2 2 
1 2 .72 .45 1 2 
1 1 .92 .84 1 1 
2 2 .49 .00 2 2 
Table A,2. - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
Coca-Cola 76 .90 .90 
American Cyanamld 77 .57 .21 
Celanese 78 .50 .00 
Colgate-Palmolive 79 .98 .95 
Grumman 80 .98 .95 
Textron 81 .51 .35 
Owens-Illlnols 82 .18 .00 
Wilson 83 ,00 .00 
Borg-Warner 84 .50 .00 
Youngstown-Lykes 85 .50 .00 
Douglas Aircraft 86 1.00 1.00 
J. F, Stevens 87 .00 .00 
National Lead 88 .32 .00 
Bendlx 89 .69 .59 
American Home Products90 .63 .56 
Reynolds Metals 91 .50 .00 
National Cash Register 92 .55 .10 
Weyerhauser 93 .50 .00 
Allls-Chalmers 94 .72 .50 
Campbell Soup 95 .50 .00 
Crown Zellerbach 96 .37 .00 
American Brands 97 1.00 1.00 
Tidewater Oil 98 .50 .00 
GenesCO 99 .00 .00 
Eaton Yale & Towne 100 .56 .18 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Cias 
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
1 1 .90 .90 1 1 
2 2 .57 .21 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 .98 .95 1 1 
1 1 .98 .95 1 1 
2 2 .48 .37 2 2 
3 3 
2 
0 
.18 .00 3 2 
J 
2 
C 
2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 .32 .00 3 2 
1 1 .76 .59 1 1 
2 1 .53 .53 2 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .55 .10 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 .72 .50 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .37 .00 2 2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
.84 .84 1 1 
3 
c 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .56 .18 2 2 
Table A.2, - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
Honeywell 101 1.00 1.00 
Morrell 102 .00 .00 
Atlantic Richfield 103 .50 .00 
Beatrice Foods 104 .10 .00 
Signal Companies 105 .50 .00 
Kennecott Copper 106 .95 .95 
TRW 107 .60 .45 
Pullman 108 .10 .00 
White Motor 109 .58 .15 
Standard Brands 110 .10 .10 
St. Regis Paper 111 .28 .17 
Whirlpool 112 .50 .00 
National Biscuit 113 .00 .00 
American Smelting & 
Refining 114 .83 .67 
Martin Marietta 115 .75 .59 
Standard Oil (Ohio) 116 .50 .00 
Kimberly-Clark 117 .50 .00 
Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical 118 .50 .00 
Georgia Pacific 119 .55 .16 
United Merchants & 
Mfrs. 120 .04 
o
 
o
 
General Mills 121 .48 .31 
American Standard 122 .26 .00 
Marathon Oil 123 .50 .00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
1 
•a 
1 
o 
H
 
1 
.
 
1 
O
 
I 
o
 
H
 
•
 
1 
O
 
o
 
1 1 
J 
2 
C» 
2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .10 .00 3 2 
2 2 .58 .17 2 2 
1 1 .95 .95 1 1 
2 2 .60 .45 2 2 
3 2 .10 .00 3 2 
2 2 .58 .15 2 2 
3 2 .10 .10 3 2 
3 2 .44 .35 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
1 1 .83 .67 1 1 
1 1 .78 .51 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .54 .14 2 2 
3 2 .04 
o
 
o
 
.
 
3 2 
2 2 .46 .29 2 2 
3 2 .26 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Table A,2. - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) (8) 
Rank B 
by B B* Cias 
Sales 
(65) 
ses 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
Mead 124 .50 .00 2 
Pfizer 125 .73 .46 1 
Kaiser Industries 126 .49 .00 2 
Carnation 127 .00 .00 3 
Hercules 128 .38 .03 2 
Continental Baking 129 .50 .00 2 
H. J. Heinz 130 .15 .00 3 
Motorola 131 .50 .00 2 
Pepslco 132 .78 .75 1 
Rockwell-Standard 133 .00 .00 3 
Ogden 13^ .42 .17 2 
National Distillers 
.60 & Chemical 135 .75 1 
Raytheon 136 .50 .00 2 
Sunray DX 137 .50 .00 2 
Babcock & Wllcox 138 .75 .55 1 
Johns-Manvllle 139 .00 .00 3 
Hygrade Food Products 140 .00 .00 3 
American Metal Climax l4l .^5 .20 2 
Zenith 142 .50 .00 2 
Central Soya 143 .00 .00 3 
Quaker Oats 144 .65 .60 2 
Scott Paper 145 .45 .00 2 
Phelps Dodge 146 .98 .95 1 
phlllp Morris 147 1,00 1.00 1 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B* B B* 
Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses 
(65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
2 .34 .00 2 2 
2 .73 .46 1 2 
2 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 
O 
.34 .02 2 2 
c 
2 .15 
1 o
 
1 o
 
1 
•
 3 2 
2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 
O 
.78 .75 1 1 
C 
2 .42 .17 2 2 
1 .74 .56 1 1 
2 
O 
.50 .00 2 2 
C 
1 .75 .55 1 1 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 .45 .20 2 . 2 
2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
1 .65 .60 2 1 
2 .45 .00 2 2 
1 .98 .95 1 1 
1 .98 .96 1 1 
Table A,2. - Continued! 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (62) 
Burroughs 148 .89 .89 
Lever Brothers 149 «MM 
McGraw-Edls on 150 .50 .00 
Time 151 .42 .07 
U.S.Plywood-Champion 
Papers 152 .50 .00 
Ashland Oil 153 .50 .00 
Hunt Foods 154 .05 .00 
Budd 155 .40 .00 
Plllsbury 156 .11 .00 
Avco 157 .38 .36 
Horme1 158 .00 .00 
Ingersoll-Rand 159 .54 .16 
Texas Instruments l6o .50 .12 
Johnson & Johnson l6l .00 .00 
American Sugar 162 .50 .00 
Del Monte 163 .00 .00 
Champion Papers 164 .50 .00 
Anheuser-Busch 165 .50 .00 
Boise cascade 166 .50 .00 
Otis Elevator 167 .50 .00 
Container Corp.of 
America 168 .00 .00 
Combustion Engring. 169 .50 .03 
Dana 170 .50 .00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) ( 69 ) (69) (69) 
1 1 .89 
1 
.
 
1 
00
 
1 v
O 1 1 
N)
 1 
2 .50 
1 0
 
1 0
 
1 
.
 
2 2 
2 2 .42 .07 2 2 
2 2 .44 .00 2 2 
2 
-3 
2 
0 
.50 .00 2 2 
J 
2 2 .40 •
 
1 
0
 1 
0
 1 1 CVJ 
2 
3 2 .11 .00 3 2 
2 2 .41 .38 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .54 .16 2 2 
2 2 .50 .12 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 p 
2 
0 
.00 .00 3 2 
2 
iC 
2 .50 
1 0
 
1 0
 
1 
•
 2 2 
2 2 .42 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 
2 
2 
2 .50 .03 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Table A,2. - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (62) (65) (65) 
Xerox 171 1.00 1.00 
Clark Equipment 172 .45 .00 
Interco 173 .00 .00 
Bristol-Myers 17^ .58 .35 
Fruehauf 175 .00 .00 
AMF 176 .40 .00 
Warner-Lambert 177 .78 .72 
IPL 178 .00 .00 
Air Reduction 179 .52 .06 
Tlmken 180 .00 .00 
Armstrong Cork 181 .45 .00 
Koppers 182 .50 .00 
Crane 183 .25 .00 
Mack Trucks 184 .50 .00 
Kellogg 185 1.00 1.00 
Agway 186 
Dart Industries 187 .23 .10 
A. 0. Smith 188 .50 .00 
Foremost Dairies 189 .00 .00 
Dresser Industries 190 .50 .00 
Seagram & Sons 191 1.00 1.00 
Avon 192 .50 .00 
Carrier 193 .50 .00 
Amerada Hess 194 .50 .00 
Rohm & Haas 195 .52 .05 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
2 2 .45 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .68 .50 1 1 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .40 .00 2 2 
1 Q 1 2 
.78 .72 1 1 
J 
2 2 .54 .09 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .45 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 
0 
2 
p 
.25 .00 3 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
3 2 .23 .10 3 2 
2 
T 
2 
2 
.50 .00 2 2 
J 
2 2 .50 
1 0
 
1 0
 
1 
•
 2 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .52 .05 2 2 
Table A.2. - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (62) (62) (6?) 
Pet 196 .00 .00 
Sherwin-Williams 197 .45 .00 
Diamond Int'l. 198 .50 .00 
Worthlngton 199 .70 .40 
General American 
Transportat1on 200 .05 .05 
Corning Glass Works 201 .50 .00 
Northrop 202 .87 .87 
Gillette 203 .55 o30 
LTV 20^ .46 .23 
Allegheny-Ludlum 205 .50 .00 
Owens-Comlnp Flberg]a8206 .50 .00 
Magnovox 207 .42 .00 
Merck 208 .78 .57 
Cerro 209 .50 .00 
Stauffer Chemical 210 .50 .00 
Westvaco 211 .75 .50 
Archer-Danlels-Mldland 212 .03 .00 
Kerr-McGee 213 .50 .00 
Int'l. Multifoods 214 .00 .00 
West Polnt-Pepperell 215 — — — — — — 
Eli Lilly 216 1.00 1.00 
Consolidated Coal 217 .00 .00 
Brunswick 218 .15 .00 
Richfield Oil 219 .50 .00 
Crucible Steel 220 .50 .00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
3 2 .06 .00 3 2 
2 2 .45 .00 2 2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
.48 .00 2 2 
3 2 .05 .05 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 .87 .87 1 1 
2 2 .55 .30 2 2 
2 2 .46 .23 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .42 .00 2 2 
1 1 .78 .57 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 .75 .50 1 1 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
- - .00 .00 3 2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1.00 1.00 1 1 
j 
3 
c, 
2 .15 
1 0
 
1 0
 
1 
.
 
3 2 
2 2 — — — — — 
Table A.2, - Continued; 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (62) 
Cudahy 221 .02 .00 
Ethyl 222 .50 .00 
Kaiser Steel 223 .50 .00 
Oscar Mayer 224 .00 .00 
U. S. Gypsum 225 .09 .00 
ACP Industries 226 .00 .00 
Glldden 227 .29 .00 
Sterling Drug 228 .92 .84 
General Cable 229 .50 .00 
Llbby McNeill & Llbby 230 .08 .00 
Admiral 231 .50 
0
 
0
 
Essex International 232 — — — — —  —  
Grlnnell 233 .00 .00 
Midland-Ross 234 .50 .00 
Land 0*Lakes Cresmerles 235 — — — 
pacific Car & Foundry 237 .05 .00  
Liggett & Myers 237 1.00 1.00 
P. Lor 1 Hard 238 1.00 1.00 
Lowensteln & Sons 239 .00 .00 
Revere Copper & Brass 240 .75 .50 
Philadelphia & Readlng24l .00 .00 
Fllntkote 242 .11 .00 
Union Camp 243 .28 .00 
Collins Radio 244 1.00 1.00 
Cummins Engine 245 .50 .00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas­
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
3 2 .02 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 .09 .00 3 2 
3 2 
0 
0
 
0
 .00 3 2 
J 
1 
C 
1 .84 .68 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .08 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
c p .53 
.17 2 2 
J 
2 2 
1 
•
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0
 1 
1 
.
 1 
1 
0
 1 
1 
0
 1 
2 2 
3 2 .05 .00 3 2 
1 1 .62 .62 2 1 
JL 
3 
J. 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
1 1 .75 .50 3 2 
3 
3 
2 
2 .10 .00 3 2 
3 2 .28 .00 3 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Table A.2. - Continued; 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
H. K. Porter .49 .00 
Cannon Mills 247 .00 .00 
Llbbey-Owens-Pord 248 1.00 1.00 
Rath Packing 249 .00 .00 
Newport News Ship­
building 250 .95 .90 
Skelly Oil 251 .50 .00 
Westinghouse Air 
.40 Brakes 252 .00 
J. I. Case 253 1.00 1.00 
Norton 254 .08 .00 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
Steel 255 .50 .00 
Addressograph-Multi-
256 graph .50 .00 
Scovlll Manufacturing 257 .05 .00 
Brown Shoe 258 .00 .00 
Consumers Co-op Assn . 259 — — — — — —  
Inmont 260 .14 ,00 
Int'l.Minerals & 
.46 Chemicals 261 .00 
Interlake 262 .48 .00 
Abex 263 .00 .00 
National Gypsum 264 .36 .12 
North American 
Philips 265 1.00 1.00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
2 2 .49 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
1 1 — — — — — — - -
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 
1 
2 
1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
3 2 .08 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .05 .00 3 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 
i^
.
 
',00 3 
1 CM 
2 2 .46 .00 2 2 
2 2 
0 
.45 .00 2 2 
3 
2 
c 
2 .36 .12 2 
1 C\1 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
Table A.2. - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
Crown Cork & Seal 266 .40 .00 
American Bakeries 267 .50 .00 
Cluett, Peabody 268 .00 .00 
Eltra 269 .48 .00 
Cone Kills 270 .00 .00 
Emerson Electric 271 .70 .60 
Springs Mills 272 — —  —  — — —  
Tecumseh Products 273 .08 .00 
Joseph Schlltz Brewing 274 .50 .00 
Evans Products 275 .00 .00 
Dan River 276 .00 .00 
Revlon 277 .50 .00 
Hooker Chemical 278 .50 .00 
Hoover 279 .10 .00 
Smith Kllne & French 280 .86 .80 
Foster Wheeler 281 .50 .00 
Upjohn 282 .86 .71 
General Precision 283 .50 .00 
Kayser-Roth 284 .00 .00 
Kelsey-Hayes 285 .00 .00 
Abott Laboratories 286 .51 .40 
Engelhard Industries 287 .95 .90 
Ryan Aeronautical 288 .95 .90 
Tlmes-Mlrror 289 .55 .40 
D1 Giorgio 290 .00 .00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(62) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
2 2 .40 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .48 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
1 1 .70 .60 1 1 
— - .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 .08 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .18 .00 3 . 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 0 
,60 .20 2 2 
2 
3 
c 
2 .10 .00 3 2 
1 1 .86 .80 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
.86 .71 1 1 
c 
3 
6 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .51 .40 2 2 
1 1 .95 .90 1 1 
J. 
2 
_L 
2 .55 .40 2 2 
3 2 .05 .02 3 2 
Table A.2. - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) (8) 
Rank B 
by B B* Clas 
Sales ses 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) (65) 
CFI Steel 291 .50 .00 2 
Sunbeam 292 .10 .00 3 
Campbell Taggert 293 .50 .00 2 
USM 294 .39 .00 2 
R,R,Donnelley & Sons 295 .00 .00 3 
Parke Davis 296 .70 .70 1 
Stokely-Van Camp 297 .00 .00 3 
A.E.Staley Mfg. 298 .00 .00 3 
Schenley Industries 299 1.00 1.00 1 
McLouth Steel 300 .50 .00 2 
McGraw-Hlll 301 .18 .00 3 
GAP 302 .62 .24 2 
Federal Mogul 303 .00 .00 3 
Richardson-Merrell 304 .95 .90 1 
Llnk-Belt 305 .50 .00 2 
Chemetron 306 .50 .00 2 
Hershey Foods 307 .50 .00 2 
Amerada Petroleum 308 .50 .00 2 
Diamond Shamrock 309 .50 .00 2 
Peabody Coal 310 .00 .00 3 
Ex-Cell-0 311 .44 .00 2 
Beech-Nut Life Savers 312 .50 .33 2 
Potlatch Forests 313 .50 .00 2 
Carborundum 314 .25 .00 3 
Be ml s 315 .32 .00 3 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B* B B* 
Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses 
(62) (69) (69) (69) (6?) 
2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 .10 .00 3 2 
2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 .39 .00 2 2 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
1 .70 .70 1 1 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 .00 oOO 3 2 
1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 .18 .00 3 2 
2 .62 .24 2 2 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
1 
2 
.95 .90 1 1 
2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 
O 
.50 .00 2 2 
2 
2 
.50 
1 O
 
1 
1 O
 1 
1 
.
 1 
2 2 
2 
o 
.52 .16 2 2 
c 
2 Tio .00 2 2 
2 .25 .00 3 2 
2 .32 .00 3 2 
Table A,2. - Continued; 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
Polaroid 316 .95 .95 
Sunshine Biscuits 317 .00 ,00 
Cincinnati Milacron 318 .26 .00 
ESB 319 .62 .25 
Colt Industries 320 .62 .25 
Lone star Cernent 321 .50 .00 
Gerber 322 .50 .00 
Cotton Producers Assn.323 MAW W — — — 
American Enka 324 .50 .00 
Studebaker 325 .20 .05 
Cutler-Hammer 326 .69 .43 
Lear Siegler 327 .19 
Stanley Warner 328 .49 .00 
Fairmont Foods 329 .00 .00 
Indian Head 330 .02 .02 
Bmhart 331 .34 .00 
Amsted Industries 332 .20 .00 
Eastern Gas & Fuel 333 .22 .00 
Hupp 334 .42 .00 
Rockwell Manufacturing335 .01 ,00 
Sharon Steel 336 .50 .00 
Bell & Howell 337 .60 .30 
Iowa Beef Packers j38 .00 .00 
Blaw-Knox 339 .50 .00 
Pittsburgh Steel 340 .50 .00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
1 
g 
1 .95 .95 1 1 
i 
3 
2 
2 .26 .00 3 2 
2 2 .62 .25 2 2 
2 2 .62 .25 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 
3 
2 
2 1 
•
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
O
 1
 1 O
 
1 
1 O
 1 
1 
•
 1 
1 CM 
1 
1 CM 
1 
1 2 .69 .43 1 2 
2 
O 
2 
o 
.44 .19 2 2 
c* 
3 
C 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 .01 .01 3 2 
2 2 .34 .00 2 2 
3 2 .40 .00 2 2 
3 
o 
2 
o 
.22 .00 3 2 
3 2 
K iH I ^
 
1 o
 
1 o
 
1 
•
 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .60 .30 2 2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
.00 .00 3 2 
Table A,2,- Continueds 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (6?) 
Gulf & Western 341 .07 .00 
McCall 3^2 .25 .00 
Falrchlld Cernera 343 .50 .00 
Outboard Marine 3# .50 .00 
Mohasco Industries 345 ,12 .00 
Pabst Brewing 3k6 .50 .00 
Square D 347 1.00 1.00 
Castle & Cooke 3^1-8 .05 .00 
Chicago Bridge & Iron 3^9 .00 .00 
Purex 350 .35 .00 
Thlokol Chemical 351 .60 .20 
Cyclops 352 .50 .00 
Interstate Brands 353 .50 .00 
Murphy Oil 354 .50 .00 
Simmons 355 .00 .00 
Ward Poods 356 .26 .00 
Anchor Hocking 357 .00 .00 
Rayonler 358 .90 .80 
American Chain & 
Cable 359 .40 .00 
Granite City Steel 360 .42 .00 
Thomas J, Llpton 361 MSB M 
Stanley Works 362 .00 .00 
Hart Schaffner & Mara 363 .00 .00 
Eagle-Plcher 364 .40 .00 
Hewlett-Packard 365 1.00 1.00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
3 2 0 
.25 .11 3 2 
J 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .12 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
3 2 .05 .00 3 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .45 .05 2 2 
2 2 ,60 .20 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .48 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 .26 .00 3 2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
.00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .40 .00 2 2 
2 2 .42 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .40 .00 2 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
Table A.2. - Continuedi 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
Kendall 366 .08 .08 
Trane 367 .50 .00 
Hammermill Paper 368 .75 .50 
Kern County Land 369 ,00 .00 
Harsco 370 ,00 ,00 
Control Data 371 1.00 1.00 
Beaunit 372 .17 .00 
Fleldcrest Mills 373 ,00 .00 
Jim Walter 374 .02 .00 
Pocolet Industries 375 .00 .00 
Rohr 376 .91 .82 
General Host 377 .50 .00 
Pennwalt 378 .53 .07 
Houdallle 379 .33 .00 
U.S.Pipe & Foundry 380 .50 .00 
American Petrofina 381 .50 .00 
Keystone Consolidated 382 .35 .00 
Jonathan Logan 383 .00 .00 
National Can 384 .50 .00 
Ampex 385 .58 .15 
Ruberold 386 .10 .00 
Falstaff Brewing 387 .50 .00 
Stewart-Warner 388 .45 .00 
Universal American 389 oOO .00 
SCM 390 .35 .04 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B Ba­ B B* 
Clas­ das­ B B* Clas­ Clas­
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
3 2 .08 .08 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 
0 
1 
2 
.75 .50 1 1 
J 
3 2 .00 
1 0
 
1 °
 3 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
3 2 .17 .00 3 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
.02 .00 3 2 
1 1 .91 .82 1 1 
2 2 .48 oOO 2 2 
2 2 .53 .07 2 2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
.33 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .35 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .47 .00 2 2 
2 2 .58 .15 2 2 
3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 
0 
2 
0 
.45 .00 2 2 
J 
2 
(Cm 
2 .35 .04 2 2 
Table A.2. - Continued; 
(1) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Rank B B* B B* 
by B B* Clas­ Clas­ B B* clas­ Clas­
Sales 
(65) (65) 
ses ses ses ses 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
Joy Manufacturing 391 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
ITE Imperial 392 1,00 1.00 1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
Standard Packaging 393 .60 .30 2 2 .60 .30 2 2 
Cessna Aircraft 394 1.00 1.00 1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
Curtiss-Wright 395 .70 .40 1 2 .70 .40 1 2 
Hanna Mining 396 1.00 1.00 1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
Allied Mills 397 .00 .00 3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
Armstrong Rubber 398 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Koehring 399 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Vulcan Materials 400 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Witco Chemical 401 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Consolidated Cigar 402 .50 .00 2 2 mm^mm 
Arvin Industries 403 .22 .00 3 2 .22 .00 3 2 
New York Times 404 .97 .95 1 1 .97 .95 1 1 
Rex Chainbelt 405 .43 .00 2 2 .43 .00 2 2 
Ideal Basic Industries406 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Inland Container 407 .15 .00 3 2 .15 .00 3 2 
Chesebrough-Pond * s 408 .53 .29 2 2 .53 .29 2 2 
Western Publishing 409 .00 .00 3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
Keebler 410 .00 .00 3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
Miles Laboratories 411 .77 .69 1 1 .77 .69 1 1 
Lukens Steel 412 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Riegel Paper 413 .48 .00 2 2 .48 .00 2 2 
Cowles Communications 414 .67 .33 1 2 .67 .33 1 2 
St. Joe Minerals 415 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Table A.2. - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
Kellwood 416 .00 .00 
Clark 011 417 .50 .00 
Rheem Manufacturing 418 .18 .00 
calumet & Hecla 419 .55 .10 
Groller 420 .00 .00 
Sybron 421 .00 .00 
Woodward 422 .45 .00 
Maremont 423 .50 .00 
Wamaco 424 .00 ,00 
KUP Sutherland 425 .75 .50 
Copperweld Steel 426 .50 .50 
Champion Spark Plug 427 .00 .00 
American Optical 428 .00 .00 
Needham Packing 429 .00 .00 
Plbreboard 430 .33 .00 
Chicago Pneumatic T00I43I .25 .00 
Handy & Barman 432 .88 .75 
Endlcott Johnson 433 .00 .00 
cabot 434 .50 .00 
canada Dry 435 .80 .80 
Wrlgley 436 1.00 1.00 
E. W. Bllss 437 .50 .15 
Crowell Collier & 
M&cmlllan 438 .00 .00 
Bucyrus-Erle 439 .50 .00 
American Blltrite Rub.440 .50 .00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
.50 .00 2 2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 0
 
1 0
 
1 
•
 
1 0
 
1 0
 
1 
> 3 2 
3 0 
2 
0 
.15 .00 3 2 
c 
2 
6 
2 .50 oOO 2 2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
.00 .00 3 2 
2 1 .50 .50 2 1 
3 0 
2 
0 
.00 .00 3 2 
J 
3 
c 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 .33 .00 3 2 
3 2 .25 .00 3 2 
1 1 .88 .75 1 1 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
.50 .00 2 2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1.00 1.00 1 1 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .00 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Table A,2. - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
sales 
Corporation (65) (65) 
Insllco 441 .21 .00 
Harrls-Intertype 442 .50 .00 
Interpace 443 .18 .00 
U.S. Industries 444 .24 .00 
Warwick Electronics 445 .50 .00 
Great Western Sugar 446 .50 .00 
Collins & Aikman 44? .00 .00 
Roper 448 .37 .00 
U.S. Smelting 449 .83 .67 
Miehle-Gos s-Dextor 450 .50 .00 
Certain-teed Products 451 .20 .00 
Harbison-Walker 452 .10 .00 
H. H. Robertson 453 .30 .00 
Howmet 454 .25 .00 
Gardner-Denver 455 .50 .00 
Hobart Manufacturing 456 .50 .00 
Morton International 457 ••MM — «W 
Reichhold Chemicals 458 .50 .00 
Curtis Publishing 459 .50 .00 
Beech Aircraft 46o 1.00 1.00 
Hoover Ball & Bearing 46i .07 .00 
Colorado Milling 462 .00 .00 
Air Products & 
Chemicals 463 .50 .00 
Commonwealth Oil 464 .50 .00 
Wagner Electric 465 .88 .75 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(6?) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
3 2 .21 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .18 .00 3 2 
3 2 .15 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 
3 
2 
2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .37 .00 2 2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
.83 .67 1 1 
3 0 
2 
0 
.20 0
 
0
 
3 2 
V 
3 
w 
2 .30 .00 3 2 
3 2 .25 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 •
 
1 
0
 
0
 
2 2 
2 
p 
2 
p 
.50 
1 
"
 
1 
0
 1 
0
 1 1 CVJ 
2 
1 
Cé 
1 1.00 M
 
•
 
1 
0
 1 
0
 1 
1 1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
.10 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 — — — — — — M M. 
Table A.2; - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) 
Rank 
by B B* 
Sales 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) 
Maytag 466 .50 o
 
o
 
Standard Pressed 
Steel 467 o
 
o
 
.00 
Olivetti Underwood 468 — — 
Trans Union 469 .05 .00 
Black & Decker 470 .00 .00 
Farmers Union Central 471 M 
Rheingold 472 .20 .00 
Federal Pacific Else, ^73 1.00 1.00 
Coastal States Gas 474 .50 .00 
Sobering 475 1.00 1.00 
Carpenter Technology 476 .50 .00 
Cooper Industries 477 .50 .00 
Ceco 478 .50 .00 
Dorr-Oliver 479 .50 .00 
Clevlte 480 .20 .00 
Green Giant 481 .00 .00 
Palrchlld Hlller 482 1.00 1.00 
U.S. Sboe 483 .00 .00 
Warner & Swasey 484 .50 .00 
Brockway Glass 485 .00 .00 
Hanes 486 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
Northwestern Steel & 
Wire 487 .50 .00 
Harnlschfeger 488 .67 .33 
Blue Bell 489 .00 .00 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
B B* B B* 
Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas 
ses ses ses ses 
(65) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
2 2 .50 
o
 
o
 2 2 
3 2 .00 1 
•
 
1 
o
 
1 
o
 
3 2 
3 2 .05 .00 3 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 .20 .00 3 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
.50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
1 1 1.00 1.00 1 1 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
3 2 .00 
o
 
o
 3 2 
2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
1 2 .67 .33 1 2 
3 2 .00 .00 3 2 
Table A,2. - Continued: 
(1) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Rank B B* B B* 
by B B* Clas­ Clas­ B B* Clas­ Clas­
Sales ses ses ses ses 
Corporation (65) (65) (65) (66) (65) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
Mead Johnson 490 1,00 1.00 1 1 —  — —  - -
Wyandotte Chemicals 491 .50 .00 2 2 Mt mm M Mi mm M 
Electrolux 492 .00 .00 3 2 — — — — — — —  -
Great Northern 
Nekoosa 493 .25 .00 3 2 .25 .00 3 2 
Bunker-Ramo 494 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
AMP 495 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Pltney-Bowes 496 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Slgnode 497 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Reeves Brothers 498 .10 .00 3 2 .10 .00 3 2 
Detroit Steel 499 .50 .00 2 2 .50 .00 2 2 
Island Creek Coal 500 .00 .00 3 2 —  —  —  —  —  —  - -
2 ou 
Discussion of control classifications differing from 
those of Lamer or MCCi 
General Motors (sales rank 1), classified General 
Motors as owner controlled because Dupont (owner controlled 
through Christiana Securities) and Christiana Securities had 
large holdings in GM throughout most of the period included in 
their research. According to Lamer, by 1964 Dupont and 
Christiana had sold their shares to the general public in 
accordance with an anti-trust suit. 
Shell Oil (rank 15). Larner basically ignored the ques­
tion of ultimate control if a firm was immediately controlled 
by a foreign company. Consequently he called Shell owner con­
trolled. In attempting to determine the type of ultimate con­
trol of Shell, the following information was relied upon: 
1. In 1969, 69 percent of Shell Oil was owned by 
Shell Petroleum, N.V. 
2. Royal Dutch Petroleum owned 60 percent of Shell 
Petroleum, N.V. 
3. In Royal Dutch, there were I.5 million shares of 
preferred stock outstanding, each with $0 votes per 
share. 
4. There were also I50 million shares of Royal Dutch 
common outstanding, each with one vote per share up 
to a maximum of 30O votes per voter, regardless of 
proxies. 
5. The Shell Transport and Trading Co., Ltd., owned 
4o percent of Shell Petroleum, N.V., and had 335t000 
stockholders. 
While this evidence cannot be considered completely 
convincing, the specially vote-weighed preferred stock and the 
vote maximum of Royal Dutch might be interpreted as a tactic 
205 
of. a small group to retain control of a large corporation. 
Hence Shell Oil was classed as manager controlled. 
Firestone (31). The Firestone family controlled 31 per­
cent of the stock in I963 but only 21 percent by 1970. The 
change in the control classifications reflects this dwindling 
ownership. 
National Steel (55)» The fact that Hanna Mining Co. (SO) 
owns 6,3# of National Steel and insiders own h-% is not in it­
self sufficient reason to call National Steel weak owner con­
trolled, This classification was decided upon because National 
and Hanna have three directors in common. 
Singer (65). Singer undertook a large number of mergers 
and acquisitions in the late 1960*s. This activity explains 
why its directors held Z5% of its stock in 1964 but only 2^ in 
1970. 
General Tire and Rubber (69). No argument can be found 
with Lamer*s classification for 1964; the O'Neills and their 
associates held 14.8# of the stock then. But by 1970 the 
directors owned less than 5^ of the stock, so the classifi­
cation was changed for the second half of the period. 
Martin Marietta (115). No verification could be found 
for MCC's decision to place Martin Marietta in the owner con­
trolled category. Neither Moody's nor Lamer report any large 
stockholdings, and Value Line says that the directors own only 
1,5# of the stock. 
Ashland Oil (153). Like Singer, Ashland Oil has been 
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actively involved in mergers and acquisitions. MCC class 
it as owner controlled, but by 1970 insiders controlled only 
6^ of the stock, so the classifications used here are WO and 
M for the two periods, respectively, on the presumption that 
the declining ownership control was a result of the merger 
activity. 
Cudahy (221). In 1969, 11.5"^ of the Cudahy stock was 
held by U.S. Smelting, Refining & Mining (449), but none of 
the data sources gives any indication of owner control of U.S. 
Smelting. Therefore, Cudahy was classified as ultimately 
manager controlled. 
Emerson Electric (271). Again no evidence was found to 
corroborate MCC's classification of owner control. 
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APPENDIX B. BARRIERS TO ENTRY TO VARIOUS INDUSTRIES 
It was not expected at the outset that this study would 
involve detailed industry studies of each industry in which 
each of the 500 largest firms had sales. Consequently, when­
ever possible, previous studies were relied upon to orovide 
information on barriers to entry to these industries. The 
four primary sources were Bain (19^5)» Mann (1966, 1970), and 
Shepherd (1970). Supporting evidence was frequently drawn 
from a Federal Trade Coimnission(FTC) study done in I967. 
Bain and Mann discuss four basic types of barriers to 
entry. These are 
1. scale barriers. The cost curves for firms 
in a particular industry may be downward sloping 
until a very large rate of output is reached. This 
rate of output may be so large relative to the total 
demand for the product that only a few firms can 
profitably exist in the industry. Entry by another 
firm would reduce the market shares of all firms and 
raise their costs so that none of them could be pro­
fitable. Potential entrants, recognizing this state 
of affairs, will try to avoid unprofitable entry, but 
the incumbents may still be enjoying monopoly profits. 
2. product differentiation barriers. If con­
sumers are strongly attached to existing brands of a 
product, either because they find the relevant infor­
mation difficult to acquire or comprehend or because 
of large advertising expenditures, entrants to this 
industry will be forced to sustain burdensome ad­
vertising expenditures if they wish to capture a pro­
fitable share of the market. 
3. absolute cost barriers. If one firm or a few 
firms control necessary patents or natural resources 
or have special technical secrets, entry into this 
industry will be effectively impeded, 
capital barriers. In undertaking a business 
venture, a firm will require capital in the form of 
plant, equipment, and inventories. If the capital 
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markfit is Imperfect, larpe capital requirements 
in an industry may be a barrier to entry. 
This basic framrwork of analysis has been followed in this 
appendix whenever necessary and/or possible. 
In the following tables are listed industries with 
very high (VH), substantial (S), or moderate-to-low (M-L) 
barriers to entry, respectively. The codes in parentheses 
following each industry refer to the source(s) in which the 
classification was made. These sources and their codes are; 
B. Bain (I965) 
MR, Mann (I966) 
m, Mann (1970) 
Sh, Shepherd (1970) 
P, Palmer, this study. 
An asterisk following an industry indicates a disagree­
ment among sources as to the appropriate class for that in­
dustry, Resolutions of these disagreements along with ex­
planations of all classifications coded "P" follow these 
first three tables. When asked his opinion of the disagree­
ments, Shepherd responded, "I regard all estimates of entry 
barriers as unavoidably subjective in some degree,,,",^ 
After attempting the estimates himself, one can only agree. 
G, Shepherd, May I7, 1971, Private communication. 
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Table B.l. Industries with very high barriers to entry 
1. automobiles (B, MR. MW, Sh) 
2. farm machinery and equipment. 
Integrated line or heavy 
equipment (*) 
3. cereal (*) 
4. chewing gum (*) 
5. distilled liquor (B, MR. rw, 
Sh) 
6. cigarettes (*) 
7. pulp mills (Sh) 
8. newspapers (Sh) 
9. sulphur (MR, MW) 
10. nickel (MR, MW) 
11. copying equipment (Sh) 
12. soft drink flavorings (MW) 
13. ethical drugs (MR, Sh) 
14. proprietary drugs (*) 
15. soap and other detergents 
. (*) 
16. explosives (Sh) 
17. flat glass (MR, MW, Sh) 
18. primary copper (*) 
19. integrated copper operations 
(*) 
20. razor blades and razors (Sh) 
21. computing and related 
machines (Sh) 
22. transformers (Sh) 
23. switchgear and switchboards 
(Sh) 
24. electric motors and generators 
(Sh) 
25. industrial controls (Sh) 
26. carbon and graphite products 
(MW, Sh) 
27. buses (Sh) 
28. electric lamps (Sh) 
29. telephone and telegraph apparatus 
(Sh) 
30. aircraft engines and parts (Sh) 
31. aircraft (Sh) 
32. shipbuilding and repairing (Sh) 
33» locomotives and parts (Sh) 
34. photographic equipment (Sh) 
35« aerospace and defense (P) 
36. iron ore (P) 
37. copper ore (P) 
38. network broadcasting (P) 
39. utilities (P) 
40. precious metals (P) 
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Table 3,2. Industries with substantial barriers to entry 
37. 1, light farm equipment (*) 
2, blended and prepared flour 
mixes (Sh) 38. 
3, bread and related products 39, 
(*) 
4, chocolate and cocoa pro-
ducts (Sh) 4l, 
5, sanitary paper products(Sh) 
6, periodicals (*) ^2. 
7, alkalies and chlorine (MW, 43. 
Sh) . I, 
8, industrial gases (Sh) 44', 
9, intermediate coal tar pro- ^5» 
ducts (Sh) 46, 
10, inorganic pigments (Sh) ^7, 
11, other inorganic chemicals 48, 
(Sh) 49. 
12, organic chemicals (Sh) 50, 
13, synthetic rubber (Sh) 
14, other man-made fibers (Sh) 51* 
15, toilet preparations (Sh) 
16, petroleum refining (B,MR,Sh)52, 
17, tires (*) 53* 
18, other pressed and blown 
glass (*) 54. 
19, cement (*) 
20, blast furnaces and steel 55* 
mills (*) 
21, cold-finished steel shapes 56, 
(*) 57. 
22, steel pipe and tube (*) 58. 
23, primary zinc (Sh) 59. 
24, primary aluminum(MR,MW,Sh) 60. 
25o copper rolling and drawing 61, 
(*)  62 .  
26, aluminum rolling and 63. 
drawing (Sh) 64, 
270 nonferrous wire drawing, 65. 
etc. (Sh) 66, 
28. metal cans (*) 
29. shoe machinery (MR, MW) 67, 
30. sugar (MW, Sh) 68, 
31. steel power boilers (Sh) 69» 
32. safes and vaults (Sh) 70, 
33» steam engines and turbines 71. 
(Sh) 72, 
34, internal combustion engines 73, 
(Sh) 74. 
35, construction machinery (Sh) 75, 
36, elevators and escalators(Sh) 
industrial trucks and 
tractors (Sh) 
rolling mill machinery (Sh) 
paper industries machinery 
typewriters (*) 
household cooking equip­
ment ( Sh ) 
household refrigerators(Sh) 
household laundry equip­
ment ( Sh ) 
beer (*) 
lumber (Sh) 
fertilizers (Sh) 
radios and televisions(Sh) 
broadcasting equipment(Sh) 
electron tubes (Sh) 
cathode ray picture tubes 
(Sh) 
storage and primary 
batteries (Sh) 
X-ray apparatus (Sh) 
hard surface floor 
coverings (*) 
heavy industrial machinery 
(Sh) 
air conditioning and 
heating equipment (P) 
plastic production (P) 
natural gas (P) 
heavy auto parts (?) 
paperboard (P) 
local broadcasting (P) 
vehicle rental (P) 
natural resources (P) 
office machines (?) 
insecticides (P) 
steamship operations(P) 
lawn and garden equip­
ment (P) 
guns (P) 
soup (P) 
baby food (P) 
computer software (P) 
credit cards (P) 
refractory materials (P) 
mobile homes (P) 
cigars (P) 
silverware and plated 
ware (P) 
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Table i;,3. Industries with moderate-to-low barriers to entry 
1. small metal products (Sh) 
2. wooden furniture (Sh) 
3. fluid milk (Sh) 
4. wet com milllng(Sh,MW) 
5. biscuits, crackers, and 
cookies (*) 
6. rayon (*) 
7. flour (B,MR, Sh) 
8. footwear (Sh) 
9. sewing machines (Sh) 
10. woolen and cotton 
textiles (MR,Sh) 
11. clothing (MR,Sh) 
12. glass containers (*) 
13. brick and structural 
tile (Sh) 
14. gypsum products (*) 
15. abrasive products (Sh) 
16. electrometallurglcal 
products (Sh) 
17. foundries (Sh) 
18. secondary non-ferrous 
metals (M-L) 
19. canned fruits and vege­
tables (B,MR,Sh) 
20. bituminous coal (MR) 
21. transportation equipment, 
hardware (Sh) 
22. metal plumbing fixtures 
(Sh) 
23. ball and roller bearings 
(Sh) 
24. household vacuum cleaners 
(Sh) 
25« books (*) 
26. corrugated containers(Sh) 
27. engine electrical equip­
ment ( Sh ) 
28. surgical appliances and 
supplies (Sh) 
29. meatpacking (B,MR,Sh) 
30. printing (Sh) 
31. quarrying (?) 
32. plastic fabrication (P) 
33t paperboard products (P) 
34. packaging materials (P) 
35* light auto parts (P) 
36. dairy products (P) 
37. asbestos (P) 
38. real estate (P) 
39* adhesives (P) 
40. tape and allied products 
(P)  
41. advertising services (P) 
42. educational and training 
services (P) 
43. protection systems (P) 
44. leisure products (P) 
45. retailing (P) 
46. crafts, games, and toys 
(P)  
47. printing ink (P) 
48. restaurants (P) 
49. insurance (P) 
50. finance (P) 
51. rugs and carpets (P) 
52. writing equipment (P) 
53* ophthalmic goods (P) 
54. soft drink bottlers(I) 
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Farm machinery and equipment (VH2, Si). Bain(1965) and Mann 
(1966, 1970) place this industry in the substantial category, 
but Bain's discussion suggests that the industry could well 
be segmented as was done here. For heavy farm equipment 
such as tractors, combines, etc., the optimal scale of opera­
tions is ten to fifteen percent of the national market (Bain, 
p. 260), a very high scale barrier, and there are significant 
multiplant economies (Bain, p. 262). There also appear to be 
some economies for full-line integrated operations, but the 
barriers to entry are lower for small machinery (Bain, p. 262). 
Cereal (VH3)» The product differentiation barrier is 
so high that the industry is placed in the VH class. From 
Mann, "The marketing of new brands is very expensive. One 
estimate indicates that approximately 4?/^ of thtj sales revenue 
earned in the first year on fourteen new brands introduced 
between 1957 and 196I was spent on advertising in the major 
media" (1970, unpublished appendix). Shepherd placed cereals 
in the substantial barrier class. 
Chewing gum ("^/H4), Mann (I966) indicates a VH product 
differentiation barrier which is high enough to pull the in­
dustry into the VH over-all class. Shepherd placed chewing 
gum in the substantial class. 
Soap and detergents (VH15). Bain decided that the pro­
duct differentiation barrier is VH and the capital barrier 
is substantial (p. I69). He suggested that since innovation 
is quite likely in this industry, an avenue for entry was 
available through new products. This possible means of 
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entry was sufficient, he thought, to put the firm in the 
substantial class rather than the VH class. 
Shepherd's classification of VE was accepted for the 
present study because new firms do not seem to have used the 
innovation route very successfully during the 1960's, In 
fact, the proliferation of enzyme products was begun by 
Colgate-Palmolive, leading one to believe that perhaps innova­
tion and research and development may be used by incumbents 
to create another barrier to entry. 
Cigarettes (VH6). Here again the indication (Bain, pp. 
286-288) is that the VH product differentiation barrier is 
sufficient to term this industry as having VH barriers, but 
Shepherd termed the barriers substantial. 
Proprietary and ethical drugs (VH13» VH14). Mann (I966) 
and Shepherd both place ethical drugs in the VH category. 
Proprietary drugs were placed there also because of their 
high product differentiation barrier. 
Copper and copper products (VH18, VH19, S25)• Bain 
(p. 171) places all copper operations in the substantial 
class, but allows for the possibility that due to scarcity 
and the close control of natural resources, the absolute 
cost barrier may by VH. He further points out that because 
of economies of vertical integration, and optimal scale of a 
firm is 10% of the national output (p. 248). On the basis 
of this evidence. Shepherd was followed to some extent in 
the present study with primary copper and integrated opera­
tions placed in the VH class, and copper rolling and drawing 
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In the substantial class. The control of ore deposits has 
less impact on the secondary copper operations because of 
reclamation and use of scrap copper. 
Bread and related products (S3)» Mann (1966) called 
the barriers M-L in this industry even though, "For entrants 
other than grocery chains, economies of scale are a very 
important barrier to entry, largely because the relevant 
markets are small relative to the optimal size plant" (Mann, 
1966, p. 304). This high scale barrier coupled with the fact 
that the number of bakeries had declined from 5»984 in 19^7 
to 4,339 in 19^3 (FTC, I967, p. D led to agreement with 
Shepherd that the barrier to entry in the bread industry is 
probably substantial. 
Periodicals (S6), There is a serious problem in the 
periodicals industry of defining the relevant market. Women's 
magazines probably do not compete much with children's maga­
zines or financial magazines, but they all probably compete, 
to some extent with newspapers, television, radio, and per­
haps even general news magazines. Shepherd at one point (p. 
126) places "general periodicals" in the VH class, but at 
another point (pp. 274-275) places periodicals in the sub­
stantial class. 
The problem is further compounded by evidence (Advertis­
ing Age, Oct. 20, 1969) that in each specialized area the 
number of periodicals has increased rapidly during the past 
decade, but this growth has been due to specialization and 
product differentiation. It may still be that the barriers to 
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entry into the subindustry of general, nationwide news and 
consumer magazines are very high. This possibility has been 
rejected in the present study because these general periodi­
cals must compete on nearly equal terras with various spec­
ialized periodicals (and other news and entertainment sources) 
for the readers' time as well as money. 
Tires (S17). Bain put this industry in the M-L class 
partly because of its low scale barrier (p. 238), and partly 
because of the comparative ease of entry to the replacement 
field. The industry was moved up a class in this study be­
cause of the possible control of natural resources, because 
of the growth of the product differentiation bar^-ier, and be­
cause of the high barrier (acknowledged by Bain) to the 
original equipment field. This last factor will grow in 
importance in the future because of the development of longer-
lasting polyester cord tires, decreasing the demand for re­
placement tires. 
Pressed and blown glass (818), Shepherd placed this in­
dustry in the VH category. The evidence provided by the FTC, 
however, was judged as insufficient to justify placing the 
industry above the upper range of the substantial category; 
Table B.4. Some structural characteristics of the pressed and 
blown glass industry^ 
Year Number of Firms concentration ratios 
4-firm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 107 51 65 60 
1954 255 67 77 88 
1958 111 64 79 90 
1963 
A 
75 68 81 93 
Source; PTC (1967, p. 9)> 
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Cenent (S19). Although the cement industry was placed 
in the M-L class by Bain, Mann (1966) reports that the optimal 
scale of operations had grown so much relative to the regional 
markets during the 1950*s that cement probably now belongs in 
the substantial class. 
Steel, cold-finished steel shapes, steel pipe and tube 
(320. S21, 822). Shepherd estimates the barriers in these in­
dustries as VH, but the evidence from Bain and the PTC on the 
steel industry overwhelmingly support Bain's estimation of 
only substantial barriers. 
The only evidence that supports placing steel in the VH 
class is the possibly Vfl barriers due to scarcity and the con­
trol of natu^-^-l resources (Bain, p. 271). Offsetting this 
possibility are the small optimal plant size (Bain, p. 236), 
only slight multiplant economies (Bain, p. 25^), only slight 
product differentiation barriers (Bain, p. 265), and low 
selling costs (Bain, p. 179)* Furthermore, from 1958 to 1963 
(the only years for which data are available in the FTC study), 
the number of firms in the steel industry increased from 14-8 
to 162. During that same time period, the 4-firm concentra­
tion ratio in the steel industry declined from .53 to ,50.^ 
In opposition to Shepherd's estimates, the secondary 
steel industries included here are placed in the substantial 
category. The reasons for this classification are that steel 
producers (into which the barriers to entry are only substantial) 
^FTC (1967, p. 10). 
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should find vertical entry into these industries relatively 
easy. In addition, these secondary industries are frequently 
able to use scrap metal and are, therefore, less dependent on 
a closely held natural resource, A final piece of supporting 
evidence is that the concentration ratios in these industries 
(.34 and .26, respectively) are even lower than that of the 
basic steel industry (Shepherd, p. 274). 
Metal Cans (S28). Before 1950, Bain thought, -he metal 
can industry might have had substantial barriers to entry. The 
anti-trust suit of that year forbidding tying contracts, he 
believed, would lower these barriers enough so that they would 
only be moderate. As can be seen from Tnble B,5i this belief 
was probably not borne out. 
Table R,5* Some structural characteristics of the metal can 
industry* 
Year Number of firms concentration ratios 
4-ftrm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 102 78 86 94 
1954 109 80 88 96 
1957 84 80 89 97 
1963 99 74 85 95 
^Source: PTC (I967, p. 11). 
The structure of the metal can industry does not seem to 
have changed much since 194-7• 
It should be pointed out, too, that the concentration 
ratios significantly understate the monopoly power of the 
firms in this industry. Because metal cans are bulky, their 
high transportation costs relative to their value makes their 
relevant market regional rather than national in scope. 
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Within each region the concentration ratios may be much higher 
and the barriers to entry may also be higher. 
Typewriters (840)« The placement of the typewriter in­
dustry by Shepherd into the M-L category is not supported by 
the FTC data in Table 8,6. The persistently small number of 
Table B.6, Some structural characteristics of the typewriter 
industry^ 
Year Number of firms concentration ratios 
4-firm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 23 .79 .96 1.00 
1954 15 .83 .99 1.00 
1958 15 .79 .99 1.00 
1963 17 .76 .99 1,00 
^Source: FTC (196?, p. 13). 
firms and large concentration ratios suggest the existence 
of at least substantial barriers to entry. It seems unlikely 
that such an industry structure could be maintained for long 
without the existence of significant barriers to entry. 
Peer (S44). Ifenn (I966) placed this industry in the 
M-L class because only insignificant scale economies seemed 
evident and because, "One consumer survey indicates that 
beer-drinkers do not show a marked preference for nationally 
advertised beers" (p, 305)* Additional facts cast some doubt 
on this decision and suggest that the beer industry has sub­
stantial barriers to entry. 
Most important of these facts are the data from the FTC 
in Table B.7 showing that the big brewers are becoming bigger 
while the small brewers are finding it difficult to remain pro­
fitable. Suggested reasons for this phenomenon are price 
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wars, seasonal fluctuations, high fixed expenses, and encroach­
ment by industry giants (Financial World, Oct. 2, I968). These 
reasons further suggest that the capital barrier (as opposed 
to the scale barrier) is fairly high because of seasonally 
fluctuating inventories. They also suggest that the product 
differentiation barrier is growing as the nationwide industry 
giants encroach upon the regional markets of the small brewers. 
Additional evidence of growing barriers to entry to the 
beer industry are that the top two firms accounted for yi.% of 
beer sales in I969 (Marketing/Communications, Jan., 1970) and 
that regional brewers find it difficult to go national (Forbes, 
Sept. 15, 1969). 
Table B.7. Some structural characteristics of the malt liquor 
industry®-
Year Number of firms concentration ratios 
4-firm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 4-04 21 30 44 
1954 263 27 41 60 
1958 211 28 44 68 
1963 171 34 52 78 
^Source: FTC (I967, P. 2). 
Hard surface floor coverings (S53). Ifenn (1970) is un­
convincing in his reasons for having placed this industry in 
the substantial class. He says that the optimal scale of 
operations may be around 10^ of the national output, but he 
also points out that, "The cost curves below minimum optimal 
scale in these three product lines may be fairly shallow, 
though, because the major study of this industry does not list 
economies of scale to the plant or to the firm as a significant 
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deterrent to entry and there is no apparent tendency for 
small plants to disappear over time" (unpublished appendix). 
Mann further says that the product differentiation 
barrier seems important, but there appears to be no sizeable 
absolute cost barrier and capital requirements are only 
moderate. One is tempted, on the basis of these facts, to 
agree with Shepherd that the barriers to entry here are only 
M—L» 
The FTC data (Table B,8) are strong enough, though, to 
tip the scales in Mann's favor. On the theory that small 
numbers and high concentration ratios cannot long exist in an 
industry without significant barriers to entry, one must 
finally place the hard surface floor covering industry in the 
substantial category. 
Table B,8, Some structural characteristics of the hard sur­
face floor coverings industry# 
Year Number of firms concentrât!on ratios 
firm 8-firra 20-firm 
1947 14 .80 .95 1.00 
1954 10 .87 .96 1.00 
1958 11 .83 .96 1.00 
1963 14 .87 .98 1 .on 
^ Source: FTC (196?, p . 16), 
Biscuits, crackers. and cookies (M-L5). Mann's classi 
fication of this industry as having substantial barriers to 
entry is questionable. He states that, "...economies of scale 
appear to be unimportant" (I966, p, 304), and that capital 
requirements are moderate (p, ^04), It also would seem that 
the absolute cost barriers are low. The only substantial 
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barrier in this industry is that of product differentiation. 
As stated, this evidence is not convincing on whether the 
industry has substantial or moderate-to-low barriers# The 
argument for M-L (Shepherd's choice) is more persuasive 
when it is realized that biscuits, etc., are less perishable 
than bread. As a result, a potential entrant must capture 
a smaller share of the market to be profitable in biscuits 
than in bread. He can ship his product farther, and it 
will last longer on the shelves. 
Rayon (M-L6). The barriers in the rayon industry were 
termed substantial by Shepherd, but Bain's classification of 
the industry as M-L was given more weight in the present 
study. There may have been some absolute cost barrier to 
entry due to secret techniques as the industry was developing 
(Bain, p. 155)» but by i960, these techniques were fairly 
readily available. There are no product differentiation 
barriers (Bain, p. 137). 
Glass containers ( M-L12 ). Mann (1966) put this industry 
in the M-L category because "Economies of scale do not seem 
to be important..." (p. 304), and there is "...little room 
for product differentiation" (p. 304). He mentions also that 
the patent control, which provided a very high barrier, was 
effectively diminished by an anti-trust suit in 1946, If 
these statements are correct, there is no reason for Shepherd's 
classification of VH. 
Gypsum products (M-L14). Shepherd placed the gypsum 
industry in the substantial class, but after U.G. Gypsum was 
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required to desist from exclusively licensing its patents in 
a 1951 anti-trust suit, the absolute cost and product differ­
entiation barriers became negligible (Bain, pp. 2-56-268), 
Books (M-L25). Shepherd classed the barriers substantial 
here, but this classification was rejected because, while 
through copyright laws each title has its own monopoly, there 
are generally many competitors in each subject area. This 
widespread competition is evidenced by the FI'C data presented 
in Table B,9* 
Table B,9. Some structural characteristics of the book in­
dustry^ 
Year Number of firms concentration ratios 
4-firm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 635 ,18 .29 .48 
1954 804 .21 .32 .51 
1958 883 .16 .29 .48 
1963 936 .20 .33 .56 
®Source; FTC (I967, p. 6), 
Aerospace and defense (VH35)« This industry was placed 
in the VH class because of its obvious similarities to the 
aircraft industry (VH31). 
Iron and copper ore (VH36, VH37)» The control of scarce 
natural resources (Bain, p. 171) seemed sufficient to justify 
placing these industries in the VH class. 
Network broadcasting (VH38). The economies of scale 
seem to be such that the existing firms in this Industry have 
nearly natural monopoly power. The failure of recent attempts 
to enter it also suggest a VH classification. 
Utilities (VH39). These are assumed to have natural or 
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state-endowed monopoly power. 
Precious metals (VH40). The general technology in 
these Industries is similar to that of primary copper (VH18), 
and their smaller markets increases their scale barriers. 
Air conditioning and heating equipment (855). These 
products were deemed sufficiently similar to heavy industrial 
machinery (S5^) and large consumer appliances (841, 842, S43) 
that they were placed in the substantial class. 
Plastic production and fabrication (856, M-132). Plastic 
production was equated with chemicals (811, 812) and put in 
the class with substantial barriers. Plastic fabrication, 
though, depends less on patents, secret technologies, and 
scale barriers to entry. Consequently its barriers were 
termed M-L, 
Natural gas (857), The conditions in this industry were 
believed to be enough similar to those in the petroleum in­
dustry (Sl6) to justify placing it in the substantial class. 
One significant difference, though, is that natural gas is sold 
in large amounts to regional distributors who have natural 
monopolies. This situation gives rise to bilateral monopoly 
conditions, which may or may not, depending on relative bar­
gaining powers, affect the performance in the natural gas in­
dustry. 
Auto parts (858. M-L35). This industry was segmented 
into the two groups because heavy auto parts more closely 
resemble heavy industrial equipment (854) and internal com­
bustion engines (834), Light auto parts are likely to be 
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similar to engine electrical equipment (M-L27) and small metal 
products (M-Ll). 
Pulp, paper, and paper products (VH7t 35. S59t M-L26, 
M-L33, M-L34). These various subindustries are quite trouble­
some, Shepherd's placement of pulp mills in the VH class was 
accepted. So was his placement of sanitary paper products in 
the substantial class. The rest of the products seemed to fall 
into the two broad groups of paper or paperboard manufacturing 
and paper or paperboard products. The former pjroup was placed 
in the substantial class because of its closer vertical con­
nection with lumber supplies and its greater scale barriers 
than the latter. 
Local broadcasting ( s6o ), The growth of the markets, 
the increasing use of UHF channels, and the recent license 
changes by the FCC were all factors influencing the decision 
to place this industry in the substantial class. 
Vehicle rental ( s6 l ) .  The barriers to entry into this 
industry were judged to be substantial rather than VH because 
the product differentiation and capital barriers are lower 
than those in the automobile industry. 
Natural resources (s62). This industry is such a con­
glomeration of activities that an estimation of its barriers 
to entry must be tenuous at best. This estimation was at­
tempted only because no further sales disaggregation is pro­
vided for ITéW.'o The substantial classification was finally 
decided upon because most ore activities are VH (VH36, VH37), 
while lumber and cement are substantial (S45» S19), and 
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gypsum (y-Ll4) and asbestos (M-L37) are M-L. Substantial 
seemed a reasonable average of these barriers. 
Office machines(S63). Office machines were considered 
similar to typewriters (S40) and were placed in the same 
category. 
Insecticides (s64), These appear to be related to chemi­
cals (Sll, 812) and fertilizers (S46) and consequently were 
assigned to the substantial category. 
Steamship operations (S65). This Industry was finally 
assumed to have substantial barriers because of its capital 
requirements, but its international market and competition 
may be strong enough that it should have been placed in the 
M-L category. 
Lawn and garden equipment (S66). Because light farm 
equipment (SI) and large consumer appliances (S4l, S42, 343) 
were all in the substantial class, the lawn and garden equip­
ment industry was put there, too. 
Guns (S67). This Industry also seemed similar enough 
to the large consumer appliance industries (841, 842, 343) 
that it was placed in the substantial class. 
Soup and baby food (s68. S69). Bain, Mann (I966), and 
Shepherd all agree that generally canned fruits and vegetables 
(M-L 19) belong to the M-L category. These two products seemed 
different, though, because of specialized product differentia­
tion, and were elevated by this study to the substantial 
category. In both cases there are only two firms controlling 
very large shares of the market. Campbell Soup alone controls 
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nearly 90'^ of the soup market (Shepherd, p. 153). 
Computer software (870). Since computer software con­
sists basically of paper products and paperboard products, it 
might upon initial consideration be assigned to the M-L class, 
but the tying contracts of software to hardware throughout 
much of the I960*s suggested that it should properly be placed 
in the substantial class, at least for that time period. 
Credit cards (371). The capital barriers and the 
problems of establishing an organization for the clearance of 
accounts were deemed sufficiently significant to justify the 
placement of the credit card industry in the substantial cate­
gory. 
Refractory materials (872). The declining number of 
firms in this industry and its slightly increasing concentra­
tion ratios led to the decision to assign it to the substan­
tial barrier class (Table B.IO), 
Table B.IO, Some structural characteristics of the clay re­
fractories industry^ 
Year Number of firms concentration ratios 
4-firm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 108 .41 .57 .76 
1954 113 .43 .60 .79 
1958 104 .43 .61 .81 
1963 80 .41 .60 .83 
^Source: PTC (I967, p. 9). 
Mobile homes (873). This industry was put in the 
substantial class rather than the VH class because its scale 
and product differentiation barriers are more near] y like 
those of the truck industry (837) than the automobile jn3ustry(VHl), 
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Cigars (S74). The cigar industry has experienced a 
sizeable decrease in the number of firms and a sizeable in­
crease in its concentration ratios (Table B.ll). The re­
latively large number of remaining firms and the lower pro­
duct differentiation barriers here than in the cigarette in­
dustry were nevertheless deemed sufficient for placing cigars 
in the substantial class. 
Table B.ll. Some structural characteristics of the cigar 
industry^ 
Year Number of firms concentration ratios 
4-firm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 765 
1954 375 
1958 247 
1963 164 
.41 
.44 
.54 
.59 
.57 
.64 
.75 
.81 
.76 
.30 
. 96 
.92 
^Source; PTC (I967, p. 9). 
Silverware and plated ware (879) . The only slightly 
declining number of firms (increasing since 1954) and the 
declining concentration ratios shown in Table B,12 suggest 
that the barriers to entry to this industry may be substantial 
but are not high enough to be termed VH. 
Table B,12, Some structural characteristics of the silvenvare 
and plated ware industry^ 
Year Number of firms con centration ratios 
4-flrm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 221 .61 .72 .82 
1954 190 .61 .72 .83 
1958 198 .54 .67 .79 
1963 201 .55 . 66 .81 
^Source: FTC (I967, P. 15). 
Quarrying (M-L31). Because the number of firms in the 
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cut stone and stone products industry has increased from 624 
in 1947 to 857 in I963 (FTC, 1967, P. 10), and because the 
control of scarce natural resources seems unimportant, this 
industry was placed in the M-L class. 
Dairy products (W-L36). This industry was related to 
fluid milk (M-L3), biscuits, etc., (M-L5), and canned fruits 
and vegetables (M-L19) and placed in the M-L category. 
Asbestos (M-L37)» While there is some control of the 
natural resources of this industry, and there are some attempts 
at product differentiation, the general structure of the as­
bestos industry probably does not differ significantly from 
that of the gypsum industry (M-L14). 
Real estate (M-L38). Land development may have some 
semblance of natural monopoly powers associated with any 
single development, but the range of substitutes seems broad 
enough, especially for firms operating on a nationwide basis, 
to merit the assignment of this industry to the M-L class, 
Adhesives (M-L39). These seemed somewhat similar to 
abrasives (M-L15) and were placed in the same category» This 
decision was also based on considerations of different types 
of adhesives (e.g., chemical, biological), all of which 
compete to some extent. 
Tape and allied products (M-L40)= This industry appears 
to be related to that of plastic fabrication (M-L32) and 
hence was assigned to the M-L class. 
Advertising, educational, and training services (M-L41. 
M-L42), These various services were placed in the M-L barrier 
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class because of their low capital, scale, and absolute cost 
barriers. Product differentiation, though it exists, also 
seems unimportant as a barrier to entry. 
Protection systems (M-L^3). Protection systems are con­
structed primarily of small metal products (M-Ll) and metal 
plumbing fixtures (M-L22), placing them in the M-L class of 
barriers to entry. 
Leisure products (M-IA4). On the assumption that gen­
erally these involved small metal parts (M-Ll), textiles 
(M-LIO), or plastic fabrication (M-L32), leisure products were 
for the most part assigned to the M-L category. Exceptions 
were made in the cases of guns (S67), boats, and bowling 
alleys and pinsetters because these more nearly represented 
large consumer appliances (S4l, S42, S^3) or heavy industriel 
machinery (S5^). 
Retailing and restaurants (M~lA5, M-L48), The barriers 
to entry to these industries were termed M-L because of their 
relatively low capital, scale, and absolute cost berriers. 
The growth of chain outlets and franchises may have fore­
closed entry slightly, but a growing and shifting population 
provides a constantly growing and changing source of demand 
to be tapped by potential entrants. 
Crafts. games. and toys ( M-L46 ). This industry con­
sists primarily of small metal products (M-Ll), paperboard 
products (M-L33)f and plastic fabrication (M-L32). Additional 
evidence from the PTC concerning the games and toys industry 
is relevant: 
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Table B,13. Some structural characteristics of the games and 
toys industry* 
Year Number of firms concentration ratios 
4-firm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 830 .20 .29 .44. 
1954 872 .18 .25 .40 
1958 845 .13 .22 .35 
1963 767 .15 .25 .43 
®Source: FTC (I967, p. 15). 
Printing ink (M-L47). The number of firms in this in-
dustry is no higher than the number of firms in some of the 
industries assigned to the substantial class, but the growth 
in the number of firms, shown in Table B.14, and the declining 
concentration in the industry strongly support the decision 
to assign it to the M-L class. 
Table 6.14. Some structural characteristics of the printing 
ink industry* 
Year Number of firms concentration ratios 
4-firm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 151 .57 .b9 .81 
1954 188 .54 .65 .79 
1958 193 .53 .65 .78 
1963 216 .48 .63 .77 
^Source: FTC (1967, p. 8). 
Insurance (M-L49). This industry was tentatively put 
in the M-L class because insurance firms seem abundant, with 
small ones entering regional markets with relative ease. 
Finance (M-L50). In a very general sense, this in­
dustry includes banks, savings and loan institutions, credit 
unions, finance companies, loan sharks, and Insurance companies. 
While entry into some of these forms of financial institutions 
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is impeded by federal and state regulations, entry into other 
competing segments of the industry is relatively easy. 
Rugs and carpets (M-L51). Because furniture (M-L2) 
and textiles (M-LIO) were classed in the M-L category, so were 
rugs and carpets. 
Writing equipment (M-L52). Bain (p. I69) thought that 
the only significant barrier to entry into the high-quality 
fountain pen industry was that of product differentiation. 
The writing equipment industry of the I960*s involved pri­
marily ball-point pens, though, and In this case the scale 
and capital barriers are even lower than they were for foun­
tain pens. Product differentiation still appears to have 
some importance, but the proliferation of little-known brands 
has been significant enough that the industry barriers were 
classified as M-L. 
Ophthalmic goods (M-L53)» Product differentiation in 
this industry appears to be relatively unimportant (FTC, 19^7t 
p. 15)» The data on the number of firms and concentration 
are mixed (see Table B.15), but the final decision was to 
place the industry in the lowest class. 
Table B.15. Some structural characteristics of the ophthal­
mic goods industry* 
Year Number of firms concentration ratios 
4-firm 8-firm 20-firm 
1947 175 .58 .69 .80 
1954 223 .54 .63 .75 
1958 216 .52 .62 .74 
1963 211 
.53 .62 .77 
^Source: PTC (19^7, p. 15). 
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Soft drink bottlers (M-LS4). In addition to being 
somewhat related to other food processing Industries, the 
bottling Industry was placed In the M-L category because of 
its large number of firms and low concentration ratios. The 
data in Table B.16 suggest that the barriers are growing in 
this industry, probably because of franchising by more popu­
lar national brands, but the sheer numbers involved still 
seem to warrant this decision. 
Table B.16, Some structural characteristics of the soft-
drink bottling industry* 
Year Number of firms concentration ratios 
4-firm 8-firm 20-flrm 
1947 5169 .10 .14 .20 
1954 4334 .10 .14 .21 
1958 3989 .11 .15 .22 
1963 3569 .12 .17 .24 
^Source; FTC (I967, p. 2). 
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APPENDIX C. OTHER TESTS FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY 
Table 0,1. AOV table showing heteroscedasticity amon% 
when B* is used to measure monopoly power 
Source ; df SS F 
Mean 1 12656,47 
Treatments 17 
T 2 2102,20 16,827' 
S 3 696,99 3.719 
B* 1 710.68 11.377' 
TxS 6 310.10 0,827 
TxB* 2 13.03 0,104 
SxB* 3 344,50 1,838 
Error 6 374,79 
^Significant at the five percent level. 
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Table C.2. A.OV table showing heteroscedasticity among 
when B is used to measure monopoly power 
Source: df S3 F 
Mean 1 17560.23 
Treatments 23 
T 2 11029.63 17.342 
S 3 711.46 0.745 
B 2 477.45 0.750 
TxS 6 451.37 0.237 
TxB 4 220.21 0.173 
BxS 6 2642.52 1.385 
Error 12 3815.61 
^Significant at the five percent level. 
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Table C.3» AOV table 
when B* is 
showing heteroscedasticity among Att 
used to measure monopoly power 
Source : df SS F 
Mean 1 17586.84 
Treatments 17 
T 2 13183.98 14.870* 
S 3 516.54 0.388 
B* 1 1132.73 2.555 
TxS 6 583.95 0.220 
TxB* 2 571.02 0.644 
SxB* 3 2006.46 1.509 
Error 6 2659.68 
^Significant at the five percent level. 
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Table C.4, AOV table showing heteroscedasticity among 
variation in reported profit rates for each 
firm 
Source: df ss F 
Mean 1 4290.03 
Treatments 23 
T 2 2790,03 8.890' 
S 3 205.44 0.436 
B 2 1.14 0,003 
TxS 6 506,35 0.537 
TxB 4 274.68 0,437 
SxB 6 19.56 0,020 
Error 12 1882,87 
^Significant at the five percent level. 
